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INTRODUCTION

Humpty Dumpty was sitting, with his legs crossed like a
Turk, on top of a high wall - such a narrow one that Alice
quite wondered how he could keep his balance ....
"Why do you sit out here all alone?" said Alice, not wishing to begin an argument.
"Why, because there's nobody with me!" cried Humpty
Dumpty. "Did you think I didn't know the answer to that? Ask
another."'
Like Lewis Carroll's master of literalism, the Supreme Court
sits alone and authoritative atop a precarious perch. Yet while
Humpty Dumpty's unchallengeable definitions lend meaning to
"the greatest of all nonsense poems in English," 2 the Court faces
the far more daunting task of providing a coherent hermeneutics for
the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.'
To reconcile the conflicting goals of the Code and to coordinate the Code's interaction with other federal statutes and with state
laws, the Court has increasingly embraced a "plain meaning" approach to the statutory text. As developed in a series of recent
bankruptcy decisions under Chief Justice Rehnquist, 4 this doctrine
emphasizes the literal interpretation of Code provisions, placing an
"exceptionally heavy" burden on proponents of any other construction.5 So long as the plain meaning of a Code section is "coherent
I LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLAsS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND
THERE (1896), reprinted in THE ANNOTATED ALICE 261, 263 (Martin Gardner ed.
1960) (hereinafter LOOKING-GLASS).
2 Id. at 191-92 & n. 11. It is to Humpty Dumpty that Alice turns for an explanation of a work that, printed backwards, had required her to "hold up [the page] to a
glass, (so that] the words will go all the right way again." Id. at 191.
"You seem very clever at explaining words, Sir," said Alice.
"Would you kindly tell me the meaning of the poem called
'Jabberwocky'?"
"Let's hear it," said Humpty Dumpty. "I can explain all the
poems that ever were invented - and a good many that haven't been
invented just yet."
Id. at 270.
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988) (hereinafter, the "Code"). Generally, this Article denotes by "section" both sections (e.g., "§ 550") and subsections (e.g.,
"§ 547(b)(1)") of the Code. The term "subsection," however, will refer to subsections only.
4 William H. Rehnquist was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States on September 26, 1986. Of the opinions analyzed at length in
Section II of this Article, only Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986), which has been included as a point of
reference and departure, was not decided by the "Rehnquist Court."
5 Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 530 (1991) (footnote omitted) (ordinary
course of business exception to avoidance of preferential transfers equally applica-

1993]

GRAMMARIANS AT THE GATE

1639

and consistent" with the remainder of the Code and with other statutes, the section's legislative history will generally be deemed
irrelevant.6
However, if the provision as written is "open to interpretation,"
and if bankruptcy law under "the proposed interpretation, [(even if
literal) is] in clear conflict with state or federal laws of great importance," 7 the Court will review the provision's legislative history.
The drafters' intent, as revealed by such an inquiry, will then take
precedence over construction of the provision's "plain meaning.''8
By encouraging a relatively straightforward reading of the
Code, this approach in theory increases the predictability of bankruptcy decisions and thus decreases the volume of litigation over the
statute's construction. In practice, though, the Court has arguably
championed policy over punctuation, and pre-Code predecent over
linguistic logic. The "plain meaning" approach, like the Code itself,
appears structured and principled but actually remains susceptible
to conflicting interpretations and applications. 9 Part II of this Artible to "long-term" and "short-term" debt). See infra notes 176-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wolas.
6 U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (creditor may receive
postpetition interest on nonconsensual oversecured claim). See infra notes 86-128
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ron Pair decision.
7 Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 245.
8 Id. at 245-46.
9 Humpty Dumpty offers inspired and often colorful explanations of the "nonsense" words of "Jabberwocky":
Alice repeated the first verse:'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogroves,
And the mome raths outgrabe."
"That's enough to begin with," Humpty Dumpty interrupted:
"there are plenty of hard words there. 'Brillig' means four o'clock in
the afternoon - the time when you begin broiling things for dinner."
"and what are 'toves'?" ....
'Well, 'toves' are something like badgers - they're
something like lizards- and they're something like
corkscrews."
"They must be very curious-looking creatures."
"They are that," said Humpty-Dumpty: "also they make their
nests under sundials - also they live on cheese."
LOOKING-GLAss, supra note 1, at 270-71.
However, by rejecting his interpretation of a more familiar word, Alice forces
Humpty-Dumpty to reveal the true source of his hermeneutic confidence: " 'But
"glory" doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,' Alice objected. 'When I use a
word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose
it to mean - neither more nor less.' " Id. at 269.
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has moved from addressing the "plain mean-
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cle analyzes the development of the "plain meaning" approach over
the course of thirteen recent opinions, through the Court's 1992-93
term.' ° Part III discusses the ambiguities inherent in the "plain
meaning" approach, and reviews the implications of this
indeterminacy.
II.

CASE STUDIES

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
master - that's all."
Alice was too much puzzled to say anything; so after a
minute Humpty Dumpty began again. "They've a temper,
some of them - particularly verbs; they're the proudest- adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs- however, I
can manage the whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That's
what I say!"
"Would you tell me, please," said Alice, "what that
means?"
"Now you talk like a reasonable child," said Humpty
Dumpty, looking very much pleased."
A.

Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
2
Environmental Protection'

In Midlantic, the Court addressed the interpretation of a
seemingly unambiguous Code provision that had neither a counterpart under the Bankruptcy Act nor a documented legislative
history. Rejecting the literal reading of the Code section in question, the Court held that in enacting the Code, Congress had implicitly incorporated judicial precedent developed under the
Code's predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.1'
Though responsive to emerging legislative concerns regarding environmental protection, the Court-created exception to the
power of abandonment introduced ambiguities that are still being" of specialized terms of the Bankruptcy Code, as embedded in their statutory
context, to interpreting more common phrases that are not regarded as bankruptcy's "terms of art." See infra notes 595-96. Arguably, a similar loss of interpretive certainty will result from this trend.
10 Several other bankruptcy decisions of the Rehnquist Court have not been discussed in depth, but referred to solely for illustration of more general principles.
See, e.g., infra notes 175, 247, 252, 659-76 and accompanying text.
I I LOOKING-GLAss, supra note 1, at 269.
12 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
13 Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (generally dispersed thoughout Title II).

1993]

GRAMMARIANS AT THE GATE

1641

ing resolved by lower courts. More generally, though reconfiguring a straightforward Code provision to conform both to preCode precedent and to post-Code legislation, Midlantic did not
indicate the extent to which such extraneous material would be
relied on by future interpreters of this statute.
1. Background
A processor of waste oil that was responsible for cleaning up
at its New York and New Jersey facilities a total of "470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil"' 4 filed a Chapter
11 petition for reorganization and subsequently converted the
case to a Chapter 7 liquidation. The environmental authorities
of these two states asserted that the trustee's proposed abandonment of the facilities would contravene state laws and regulations
concerning public health and safety. They argued that, if the
trustee's security measures to prevent vandalism, fire, and public
entry were discontinued, the leaking and deteriorating containers
of oil would be far more likely to cause "explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and
injury, genetic damage, or death through personal contact."' 5
Under § 554(a) of the Code, "[a]fter notice and a hearing,
the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and
benefit to the estate."' 6 Observing that the abandonment power
had not been statutory before the enactment of the Code, and
that there existed no legislative history of this section, the Third
Circuit concluded that this power had been derived from judicial
precedent that had subordinated it to public health regulations. ,7
Id. at 499 n.3.
Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, 23).
11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988). The words "and benefit" were added by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, Tit.
III, § 468(a), 98 Stat. 30. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 496.
17 City of New York v. Quanta Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources Corp.),
739 F.2d 912, 916 (3d Cir. 1984) (analyzing City and State of New York's conflict
with trustee) (quoting Ottenheimer v. Whittaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952):
It seems obvious to us that a rule which is not provided by statute
but built up by the courts to facilitate the administration and distribution of the assets of a bankrupt estate should not be extended so as to
reach such an unreasonable and unjust result. The judge-made rule
must give way when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not dealing with a
burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his property by contract, but a
duty and a burden imposed upon an owner of vessels by an Act of
Congress in the public interest.
Id. In Ottenheimer, the Fourth Circuit had refused to allow the trustee to abandon
14
15
16
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Those decisions revealed that "where important state law or general equitable principles protect some public interest, they
should not be overridden by federal legislation unless they are
inconsistent with explicit congressional intent such that the
supremacy clause mandates their supersession by the abandon8
ment power."'
Indeed, the Third Circuit construed at least three separate
sections of the Code as indicating that the abandonment provision was not intended to preempt the exercise of state police
power. First, the automatic stay of § 362 applies neither to a governmental unit's actions to enforce its police or regulatory power
nor to the enforcement of judgments, except money judgments,
obtained by the government in such proceedings. 19 Second,
§ 959 requires the trustee who manages or operates the debtor's
valueless barges that the bankrupt had insufficient funds to maintain or to remove
from the harbor: the anticipated sinking of the barges would obstruct the passage
of other vessels in the harbor, in violation of federal law.
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
683 (1942), the appellate panel, observing that the Bankruptcy Act by its own language did not explicitly supersede the state's power to regulate local railroads, subjected the trustees of a reorganizing railroad to regulations prohibiting the
cancellation of service along a certain railway line. In like manner, the court in In re
Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 BCD 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974), citing the equitable nature of
the bankruptcy court, would allow the trustee to abandon underground steam
pipes, vents and manholes only after the steam openings were filled and sealed.
The Third Circuit reached the same conclusions in the companion case concerning the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's suit against the
trustee. In re Quanta Resources Corporation, 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984). The
majority held that the case "does not present us with a significantly different factual
situation from that presented to us" by the companion case; nor did there appear a
"principled distinction between the issues presented in this case and those
presented in the companion Quanta case in which New York is the appellant. Thus
the analysis and reasoning of 739 F.2d 912 apply equally to the case at bar." Id. at
928.
Similarly, Judge Gibbons's dissent "would affirm that bankruptcy court's order
in this case for the same reasons stated in my dissent in the companion case." Id. at
929.
18 Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 918. The Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
19 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) & (5) (1988), respectively, provide that the automatic
stay does not apply to "the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power" or to "the enforcement of ajudgment, other than a money judgment,
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property to obey relevant state laws.2 ° Finally, § 105 authorizes
the bankruptcy court to "issue any order, process or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions" of
the Code.2 '
The dissent endorsed a more literal reading of the statute,
particularly in the absence of legislative history for § 554(a). Because the petitioners had not challenged on appeal the bankruptcy court's finding that the property was burdensome and of
inconsequential value to the estate, the Code's criteria for abandonment had been satisfield. 2 2 The precedent cited by the majority was far from dispositive, because it had been handed down
before § 554 had allowed trustees to abandon burdensome property.23 Moreover, unlike the automatic stay of § 362, the Code's
abandonment provision as written contains no 24exception prohibiting abandonment in cases of public interest.
obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power."
20 As the court in Quanta Resources Corp. noted:
Except as provided in section 1166 [concerning reorganization of
railroads], a trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause
pending in any court of the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his possession as
such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of
the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the
same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to
do if in possession thereof.
Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 919 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)).
Unlike the trustee, the Third Circuit found this provision applicable to liquidation proceedings:
[Ilt would be an overly literal reading that would dismiss wholly the
import of the provision on the ground that "abandonment" of property is distinguishable from "management" of property. The interests
at stake are not so different; in each case the creditors have an interest
in preserving the debtor's estate so as to maximize their proportionate recovery ....

Id at
21
22
23
24

920.
11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 923.
Id. at 923-24.
Id. at 924. Judge Gibbons explained:
[T]he plain language of [section 554] permits abandonment in this
case; moreover, there is no legislative history to that section providing
any exceptions to the statute or expressing any intent contrary to
abandonment by a trustee of property found to be burdensome or of
inconsequential value. A fair reading of section 554 permits abandonment in this case and thus avoids the constitutional question
presented by the taking clause.
Id. at 925 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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Honoring a Pre-Code Exception

Affirming the Third Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court
inferred that the congressional enactment of § 554 incorporated
the pre-Code judicial requirement of compliance with the restrictions of state and federal law.25
Justice Powell's majority opinion, like that of the Third Circuit, cited not only the existing exceptions from the automatic
stay for government actions, but also the requirement that the
trustee comply with state laws, as evidence that the Code's provisions for the trustee to abandon estate property did not preempt
state environmental law. 26 Responding to the argument that
Congress could have provided similarly explicit limitations on
the abandonment power, the Court observed that the specific restrictions to the automatic stay power had been a congressional
reaction to judicial interpretations between 1973 and 1978 that
had greatly expanded the scope of the automatic stay; by contrast, precedent had "firmly established" at the time of the
Code's enactment the exceptions to abandonment. 27 Finally, the
post-Code enactment of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") 28 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 29
indicated a clear congressional intent to prevent, restrict and
remedy the disposal of hazardous materials.3 0
The bankruptcy court, before authorizing abandonment, was
therefore required to
formulat[e] conditions that will adequately protect the public's
health and safety. Accordingly, without reaching the question
whether certain state laws imposing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy
adjudication itself, we hold that a trustee may not abandon
25 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 500-01. The Court observed that "[t]he normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. ... The Court
has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy
codifications." Id. at 501 (citing Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904) (extraordinary exemptions from nonbankruptcy law are accorded trustee only where
Congress "clearly expressed" them); and Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 85
(1939) (in absence of congressional "language fitting for so drastic a change,"
states' longstanding power over local railroad service was not withdrawn by grant
to district courts of bankruptcy powers over railroads)).
26 Id. at 502-05.
27
28
29

Id. at 504.

42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1988).
30 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505-06.
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property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that
is reasonably designed to
protect the public health or safety
31
from identified hazards.
In a footnote, however, the Court characterized this environmental exception as "narrow":
[i]t does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment.
The abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health
or safety from imminent and identifiable harm. 2
Although the parameters of this exception have been addressed by
many different courts, the trustee's obligation to comply with state
environmental laws in the context of abandonment remains open to
interpretation.3 3
31

Id. at 507 (footnote omitted).

32

Id. n.9.

33 Several courts have required strict compliance. See, e.g., Lancaster v. State of

Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Company), 831 F.2d 118, 122 (6th
Cir. 1987) (whether trustee is liquidating, managing, or reorganizing debtor's estate, environmental hazard on estate's property is within his control and must be
remedied); In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 167-69 (Bankr. D. Mass.1989)
(trustee must comply fully with state environmental laws, unless he does not have
financial resources to satisfy their obligations); In re Peerless Plating Company, 70
B.R. 943, 947 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (generally requiring full observance of
state regulations); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 782 n.7 (D. Me. 1987) (Midlantic does
not entitle bankruptcy court to make what is a quintessential legislative determination - that is, what set of conditions of hazardous waste storage will "adequately
protect the public's health and safety"; such conditions are conditions that will provide for compliance with relevant state and local laws).
Other courts have found the trustee obligated only to prevent imminent harm.
See, e.g., In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 16 (4th Cir. 1988) (before authorizing abandonment, bankruptcy court must determine whether risk of imminent
harm exists in reference to design of state law or regulation alleged to have been
violated; court must then impose conditions that will adequately protect public's
health and safety under this law); Leavell v. Karnes, 143 B.R. 212, 218 (S.D. Ill.
1990) (bankruptcy court must first determine whether property poses immediate
and identifiable threat to public health or safety; if so, court may allow abandonment only after proper steps taken to protect public); In re Shore Company, Inc.,
134 B.R. 572, 578 (Bank. E.D. Tex. 1991) (trustee's right to abandon environmentally impacted estate property is limited only by precondition that trustee remediate
any imminent and identifiable danger present on property proposed to be abandoned); In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) (full compliance
with all environmental laws is not required prior to abandonment, but abandonment is not authorized when there is immediate threat to the public health and
safety and imminent danger of death or illness); White v. Coon (In re Purco, Inc.),
76 B.R. 523, 533 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (permitting abandonment when conditions are such that abandonment will not render public health and safety inadequately protected); In re Oklahoma Refining Company, 63 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr.
W.D. Oki. 1986) (allowing trustee who "has done what is reasonable under the
circumstances" to abandon property where: (1) pollution at debtor's refinery does
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Justice Rehnquist's dissent, which ChiefJustice Burger and Justices White and O'Connor joined, relied first on a literal reading of
§ 554(a). The dissent asserted:
This language, absolute in its terms, suggests that a trustee's
power to abandon is limited only by considerations of the
property's value to the estate. It makes no mention of other
factors to be balanced or weighed and permits no easy inference that Congress was concerned about state environmental
regulations.3 4
Yet the majority had construed the very absence of a specific restriction, along with the lack of relevant legislative history for this provision, as an indication that Congress had tacitly incorporated judicial
precedent into the Code.
Not only did the dissent distinguish the three pre-Code cases
cited by the majority, 5 but it noted that even if those decisions were
seen as directly relevant, "three rather isolated cases do not constitute the sort of settled law that we can fairly assume Congress in-6
3
tended to codify absent some expression of its intent to do so."
Nor could the majority rely on a leading bankruptcy treatise to support the proposition that the environmental exception to abandonment had been "well settled" before the Code's enactment.3 7 Had
not present immediate and menacing harm to public health and safety; (2) abandonment will not aggravate existing situation, create a genuine emergency or increase the likelihood of disaster or intensification of polluting agents; and (3)
whether abandonment is denied or approved, estate has no funds to finance closure
plan or post-closure monitoring).
See NEW JERSEY BANKRUPTCY MANUAL (1993), at 3-158 to 3-160.
34 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). The
dissent suggested that it might be amenable to "a far narrower condition on the
abandonment power than that announced by the Court today, such as where abandonment by the trustee itself might create a genuine emergency that the trustee
would be uniquely able to guard against." Id. at 515 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35 The dissent pointed out that Ottenheimer did not seek to reconcile the Bankruptcy Code with state environmental law, but instead with another federal statute,
which concerned preharbor blockage. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 511-12 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, because Chicago Rapid Transit did not address prerequisites
for abandonment, it should be regarded as dictum with respect to this aspect of the
Midlantic analysis. Id.
Although acknowledging that Lewis Jones, 1 B.R. 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974),
"admittedly comes closer to supporting the Court's position than does Ottenheimer,"
the dissent nonetheless found that "it too turns on the judge-made nature of the
abandonment power. Moreover, I do not believe that the isolated decision of a
single Bankruptcy Court rises to the level of 'established law' that we can fairly
assume Congress intended to incorporate." Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 512 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 512 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
37 Id. Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority's apparent acceptance of the
states' argument, which relied heavily upon a classic pre-Code bankruptcy treatise,
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Congress been so inclined, it could have included in § 554 a restriction analogous to that of § 1170(a)(2), which specifically requires
that the abandonment of railroad lines be "consistent with the pub38
lic interest.
Moreover, § 959(b) applies only to the trustee's management
or operation of the property, and not to a debtor's application to
abandon: the majority's construction of this provision to incorporate into § 554(a) the restrictions of state environmental laws
"would create an exception to the abandonment power without a
shred of evidence that Congress intended one."3 9 Finally, to graft
public interest restrictions onto § 554 under the equitable powers
granted to the bankruptcy court by § 105 "would plainly be contrary
to the purposes of the Code," 4 because the estate's assets, and
therefore future distributions to creditors, would be diverted towards cleanup of the property.
Midlantic, though avoiding ramifications of the Takings and
Supremacy Clauses, alerted the bankruptcy community that a Code
provision's "plain language" could be augmented by considerations
of the pre-Code precedent that Congress, in enacting the Code, had
not explicitly opposed. In addition, the policies expressed in other
Code sections, as well as those endorsed by Congress in more recent statutes, could be used to justify judicially-created amendments, whose precise contours it could be left to the lower courts to
develop.
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1978). Id. (quoting 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
502-04) (14th ed. 1978), to the effect that " '[r]ecent cases illustrate ...that the
trustee in the exercise of the power to abandon is subject to the application of
general regulations of a police nature.' "). See also Quanta v. City of N.Y., 739 F.2d
at 916 (same section of treatise).
Despite the Third Circuit's and majority's reliance on this treatise, Justice
Rehnquist found the source insufficient "legislative history" on which to ground an
interpretation of the Code. Indeed,
the proposition for which the section in Collier is cited is not the view
that authority for abandonment is qualified by state police power, but
instead the much less remarkable position that "[tihe concept of
abandonment is well recognized in the case law. See 4A Collier
P70.42[3]." In order to divine that the statutory power to abandon in
the proposed Code was to be conditioned on compliance with state
police power regulations, therefore, a Senator or Congressman would
not merely have had to look at the legislative history of the precursor
to the Code, but also would have had to read the several-page treatise
section cited in that earlier legislative history.
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 512-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1170(a)(2) (1988)).
39 Id. at 514 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
40 Id at 515 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Kelly v. Robinson 4 1

Kelly, decided the term after Midlantic, similarly concerned
the interaction of the bankruptcy process with state laws-in this
case, with statutes concerning the administration of Connecticut's criminal justice system. Unlike Midlantic, which had relied
on pre-Code precedent to create an exception to the literal language of a Code provision, Kelly involved the interpretation of an
existing Code exception, which concerned the dischargeability of
an individual debtor's debts. In concluding that restitution obligations imposed by state criminal authorities as conditions of
probation are not dischargeable in Chapter 7 proceedings, the
Court not only adopted an uncharacteristically restrictive definition of "debt," but endorsed pre-Code precedent that actually

contradicted explicit provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
1. Background
As a condition of a five-year term of probation for her conviction of larceny in the second degree, Carolyn Robinson was
required to make restitution for $9932.95 of public assistance
benefits that she had wrongfully received from the Connecticut
Department of Income Maintenance ("CDIM"). In November
1980, the Connecticut Superior Court ordered Robinson to make
monthly payments of $100 to the Connecticut Office of Adult
Probation ("COAP"), beginning in January, 1981.42
In early February 1981, Robinson filed a Chapter 7 petition.
Upon obtaining her discharge three months later, she sought a
determination that the restitution obligation was a debt dischargeable under § 727. 4 3 The bankruptcy court, adopting the
41 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
42 Robinson v. Director, Office of Adult Probation (In re Robinson), 45 B.R. 42324 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984). The Supreme Court acknowledged "some uncertainty
about the total amount Robinson was ordered to pay," because five years of
monthly $100 payments would account for only $6000 of the $9932.95 owed by the
debtor. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 39 n.2.
43 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988).
Under § 727(a), to further the
debtor's "fresh start" the court is to grant a Chapter 7 individual debtor a discharge unless the debtor has: fraudulently transferred or destroyed estate property
or records; committed perjury or made a false claim; refused to obey a lawful order
of the court, or, in certain cases, to answer material questions; or has been previously granted a discharge under certain conditions. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)
(1988) (setting forth the effect of a bankruptcy discharge). Section 524 explains
that a discharge
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that
such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the
debtor with respect to any debt discharged under § 727 . . . ; [and]
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analysis of a recent decision on similar facts,4 4 held that, because
COAP and CDIM had no statutory power to enforce their right
to receive restitution payments,4 5 they had no "right to payment"
of restitution and therefore neither a "claim" nor a dischargeable
"debt" as those terms are defined by the Code.46 Moreover, the
court noted, it would be an unsound policy choice to allow
criminals to avoid their restitution obligations by instituting
bankruptcy proceedings. 47 In fact, even if the restitution obligation could be construed as a "debt" within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code, it would constitute a "penalty" that would be
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(7).4 8
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover, or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the
debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived ....
Id. (emphasis added).
44 In re Pellegrino, 42 B.R. 129 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (Pellegrinos' obligation
to make restitution for food stamps that Mrs. Pellegrino had fraudulently received
did not constitute dischargeable "debt" under the Code), cited by Robinson, 45 B.R.
at 424.
45 The penal code of Connecticut, under which restitution was one of nine possible conditions of probation, provides for the criminal defendant to make payments to COAP, which then forwards funds to the victim. This statute does not,
however, furnish a private victim with any means of enforcing the restitution order
against a recalcitrant defendant; nor could the State, in the absence of a direct individual victim of Mrs. Pellegrino's fraud, claim greater rights against her. Pelligino,
42 B.R. at 132-34.
46 Robinson, 45 B.R. at 424-25. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988) (defining "debt"
for bankruptcy purposes as "liability on a claim") and 11 U.S.C. § 10 1(5) (defining
"debt" for bankruptcy purposes). Under § 101(5), "claim" means
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;
or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right for payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured[.]
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1958) (emphasis added.)
47 Pellegrino, 42 B.R. at 134.
48 Robinson, 45 B.R. at 425. Under § 523(a)(7), an individual debtor is generally
not discharged from a debt "to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation
for actual pecuniary loss."
Pellegrino held that
[i]t is a distortion of bankruptcy law and policy to view Code
§ 523(a)(7) as a shield to restitution obligations in the context of this
proceeding.... The bankruptcy laws were not enacted and must not
be interpreted to provide a refuge to criminals. The plaintiffs bargained in state court for Pellegrino's freedom [on the condition that
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Although the district court, in an unpublished opinion, upheld the bankruptcy court's proposed order, the Second Circuit
reversed.49 "First, the literal terms of [the Code's definition of
"claim"] are sufficiently broad - apparently by congressional design - to define as a debt a restitution obligation as to which any
person or entity, not just the crime victim, has a right to payment" 50 ; and, unlike a private victim, COAP had the right to enforce the restitution obligation. Second, policy grounds
supported the inclusion of the right of restitution in the definition of "claim." Although contradicting the great weight of precedent, 5 ' this conclusion avoided "the anomalous result that no
holder of a right to restitution could participate in the bankruptcy proceeding or receive any distributions of the debtor's assets in liquidation.
There is no evidence that Congress intended
52
such a result."

The Second Circuit also rejected the argument that the dischargeability of restitution obligations would provide "a haven
for criminal offenders. 5 3 The court of appeals observed that
this threat had been addressed by the automatic stay for criminal
restitution would be made]. This court will not permit them to escape
the full obligations of that bargain.
Pellegrino, 42 B.R. at 138-39.
49 Robinson v. McGuigan (In re Robinson), 776 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985).
50 Id. at 34. The Second Circuit cited various congressional reports indicating
that "claim" was to be construed as broadly as possible. Id. at 34-35 (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266
(new definition of "claim" in § 101(4) is the "broadest possible definition," under
which "all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will
be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest possible
relief in the bankruptcy court."); and citing the Senate report that accompanied
S.2266, reprinted in BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: HEARINGS ON S.2266 AND
H.R. 8200 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON IMPROVEMENT IN JUDICIAL MACHINERY OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977) (containing identical language to that of § 104(A), and explanation similar to that included in House
Report)).
51 The appeals court found only one reported decision supporting its view that
an obligation to make criminal restitution constituted a debt. In In re Brown, 39
B.R. 820 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984), the bankruptcy court characterized as a "debt"
the debtor's obligation, as a condition of his probation, to pay restitution to an
individual whose property he had damaged while driving "under the influence":
the court reasoned that an equivalent judgment for the victim's compensation
would itself be a dischargeable "debt."
52 Id. at 36. The Second Circuit noted that the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 recognized as a provable claim a judgment ordering restitution of a fixed sum. "Since
Congress intended its definition of 'claim' in the Code to expand the class of obligations that would be dischargeable, it is hardly conceivable that it thought that a
right to restitution provable under the 1898 Act would now be construed as outside
of the Code's broad definition of claim." 1d.
53 Id. at 37 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 342, reprinted in
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actions or proceedings against the debtor.54 In fact, the very
existence of that exception, as well as the explicitly nondischargeable status of debts to or for the benefit of governmental
units for fines, penalties, and forfeiture under § 523(a)(7), supported the view that Congress had not intended to exclude
criminals entirely from the protection of the Code's provisions.
In the context of this careful statutory balance of interests, "it is
inappropriate for a court, based on its own view as to the relative
importance of [any] policy, to create judicial exceptions to the
clear language of the statute that are warranted neither by that
language nor by the legislative history." 5 5
Unlike the bankruptcy court, the Second Circuit held that
COAP had an enforceable right to receive restitution payments
from the debtor, even though the amount of the payments had
been fixed by the Connecticut sentencing court and even though
the debtor stood to lose her freedom, rather than her property,
as a penalty for noncompliance. 5 6 Therefore, the debtor's obligation qualified as a "debt" within the meaning of the Code.5 7
On the issue of dischargeability, the appeals court found "no
question" but that the first two criteria for dischargeability under
§ 523(a)(7) had been met: Robinson's debt was to some extent a
"penalty" for her crime, and it was payable "to and for the benefit of a governmental unit." 58 The debt did not fall within the
scope of this section,5 9 however, because the debtor's obligation
was actually compensatory. First, the state statute involved allowed the state court to order a criminal to "make restitution of
the fruits of his offense or make restitution, in an amount he can
afford to pay or provide in a suitable manner,for the loss or damage
caused thereby." 6 ° Second, notwithstanding any compensatory
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299; and S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837).
54 Under § 362(b)(1), the automatic stay does not apply to "the commencement
or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor[.]" 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(b)(1) (1988).
55 Robinson, 776 F.2d at 38 (citations omitted).
56 Id. at 38-39.
57 See supra note 46.
58 Robinson, 776 F.2d at 40.
59 Id. at 40-41. Because the relevant Connecticut agencies had not timely objected to the discharge, as required by § 523(c), the debt might have been nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2) (concerning debts "for obtaining money, property
[or] services" by false pretenses, fraud, or a fraudulent writing) or § 523(a)(4) (concerning debts "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny"). Robinson, 776 F.2d at 39.
60 Id. at 40 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a)(4) (West 1985 & Supp.
1993)) (emphasis added).
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conditions of probation, the "actual pecuniary loss" involved was
in the exact amount of the loss suffered by the CDIM. Third,
though the restitution payments were made by the debtor to
COAP, they were forwarded to CDIM. 6 '
The Second Circuit thus reversed the district court's order
and remanded the matter to that court for an order declaring the
debtor's restitution obligation discharged, as well as an order enjoining COAP and CDIM from taking steps to recover further
restitution payments. 62 In a concurring opinion, one judge suggested that Congress amend § 523(a)(7) to prevent "the unfortunate result compelled by the [literal] language of the relevant
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code."' 63

To preclude convicted

criminals from declaring bankruptcy as a means of discharging
their restitution obligations, Judge Mansfield asserted, courts
would be forced to impose punishments in the form of fines, penalties, or forfeitures, which would not qualify as nondischargeable under that subsection.64
2. Adopting Precedent Contradicting the Bankruptcy Act
The Supreme Court's majority opinion, delivered by Justice
Powell, reversed the Second Circuit. As opposed to that court of
appeals, the high Court began from the position that "the [statutory] text is only the starting point [to be considered] in light of
the history of bankruptcy court deference to criminal judgments
and in light of the interests of the States in unfettered administration of their criminal justice systems. 65
Before the enactment of the Code, courts had generally
agreed that a bankruptcy discharge would not affect state criminal judgments that had been rendered against the debtor. 66 Indeed, the Court could locate only one federal decision in which a
criminal court sentence had been affected by the criminal's discharge under the Bankruptcy Act.6 7 This common policy choice
had diverged, however, from the plain intent of § 57(j), § 63 and
§ 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, which respectively: rendered unallowable debts owed to government entities; enunciated the scope
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 41-42 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
Id. at 41 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43-44 (citations omitted).
Id. at 45-47.
Id. at 45 n.6 (citing In re Alderson, 98 F. 588 (W. Va. 1899) (discharge releases
debtor from judgments assessed against him prepetition in connection with misdemeanor of unlawful retailing)).
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
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of debts to be released upon discharge (without exception for
criminal penalties); and exempted four specific groups of debts
(not including criminal penalties) from discharge. 68 The majority
attributed the reluctance of prior courts to follow the terms of
the Act to "a deep conviction that federal bankruptcy courts
should not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings, 6 9
or "limit the rehabilitative
and deterrent options available to
70
state criminal judges.

In what might be called an instance of judicial jiu-jitsu, the
Supreme Court cited the Bankruptcy Act's own depth and detail
as evidence that contrary judicial precedent should be incorporated into the Code. 7 ' After briefly reviewing the Midlantic decision, in which "we declined to hold that the new Bankruptcy
Code silently abrogated another exception created by courts construing the old Act," ' 72 the Kelly Court insisted that the Code's
literal terms were "subject to interpretation, ' 73 and that the legislative history of § 523(a)(7) did not support the conclusion
"that this language should be read so intrusively" as to discharge
a debtor's state-ordered obligation of restitution.7 4 Indeed, controversy would have marked the legislative history had such a significant change in existing practice been intended.75
Similarly, despite the language and legislative history that
would justify a broad construction of dischargeable "debts" as
defined by § 101 (4), the Court's examination of the "state of the
law ' 76 before the enactment of the Code raised "serious doubts"
that Congress had intended to include criminal penalties within
this definition.77 Finally, although three members of the Kelly
majority had not been satisfied in Midlantic by a leading bankruptcy treatise's summary of pre-Code law, 78 here that same commentary was cited with approval for the proposition that "fines
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 49.
See id. at 46 ("Congress enacted the Code in 1978 against the background of
an established judicial exception to discharge for criminal sentences, including restitution orders, an exception created in the face of a statute drafted with considerable care and specificity.").
72 Id. at 47.
73 Id. at 50.
74 Id. at 50.
75 Id. at 51.
76 Id. at 50 n.12.
77 Id. at 50.
78 See supra note 37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Midlantic
court's treatment of Collier on Bankruptcy.
68
69
70
71
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and penalties are not affected by a discharge." ' 79
In analyzing § 523(a)(7), the Court agreed with the Second
Circuit that Robinson's restitution obligations were for the benefit of the state.80 Unlike the court of appeals, however, the majority found that these obligations were not intended to compensate
the victim, but rather to further the state's "penal and rehabilitative interests.""' The noncompensatory character of these payments was supported by the victim's failure to control either the
decision to award restitution (which generally hinged on the
state's penal goals and the defendant's situation, rather than on
the harm caused) or the amount awarded. 2 The majority also
observed that the Connecticut statute at issue afforded eight possible alternatives, as well as a catchall provision, for probation
arrangements. As one of these alternatives, the restitution option called for the court to fix the amount and manner of the
defendant's restitution "in an amount he can afford to pay or
provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused
83
thereby."

In holding that the debtor's restitution obligations were not
dischargeable, the Court cast itself as preserving the integrity of
criminal proceedings in state court.8 4 By contrast, it observed,
the Second Circuit's holding would inevitably have compelled
state prosecutors to defend state criminal judgments in federal
bankruptcy court, and would have affected the state criminal
judges' choice of alternatives among imprisonment, fines and
85
restitution.

Justice Marshall's dissent, which was joined by Justice Stevens, suggested that the majority had adopted an unnatural construction of § 523 (a) (7) and of Connecticut's probation statute in
order to nullify the State's failure to object timely to the dis79 Kelly, 479 U.S. at 46 (quoting 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1609-10 & n.10
(14th ed. 1978)). The Court found that the inability of a discharge in bankruptcy to
modify a criminal judgment against the debtor "was so widely accepted by the time
Congress enacted the new Code that a leading commentator could state flatly that
'fines and penalties are not affected by a discharge.' " Id.
80 Id. at 53. The Court reached this conclusion "[blecause criminal proceedings
focus on the State's interest in rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim's desire for compensation." Id.
81 Id. (footnote omitted).
82 Id. at 52-53.
83 Id. at 52 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-30(a)(4) (West 1985 & Supp.
1993).
84 Id. at 47.
85 Id. at 48 (footnote omitted).
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charge of the debtor's restitution obligations.16 On a more theoretical level, the dissent understood that "[w]hile restitution
imposed as a condition of probation under the Connecticut statute is in part a penal sanction, it is also intended to compensate
victims for their injuries," as evidenced by the statute's explicitly
linking the amount of restitution to "the loss or damage caused"
by the defendant."7 In this connection, it was irrelevant that the
victim could not control either the imposition of an obligation of
restitution or its amount. 8 Moreover, instead of abrogating the
pre-Code precedent that held fines and penalties nondischargeable, Congress had in the Code both "codified that law and added
the requirements of section 532(a)(7)." ' 89

The majority's characterization of the debtor's restitution
payments as "to and for the benefit of a governmental unit" had
been satisfied in the present situation because the debtor had defrauded a state agency. In cases where the victim was not itself a
governmental unit, however, the majority's conclusion could be
sustained only on the more general principle that all restitution
payments benefit the government, and thereby all governmental
units, by preserving order. Yet "if the requirement is to be read
so broadly . . .any fine, penalty, or forfeiture would be for the

benefit of a governmental unit, making this qualification in section 523(a)(7) superfluous. " 90 In addition, the restitution obligation could hardly avoid being characterized as a "debt" under the
Code's sweeping definitions of "debt" and "claim."' As the
Second Circuit had concluded, the "right of payment" held by
COAP should be no less effective if Robinson's nonpayment of
restitution obligations would be grounds for her incarceration,
rather than for levy and execution upon her property.9 2
Finally, the majority's considerations of the relative authorities of state and federal courts could be seen as more properly
within the jurisdiction of Congress. Like the Second Circuit's
concurrence, the Supreme Court's dissent suggested that ConId. at 53-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 55 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
89 Id. at 55 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
90 Id. at 56 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 309 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5808, 6266 ("claim" to be given "broadest possible definition"); and
Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705, 708 (1985) (Congress desired broad definition of
"claim")).
92 Id. at 57 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86

87
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gress could, "if it were so inclined ....

amend the Bankruptcy

restitution obligations nondisCode specifically to make criminal
93
chargeable in bankruptcy.

The dissent's arguments would soon win the day in a case
strikingly similar on its facts.
3.

Sounding the Retreat? Pennsylvania Dept. of Public
94
Welfare v. Davenport

Four terms after handing down Kelly, the Court adopted a
closer reading of the Code in declaring that restitution payments
imposed as conditions of probation in state criminal actions were
dischargeable in chapter 13 proceedings. Deferring not to preCode policy, as it had in Kelly, but instead to the literal language
of the statute, the Court found itself "guided by the fundamental
canon that statutory interpretation begins with the language of
' Justice Marshall's majority opinion salvaged
the statute itself."95
a key argument of his Kelly dissent: that the Code's broad definitions of "debt" as "liability on a claim," and of "claim" as a
"right to payment," included those restitution claims enforced by
the state's threat of incarceration for nonpayment.96
The United States, as amicus on behalf of the Department of
Public Welfare, argued that restitution obligations could be pursued by an exemption provided under § 362(b)(1) from the automatic stay of "the commencement or continuation of a criminal
action or proceeding against the debtor. ' 97 However, the Court
concluded that "the language [and] the structure of the Code as
a whole" undercut this reasoning: not only did that section not
specifically exempt actions to collect restitution obligations, but
"Congress could well have concluded that ...

in the context of

Chapter 13, a debtor's interest in full and complete release of his
obligations outweighs society's interest in collecting or enforcing
a restitution obligation outside the agreement reached in the
Chapter 13 plan." 98
The United States also argued that the parity between the
treatment of claims in chapters 7 and 13 restricted to civil fines
93 Id. at 58-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
94

495 U.S. 552 (1990).

95 Id. at

557-58.

Id. at 557-58 (quoting §§ 101(11) and 101(4)(A).
97 Id. at 560 (quoting § 362(b)(1)).
98 Id. at 560-61.
96
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and penalties the exception to discharge. Section 1325(a)(4) 99
mandates that a chapter 13 plan leave creditors at least as well off
as they would have been in chapter 7; yet § 726(a)(4) provides
only a fourth priority to allowed claims for "any fine, penalty or
forfeiture .

.

. to the extent that suchfine, penalty, or forfeiture, or

damages are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered
by the holder of such claim."' 0 0 Surely, Congress could not have
intended to accord such a low priority to criminal fines and
penalties! 1
The Court disposed of this contention by observing that
Kelly's analysis of § 523(a)(7) had construed "fine, penalty, or
forefeiture" as including criminal fines and penalties. 10 2 Indeed,
if "debt" were read to exclude criminal restitution orders,
§ 523(a)(7)'s "codification of the judicial exception for criminal
restitution orders" would be rendered superfluous. 10 3 Finally,
Congress had deliberately balanced the attractiveness of chapters
7 and 13 by granting chapter 13 debtors a wider range of discharge: some of § 523(a)'s exceptions to discharge, including
§ 523(a)(7)'s exception for debts arising from a "fine, penalty, or
forfeiture," are not applicable to chapter 13 proceedings.' 4
The majority distinguished Kelly by the very principle of statutory interpretation that Midlantic, and Kelly itself, had endorsed:
"We will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy
practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a
departure."105 Although Kelly's examination of "past bankruptcy
practice" had revealed a pre-Code aversion to disturbing state
criminal judgments through bankruptcy proceedings, such an investigation would not be warranted in Davenport, where "the statutory language [of § 1328] plainly reveals Congress's intent not
99 Section 1325(a)(4) imposes as a condition of confirmation that a chapter 13
plan ensure that
the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured
claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if
the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title
on such date.
loo II U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1988) (emphasis added).
101 Kelly, 495 U.S. at 561.
102 Id. at 561-62. Although in Davenport "[tihe United States acknowledge[d] that
the phrase 'fine, penalty, or forfeiture' as it appears in § 726(a)(4) must have the
same meaning as in § 523(a)(7)," id., the Court would later find much more troublesome the principle that a phrase retains the same meaning in different sections of
the Code. See infra notes 597-602 and accompanying discussion.
103 Id. at 562.
104 Id. at 563.
105 Id. at 563 (citing Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47 (in turn citing Midlantic)).

1658

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1636

to except restitution orders from discharge in certain Chapter 13
proceedings." 106
Justice Blackmun's Davenport dissent, which was joined by
Justice O'Connor, looked beyond the literal language of the
Code to conclude that the majority's interpretation produced "a
result demonstrably at odds with the intention of [the Code's]
drafters."' 10 7 First, neither the statutory definition nor its legislative history indicated that obligations resulting from criminal restitution orders constituted "rights to payment," or claims, that
gave rise to debts that could in turn be discharged in chapter 13
proceedings.08 Second, to allow such obligations to be discharged would contradict the pre-Code precedent, examined at
length in Kelly, of respecting both the "history of bankruptcy
court deference to criminal judgments and ...the interests of the

States in unfettered administration of their criminal justice systems."' 0 9 The dissent's own analysis revealed that "under the
1898 Act... criminal monetary sanctions were not 'debts' for the
purpose of pre-Code bankruptcy proceedings.""
Nor did the Code's broad definition of "debt" provide a
clear indication that in enacting the Code Congress had intended
to change this practice. Indeed, Kelly itself had explicitly rejected
such an argument, holding that "nothing in the legislative history
of these sections compels the conclusion that Congress intended
to change the state of the law with respect to criminal judgments.""' Moreover, the legislative history indicated that
"[t]he
' 12
bankruptcy laws are not a haven for criminal offenders." "
The enactment of § 523(a)(7), observed the dissent,
106 Id.

At the time of the Davenport decision, § 1328(a), which specifies the types

of debts that are not dischargeable after the debtor has completed all payments
under his chapter 13 plan, did not mention restitution obligations. However, Congress subsequently amended this section to include as nondischargeable "debts for
restitution included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(a)(3) (1990), added by the Crime Control Act of 1990, PUB. L. No. 101-647,
§ 3103, 101 Stat. 4789, 4916, and Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, PUB. L.

No. 101-581, § 3, 104 Stat. 2865, 2865 (providing identical language).
107 Davenport, 495 U.S. at 565 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Ron Pair, 489
U.S. at 242 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
108 Id. "The statute, on its face, is not self-defining and surely does not compel
the result that criminal restitution orders constitute 'debts.' " Id. at 567 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 567 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Kelly, 479 U.S. at 44).
110 Id. at 569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
III Id. at 570 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting Kelly, 479 U.S. at 50 n.12).
112 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 342, codified at 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6299 (reviewing extent of automatic stay)).
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does little to demonstrate clear congressional intent to change
traditional pre-Code practice. Even if [that section] can be interpreted as making criminal restitution orders not dischargeable, this does not mean that Congress intended to make
criminal restitution orders debts. Under pre-Code practice,
nondischargeability of a criminal restitution order would be
evidence that it was not a debt at all. Congress gave no indication that it intended to break with this pre-Code conception of
dischargeability when it enacted § 523(a)(7)."'
Justice Blackmun thus maintained that Davenport precisely the
spectre that Kelly had sought to dispel: that sentencing courts would
be encouraged to impose prison sentences rather than restitution
obligations, because convicted criminals could evade the latter but
not the former by seeking the protection of chapter 13. Observed
the dissent, "Congress surely would not have enacted legislation
with such an extraordinary result without at least some discussion of
its consequences."' 14
Although called into question by the Davenport decision, the
logic of Kelly, like that of Midlantic, undermined any reliance on a
literal approach to the Bankruptcy Code. Yet if Midlantic and Kelly
clearly illustrated the use of legislative history to overcome the
Code's "plain meaning," the Court would soon refine its approach.
The next major decision on the interpretation of the Code would
find the Justices split over the criteria for resorting to an examination of legislative history. It would also mark the Court's rejection
of a specific set of precedent as insufficient to establish a pre-Code
practice that Congress could tacitly have imported into the Code.

C.

U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc."

5

In Ron Pair, the Court rejected the presumption of Midlantic
and Kelly that, in enacting the Code, Congress had adopted those
existing judicial constructions that it did not explicitly reject.
Under the new test, the legislative history of a provision would be
relevant to its interpretation only if the provision itself was susId. at 572 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Cf Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279,
290-91 (1990) (standard of proof for dischargeability exceptions in § 523(a) is ordinary "preponderance of the evidence" standard; because, at the time of Code's
enactment, courts continued to be nearly evenly split over appropriate standard of
proof, it would not be reasonable to conclude that in enacting this section Congress
silently endorsed background rule that "clear and convincing" evidence is required
to establish exemptions from discharge).
115 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
113
114
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ceptible to a reasonable interpretation that clearly conflicted with
important state or federal legislation.
Analyzing the effect of a strategically-placed comma so as to
endorse the "plain meaning" of the provision in question, the
Court nonetheless considered precedent to the contrary, if only
to dismiss these decisions as mere guides for the exercise of the
court's equitable powers.
1. Background
Ron Pair addressed whether the federal government was entitled to postpetition interest on its oversecured claim for unpaid
withholding and social security taxes, which claim had been perfected through a tax lien on the chapter 11 debtor's property.
Central to the analysis was the degree to which the Code should
recognize the pre-Code distinction between voluntary and involuntary secured claims.
If a creditor's claim against an estate is secured by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest, Bankruptcy Code
§ 506(a) divides the claim into a secured claim, to the extent of
the value of the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in the
property, and an unsecured claim, in the value of the remainder
of the allowed claim.' 1 6 Section 506(b) entitles the creditor to
postpetition interest on the secured claim, provided that the
claim is still oversecured after the value of the benefit to the
holder of the trustee's preserving and disposing of the property
is deducted from the value of the property:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by
property the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such
claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges
Section 506(a) provides that
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in
which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of
such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to
the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is
an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of
such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the
purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of
such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
116
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providedfor under the agreement under which such claim arose." 7
In asserting diametrically opposed interpretations of this provision, the parties advanced arguments both grammatical and historical. The debtor read the emphasized clause to modify both
"interest on such claim" and "any reasonable fees, costs, or
charges," and so to incorporate pre-Code precedent restricting
postpetition interest to oversecured consensual (i.e., contractual)
claims. The Justice Department, however, saw the clause as modifying only "reasonable fees, costs or charges," and asserted that Congress had intended to provide for postpetition interest on
oversecured nonconsensual claims as well.
The district court, relying on the "plain meaning" of the statutory section, reversed the bankruptcy court's judgment for the
debtor." 8 In turn reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit began its own analysis by finding that the ambiguity of the statute rendered pre-Code precedent relevant." 9 The court of appeals
observed that a "well-established general rule" had once prohibited
postpetition interest on both secured and unsecured claims, on the
grounds that the allowance of such interest would have penalized
those creditors to whose claims low interest rates applied, and
would correspondingly have benefited those creditors whose claims
involved higher interest rates.12' Among the judicial exceptions that
had arisen, however, was the allowance, to creditors with oversecured claims, of postpetition interest, to the extent that the value
2
of the collateral would support the payment of such interest.' '
117 Id. § 506(b) (emphasis added).

118 United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. (In re Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.),
59 A.F.T.R. 2d 87-386, 86-2 U.S.T.C. P 9642, 1986 WL 10091 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
The court's two-paragraph opinion relied on In re Colegrove, 771 F.2d 119 (6th
Cir. 1985) and In re Best Repair Company, Inc., 86-1 U.S.T.C. P 9408, No. 85-1907
(4th Cir. 1986) to support its conclusion that the plain language of Section 506(b)
entitled the United States to post-petition interest on its over-secured pre-petition
tax claim.
119 United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 828 F.2d 367 (6th Cir. 1987). The
appeals court cited Midlantic and Kelly to the effect that "pre-Code law should be
reviewed in order to better understand the context in which the provision was
drafted and therefore the language itself." Id. at 370. The court also rejected the
government's contention that this rule applied only if the pre-Code law involved
overriding considerations of public policy: under a "well-established principle in
bankruptcy law," the court could presume, in the absence of explicit indications to
the contrary, that Congress had not intended "to deviate from the judicially created
rule." Id. at 370 n.4.
120 Id. at 370.
121 Id. at 370. The other two exceptions arose where (1) the debtor was proven
to be solvent and (2) where the property in which the creditor has a security interest produced income postpetition. Id.
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This principle would give the benefit of the bargain to the oversecured creditor that had been able to extract beneficial contract
terms and valuable collateral from the debtor prepetition. But because this analysis did not apply to tax liens or to other nonconsensual liens, postpetition interest would not be allowed on such
claims, even if they were oversecured. 22
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the debtor that § 506(b) should
be read as codifying this judicially-created pre-Code exception. 2 3
This court of appeals dismissed the Fourth Circuit's own "plain
meaning" approach to the provision, 24 reasoning that the Fourth
122 Id. at 371 (citing In re Kerber Packing Company, 276 F.2d 245, 247 (7th Cir.
1960) (finding "a very clear distinction" between lien at issue, which was "a general
lien perfected pursuant to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and [that]
attaches upon all property and right to property, whether real or personal" and
liens involved in cases allowing postpetition interest on oversecured creditor's
claim, because each lien of the latter type addressed "a voluntary transaction between the debtor and creditor [in which] the payment of interest was contemplated
by the parties"); United States v. Highell, 273 F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1959) (observing that no assertion made that government's claim for postpetition interest on
income tax penalties fell within exceptions to general rule prohibiting postpetition
interest); United States v. Bass, 271 F.2d 129, 131-32 (9th Cir. 1959) (noting in this
context "a meaningful distinction . . . between statutory and contractual liens");
and United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719, 721-24 (4th Cir. 1959) (questioning
relevance of precedent allowing postpetition interest on "liens upon specific property of the bankrupt growing out of a contract between him and the creditor," because with one exception "no case found by us [on postpetition interest] involves a
statutory lien upon all of the assets of the bankrupt.")
Two additional considerations distinguish tax liens from consensual liens.
First, as opposed to contractual liens, tax liens often encumber all of the debtor's
property, instead of a specific asset. Id. Moreover, because other creditors have no
means to compel the debtor to pay its taxes in full, and thus to prevent the accrual
of postpetition interest, "[t]o penalize these creditors for the bankrupt's inability to
pay its taxes on time violates all notions of equity." Id. at 371 n.6.
Yet, as the Supreme Court would note in rejecting the Sixth Circuit's analysis,
"modem commercial lending practices have changed, and it is not unusual
for
commercial lenders to obtain a lien on almost all of the debtor's property." Ron
Pair, 489 U.S. at 247 n.9.
123 Id. at 371-72. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit cited as support for
this interpretation the opinions of "[sleveral bankruptcy courts, and at least one
district court and one commentator [i.e., Collier on Bankruptcy]." Id. at 371. That
treatise construed the placement of the comma after "interest on such claim," in
§ 506(b) to reflect the drafters' intent that interest was to be allowed only on the
claim, and not on any other amount. Id. "This commentator notes, however, that a
logical explanation for the comma is to allow for postpetition interest on nonconsensual lien claims, although [it] admittedly is not of that view." Id. (citing 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 506-43 & n.10 (15th ed. 1987)).
124 In In re Best Repair Co., the court observed that in § 506(b)
[t]he phrase "interest on such claim" is set off by commas, and the
following phrase is introduced by "and any." The effect of this usage
is to make "interest on such claim" a separate and distinct clause to
which "provided for under the agreement" does not apply. If Con-
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Circuit had improperly dismissed considerations of pre-Code
law. "2' 5 There had been no explicit indication in the legislative history of the Code that Congress had abandoned the pre-Code exception; nor would the insertion of a comma and the words "and any"
26
before the final phrase of § 506(b) suffice to express this intent.'
2.

Reinterpreting Midlantic and Kelly

Reversing the Sixth Circuit's decision,

27

the Supreme Court

gress had wanted the agreement proviso to limit "interest on such
claim" to consensual claims, it could easily have done so by listing
seriatim and in parallel form the different items an over-secured creditor can recover subject to an agreement. Though Congress could
have more clearly separated the interest clause from the agreement
clause, we think that the natural meaning of its chosen words is to
permit post-petition interest on nonconsensual oversecured claims.
789 F.2d 1080, 1082 (4th Cir. 1986) (footnotes omitted). The Fourth Circuit offered two alternate constructions that Congress could have employed had it intended to effect the opposite result, id. n.2, which result "strains the plain meaning
of the language and grammar of the provision" as enacted. Id. at 1082.
125 The Sixth Circuit indicated that
[i]n our view, the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Best Repair is weakened by its subsequent acknowledgment that "§ 506(b) is not so clear
that we would not consider its legislative history to aid our interpretation," and because it reaches its conclusion without a thorough discussion of pre-Code law, perhaps concluding that pre-Code law is
only relevant if the language is ambiguous. In light of Midlantic and
Kelly, we believe such an approach is flawed. Rather, where it is
claimed that the Code has significantly altered an existing judicially
created concept, courts should review pre-Code law since it may be
discovered that the language, when viewed in the proper historical
context, is not unambiguous but is actually subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation.
Ron Pair, 828 F.2d at 372-73 (quoting Best Repair, 789 F.2d at 1082).
126 Id. at 373.
127 The Sixth Circuit had been joined by the First Circuit, in In re Newbury Cafe,
Inc., 841 F.2d 20,22 (lst Cir. 1988) (legislative history of postpetition interest
awards "wholly inconclusive," and does not rebut initial inference, under Midlantic,
that enactment of § 506(b) was not intended to change existing law). Indeed, Newbury Cafe noted that the two other exemptions to the rule prohibiting postpetition
interest had been "preserved intact" in the Code. Id. Section 552(b) generally
allows, where provided for by the terms of a security agreement and by applicable
nonbankruptcy law, the application of prepetition security interest to postpetition
proceeds, products, offspring, rent or products of the collateral. 11 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (1988). Section 726(a)(5) authorizes payment of postpetition interest on
priority claims, allowed unsecured claims, and
any allowed claim, whether secured on unsecured, for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary or punitive damages,
arising before the earlier of the order for relief or the appointment of
a trustee, to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture or damages
are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder
of such claims.
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5).
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exhibited a reluctance to look beyond the "plain language" of
the Code, which Congress had labored over "for nearly a decade" before its enactment. 28 In a direct repudiation of Midlantic's and Kelly's principle of tacit congressional acceptance of preCode precedent, the Court in Ron Pairheld that Congress, in effecting "a substantial overhaul of the [bankruptcy] system,"
could hardly have been expected "to have explained with particularity each step it took."'1

29

Because the legislative history would

not necessarily supply indications of congressional intent, there
would be no need to penetrate beyond the Code's plain language
unless a party's interpretation of that language threatened the
statute's coherence or consistency. 0 Indeed, the literal reading
of the Code should control, unless it would "produce a result
31
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."' '
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion quickly concluded that
"[t]he language before us expresses Congress' intent - that
postpetition interest be available - with sufficient precision so
that reference to legislative history and to pre-Code practice is
hardly necessary."' 132 The presence of commas around the interest phrase in the statute, which allows "to the holder of such
claim, interest on such [oversecured] claim, and any reasonable fees,
costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which
such claim arose,"'13 3 indicated that such postpetition interest is
independent of the presence or absence of an agreement relating
to a consensual lien. Bluntly, the Court held that "[t]he language
and punctuation Congress used cannot be read in any other
way." ' 34 Thus, "[b]y the plain language of the statute, the two
types of recovery [for consensual and nonconsensual liens] are
distinct." 3 5 This construction of the statute's plain language did
not conflict with "any other section of the Code, or with any imAgreeing with the Sixth Circuit, the First Circuit concluded that "[a] comma,
often a matter of personal style, is a very small hook on which to hang a change in
the law of substantial proportions." Newbury Cafe, 841 F.2d at 22.
128 Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 240.
129 Id. at 241. On the other hand, it could be inferred from the lengthy drafting
period of the Code not only that substantial revisions had been made to the Act,
but that sufficient time had been available for Congress to have documented at least
the major changes that the Code effected.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 242 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571
(1982)).
132 Id. at 241.
'33 Id. (quoting II U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988)) (emphasis added).
134 Id. at 242 (footnote omitted).
135 Id. (footnote omitted).
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portant state or federal interest; nor is a contrary view suggested
by the legislative history." 136
The Court also found that the Sixth Circuit's interpretation
of § 506(b) as preventing postpetition interest on oversecured
nonconsensual liens would conflict with the other subsections of
§ 506, which themselves did not distinguish between consensual
and nonconsensual liens.'37 The application of § 506(b) only to
consensual liens could have been rendered explicit by the use of
the phrase, "security interest," which the Code defines, and elsewhere uses, for this purpose.' 38
Promulgating a new test, the Court held that the examination of legislative history should be limited to those situations in
which both (1) the "statutory language which, at least to some
degree, [is] open to interpretation"'3 " and (2) "under the proposed interpretation, [the Code provision is] in clear conflict with
136 Id. at 243 (footnote omitted). Although its own standard thus rendered an
examination of pre-Code precedent unnecessary, the Court nonetheless observed
that the pre-Code practice of allowing postpetition interest to holders of consensual liens but not of nonconsensual liens
was an exception to an exception, recognized by only a few courts and
often dependent on particular circumstances. It was certainly not the
type of "rule" that we assume Congress was aware of when enacting
the Code; nor was it of such significance that Congress would have
taken steps other than enacting statutory language to the contrary.

...More importantly, this "rule," in the few cases where it was
recognized, was only a guide to the trustee's exercise of his powers in
the particular circumstances of the case ....
[T]he doctrine does [not
do] anything more than provide a bankruptcy court with guidance in
the exercise of its equitable powers.
Id. at 246, 248.
137 Id. at 242 n.5.
138 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(45) (1982 & Supp. IV) [now § 101(50)] (defining
"security agreement" as an "agreement that creates or provides for a security interest"; 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(12),(13) (1982 & Supp. IV) (automatic stay not applicable
to certain actions to foreclose security interest in or relating to vessel or vessel
under construction, or fishing facilities); 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1982 & Supp. IV) (defining "cash collateral" with reference to property subject to security interest under
§ 552(b)); 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)-(5) (1982 & Supp. IV) (new value and other exceptions to trustee's avoidance power); 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. IV) (postpetition effect of security interest); 11 U.S.C. § 752(c) (1982 & Supp. 1982) (disposition
of cash or security remaining after liquidation of customer interest); 11 U.S.C.
§ 11 10(a) (1982 & Supp. IV) (right of secured party with purchase-money security
interest in aircraft equipment and vessels to take possession of such equipment); 11
U.S.C. § 1168(a) (1982 & Supp. IV) (concerning same right with respect to rolling
stock equipment); and 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV) (restricting ability
of plan to modify rights of holders of certain security interests)).
139 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 245.
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state or federal laws of great importance." 4 ' The Court explained
that neither of those conditions had been met in Ron Pair, which
involved a statute that clearly directed that postpetition interest
be paid on all oversecured claims. The "natural" interpretation
of the provision in question "does not conflict with any significant state or federal interest, nor with any other aspect of the
Code." 4 '
Justice O'Connor's dissent, which was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, found that the comma appearing
at the end of the phrase, "interest on such claim," did not diminish the relevance, to the allowance of postpetition interest, of the
consensual or nonconsensual nature of the oversecured claim.
Were the comma to be removed, the provision at issue would
allow to the holder of an oversecured claim "interest on such
claims and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for
under the agreement under which such claim arose."'14 2 By this reading,
unless such interest were the subject of a provision in a consensual agreement, it could not be awarded to the claimant. 4 ' The
statute's inclusion of the words "and any" would not affect this
140 Id. (emphasis added). The Court distinguished Midlantic as an instance in
which "we looked to pre-Code practice for interpretive assistance" because a literal
construction of the Code provision at issue would apparently have contradicted the
intention of the Code's drafters. The Court found evidence of that intention expressed in: "other provisions of the Code itself," in lack of congressional indication that nonbankruptcy law was being overturned, and in federal environmental
statutes. Id. at 244.
Kelly, the Court observed, concerned a Code provision that was similarly "subject to interpretation," and for which, "as in Midlantic, pre-Code practice was significant because it reflected policy considerations of great longevity and importance."
Id. at 244-45 (footnote omitted).
141 Id. at 245.
Although the payment of postpetition interest is arguably somewhat in tension with the desirability of paying all creditors as uniformly as practicable, Congress expressly chose to create that alleged
tension. There is no reason to suspect that Congress did not mean
what the language of the statute says.
Id. at 245-46.
142 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
143 Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 250 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The
dissent drew support from the Court's own precedent to the effect that punctuation
is not dispositive in the construction of a statute. Id. (citing Simpson v. United
States, 435 U.S. 6, 11-12 n.6 (1978) (disregarding punctuation in construing statute); Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U.S. 85, 91 (1925) (punctuation not controlling element in interpretation); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341 (1932) (punctuation
not decisive); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 479-80 (1899) (ignoring
punctuation); Ewing v. Burnet, 11 U.S. (1 Pet.) 41, 43-44 (1837) (analysis of punctuation to be employed only as last resort)).
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analysis. 144
The dissent rejected the majority's conclusion that the remainder of § 506(b) did not distinguish between consensual and
nonconsensual liens. Because § 506(b) itself refers to charges
"provided for under the agreement under which such claim
arose," the provision could be said to recognize consensual liens,
and the "reasonable fees, costs, or charges" could only be the
result of a consensual lien. i45 Contrary to the majority's suggestion, Congress would have had no need to refer to "security
in1 46
distinction.
a
such
establish
to
section
this
in
terests"
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's holding that
the statutory language addressed by Midlantic had not been
"open to interpretation." Indeed, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Midlantic had acknowledged as much. 47 The majority in Ron Pair
had misconstrued Midlantic and Kelly to prohibit consideration of
legislative history unless the statute itself was ambiguous and the
interpretation at issue conflicted with the Code or with other
laws. In fact, though, "[t]he rule of Midlantic is that bankruptcy
statutes will not be deemed to have changed pre-Code law unless
there is some indication that Congress thought that it was effecting such a change. "148
Rather than identifying an ambiguity and then determining
whether the interpretation advanced was hostile to existing statutes, the dissent derived its own two-step test from Midlantic's
analysis. "[T]he first step... is to ascertain whether there was an
established pre-Code bankruptcy practice" 149; the second step is
"to look for some indicia that Congress knew it was changing
pre-Code law."' 150 Yet the unpredictability inherent in this approach would concern precisely the issues addressed in Midlantic
and Kelly: could Congress be presumed to have documented
every change of policy? Moreover, is judicial precedent (or a
treatise's commentary on the same) the only indication of preCode bankruptcy practice? And what degree of support or docuId.
Id. at 251 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
147 Id. at 252 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor compared the majority's assertion that "Midlantic 'concerned statutory language which.., was open to
interpretation,' " id. at 245, with Justice Rehnquist's Midlantic dissent, to the effect
that the language of § 554(a) is "absolute in its terms," Ron Pair,474 U.S. at 509
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Id. at 252.
148 Id. (citations omitted).
149 Id. at 253 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 253, 254 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
144
145
146
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mentation will be sufficient to demonstrate that a pre-Code practice had been "established?"
Under the dissent's test, Justice O'Connor argued, the Code
should be seen as incorporating prior practice on postpetition
interest, for several reasons. First, the pre-Code practice of refusing to allow postpetition interest on nonconsensual liens "was
more widespread and more well established than the practice in
Midlantic." Second, knowledge of this practice could be imputed
to Congress at the time of the Code's enactment. Finally, the
legislative history of § 506(b) did not indicate Congress's intention to change this policy.' 5 '
Ron Pair'sstandard for the relevance of legislative history remains indeterminate in several respects. First, the "degree" to
which a provision is "open to interpretation" is itself subject to
question. Indeed, it is within the Court's power, as in Ron Pair,to
declare flatly that a disputed provision is not amenable to any
other than a "plain meaning" interpretation, and thus that no
ambiguity exists. 15 2 Indeed, though the disagreement of circuit

courts of appeal on the interpretation of a given Code provision
would strongly suggest that the provision was "open to interpretation," Justice Scalia has on at least two occasions reproved the
"legal culture" for advancing arguments that might have been
53
disposed of by a literal reading of the Code.
Second, even an ambiguity of sufficient stature to be deemed
"open to interpretation" might not merit legislative history analysis if the interpretation advanced is found not to present a
"clear" conflict with existing statutes. As in Midlantic, which
bowed to the environmental goals enunciated by Congress, and
Kelly, which deferred to the states' power to administer their
criminal justice systems, courts could explicitly subordinate the
interpretation of Code provisions to the aims of other statutes.
Alternatively, the Code's own goal could trump those of other
statutes. In either situation, however, the court in question
would be examining the legislative history, if any, not of the particular Code section at issue, but of the Code and/or other stat151 Id.
152 Under the strictest reading of Ron Pair, a court could refuse to consider any
interpretation other than a literal construction of a Code provision unless that
"plain meaning" itself led to "a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of
its drafters." Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242-43. Of course, this begs the question of
whether the provision is "open to interpretation," by assuming that there is only
one literal interpretation of the statute.
153 See infra notes 203, 425.

1993]

GRAMMARIANS AT THE GATE

1669

utes as a whole. Nor did Ron Pairindicate what would constitute
a "clear conflict."
Finally, the Court provided no indication of which state or
federal laws were to be considered "of great importance." Presumably, the hierarchy of statutes could vary with the context of
the issues and interests at stake. In fact, for a given context,
newly enacted legislation could alter the order of priorities.
Thus, the Ron Pair test for the relevance of legislative history
would, if anything, make the interpretation of the Code less
predictable. 54
In precluding alternate interpretations of the Code, Ron Pair
left unsettled the outlines of Midlantic's test for the relevance of
the Code's legislative history. Nor did the Ron Pair opinion
enunciate any general tests or standards for determining whether
Congress had been aware of a given pre-Code practice or precedent, and, if so, whether Congress had sought to eliminate it in
enacting the Code. Finally, Ron Pair demonstrated the Court's
increasing tendency to review an ambiguous section of the Code
in the context of other Code provisions, and, in particular, to correlate the terms of one subsection with those of neighboring subsections. The degree to which this last technique could be
applied effectively would be a significant focus of later "plain
55
meaning" decisions.
D.

156
Toibb v. Radloff

Endorsing a literal reading of the Code, the Court in Toibb,
154 Complicating this entire analysis is the fact that the Code itself, which surely
constitutes a statute "of great importance" for purposes of the Ron Pair analysis,
embraces conflicting policies: the "equity policy" of "distribut[ing] a troubled
company's assets through the equal sharing of losses by creditors of equal rank is
often at odds with the "reorganization policy" of "restructuring a business to preserve jobs, to pay creditors, [and] to produce a return for owners." MARTINJ. BIENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 1-2 (1988).
In consumer bankruptcy proceedings, the counterpart to the "reorganization
policy" is commonly known as the "fresh start" policy, but gives rise to many of the
same conflicts. Thus, "[t]he fresh start for debtors, a chance for a person in financial collapse to begin anew, is an appealing idea, until one confronts the inevitable
fact that it permits people to walk away from their obligations and to break their
promises." TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 20 (1989)
(noting also that policy of protecting each creditor from other creditors to achieve
fairest collective result actually bars "creditors from taking action to protect themselves, a right that the rest of the law enshrines and vindicates.").
155 See infra notes 597-602 and accompanying text.
156 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991).
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reversing a decision of the Eighth Circuit in holding that chapter
11 reorganizations are available to individual nonbusiness debtors.'5 7 Indeed, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion began with
the observation that, "[i]n our view, the plain language of the
Bankruptcy Code disposes of the question before us."'1

58

Under-

lying the certainty of this analysis may have been the neat interlocking of Code provisions to produce a syllogistic conclusion.
Nevertheless, the dissent managed to detect an ambiguity that
would allow the introduction of legislative history to support a
contrary interpretation. Perhaps because the issue did not turn
on the meaning of only one section of the Code, neither the majority nor the dissent referred to the statutory approach of
Midlantic, Kelly and Ron Pair.
1. Following the Logic
The interconnection of the relevant Code provisions was not
difficult to perceive. First, the Code limits eligibility for Chapter
11 relief to "a person that may be a debtor under chapter 7 of
this title, except a stockbroker or a commodity broker, and a railroad."' 159 Second, Chapter 7 relief itself is deemed available to
all "persons" except for railroads and certain financial institutions. 60 Finally, the Code defines "person" to include individuals. 6 ' Therefore, the statutory provisions on their face would
render an individual eligible for chapter 11 protection. Moreover, the specific exclusions of certain classes of debtors from the
157 Id. at 2202. Eleven months after filing a chapter 7 petition in November 1986,
Sheldon Baruch Toibb filed a motion to convert the case to a chapter 11 proceeding. Id. at 2198. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, but subsequently issued an order to show cause why Toibb's case should not be dismissed for failure
to qualify as a chapter 11 debtor. Id. After a hearing, Toibb was found not to be
engaged in an ongoing business; the court, under the authority of Wamsganz v.
Boatmen's Bank of DeSoto, 804 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1986) (predicating individuals'
eligibility for chapter 11 protection on their involvement in an ongoing business),
ordered that the proceeding be dismissed if Toibb did not, within ten days, convert
his case back to a chapter 7 proceeding. Id. at 2198-99. The district court affirmed
this order. Id. at 2199. Neither the bankruptcy court's nor the district court's decision was reported. In re Toibb, 902 F.2d 14, 14 (8th Cir. 1990).
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, without elaboration, both "the Bankruptcy Court's finding that Mr. Toibb did not qualify as a business entitled to Chapter 11 protection" and the dispositive effect of Wamsganz on the bankruptcy court's
legal analysis. Id.
158 Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2199.
159 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1988).
160 Id. § 109(b).
161 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1988). This definition appeared at § 101(35) (1988) at
the time of the Toibb decision.
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coverage of chapters 7 and 11 indicated to the Court that
although "Congress knew how to restrict recourse to the avenues
of bankruptcy relief; it did not place Chapter 11 reorganization
beyond the reach of a nonbusiness individual debtor. "162
The Court firmly rejected any inference from the Code's legislative history and structure that these debtors were excluded
from chapter 11 protection. Not only was the legislative history
irrelevant unless the statutory language was unclear, 6 3 but it was
in fact ambiguous at best on the possibility of such chapter 11
proceedings.' 64 The presence of chapter 11 provisions explicitly
referring to business debtors 65 demonstrated no more than the
"understandable expectation that chapter 11 would be used primarily by debtors with ongoing businesses[,]" and certainly did
not constitute "an additional prerequisite for chapter II
16 6
eligibility."'

Justice Stevens's lone dissent adopted a more holistic view of
the Code. Although chapter 11 relief is statutorily available "only
to [a] person that may be a debtor under Chapter 7,"167 this Justice observed, it was not necessarily intended to be available to
every such debtor.' 68 This ambiguity justified an examination of
the Code's legislative history, which satisfied Justice Stevens that
chapter 11 relief was not applicable to individual nonbusiness
debtors.' 6 9 The dissent emphasized several considerations, including: (1) the "repeated references" to the business and management of the debtor, both in chapter 11 itself and in the Senate
Toibb, 111 S.Ct. at 2199.
Id. at 2200. Curiously, the Court referred here not to Midlantic, Kelly, or Ron
Pair, but to an earlier, nonbankruptcy decision for the general proposition that
"[w]here, as here, the resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute and
the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language and then to the
legislative history if the statutory language is unclear." Id. at 2200 (quoting Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984)).
164 d. (citing H.R. REP. No. 596, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787 (offering "consumer debtors" the choice only between
chapter 13 and "straight bankruptcy" (presumably chapter 7)); and S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5789 (chapter 11
relief applicable to individuals, but its procedures are too complex to be used in
"consumer context")).
165 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988) (authorizing appointment of equity security holders' committee) and 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988) (authorizing appointment of trustee where debtor's "current management" deficient or dishonest)).
166 Id.
167 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
168 Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2202 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 2203-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162
163

1672

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1636

Report's analysis of that chapter 7 0 ; (2) the House Report's limitation of consumer relief to chapters 7 and 13171; (3) the description of chapter 11 merely as "Reorganization," as opposed to the
titling of chapter 13 as "Adjustment of Debts of an Individual
With Regular Income,"1 72; (4) the absence in chapter 11, but not
in chapter 13, of upper limits for the secured and unsecured
debts of individual debtors 7 3 ; and (5) the ability of a creditor,
under the majority's analysis, to institute an involuntary chapter
11 proceeding against nonbusiness individuals, although the
Code explicitly
prohibits such proceedings in chapter 13
74
matters. 1

Toibb, then, indicates that even a seemingly ironclad chain of
logic might be snipped by a creative approach to the ambiguities
inherent in the language of the Code. 175 Once the gate had been
170

Id. at 2202-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

171 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1977)).
172 Id. at 2202 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Cf. LOOKING-GLASS, supra note 1, at 253
(" 'Must a name mean something?' Alice asked doubtfully. 'Of course it must,'
Humpty Dumpty said with a short laugh.").
173 Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2203-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 2204 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1988) (involuntary cases may be commenced only under chapter 7 or chapter 11)).
175 Justice Stevens's appreciation of statutory ambiguity and of the corresponding importance of an examination of legislative history were similarly in evidence in
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992). In reversing the Second Circuit by holding that an interlocutory order issued by a district court sitting
as a court of appeals in bankruptcy is appealable, Justice Thomas's majority opinion
adopted a literal approach to the statutes at issue: 28 U.S.C. § 1292 provides that
courts of appeals have jurisdiction over "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts
of the United States," and 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) grants courts of appeals jurisdiction
over appeals from all final decisions, judgments, orders and decrees entered by
district courts of bankruptcy appellate panels hearing appeals from final and interlocutory orders of bankruptcy courts.
Citing Ron Pair,the Court observed that "[w]e have stated time and again that
courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in
a statute what it says there ... when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,
this first canon is also the last ..
" Id. at 1149 (citations omitted). Because 28
U.S.C. § 1292 did not distinguish between review of orders issued by district courts
sitting as trial courts in bankruptcy from those issued as appellate courts, and because no section of title 28 appeared to limit review to the former, "[t]here is no
reason to infer from either § 1292 or § 158(d) that Congress meant to limit appellate review of interlocutory orders in bankruptcy proceedings." Id. at 1150.
In a three-paragraph concurrence, which did not cite Ron Pair,Justice Stevens
reminded the Court that "[w]henever there is some uncertainty about the meaning
of a statute, it is prudent to examine its legislative history." Id. If, in enacting the
current system of bankruptcy appeals through the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAJFA"), PuB. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, "Congress had intended such a significant change in the scheme of appellate jurisdiction
[as excluding review by the courts of appeals of certain interlocutory bankruptcy
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opened to the domain of legislative history, the arguments in
favor of a "non-literal" reading of the statute grow even
stronger.
E.

76
Union Bank v. Wolas1

It was Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter in Toibb, who six
months later delivered a majority opinion that applied the "plain
meaning" approach to eliminate any distinction between "short
term" and "long term" loans in the context of the "ordinary
course of business" exception to the preference rule. Though
the Court explicitly restricted the scope of its inquiry to examining "short term" versus "long term" loans. Justice Scalia's brief
concurrence suggested that, given the plain language of the provision in question, the question should never have arisen. Apparently abandoning the conclusion of Ron Pair that considerations
of legislative history had no place in the interpretation of a sufficiently straighforward statutory provision, the Court in Wolas
championed the plain meaning of a provision completely rewritten by Congress in the enactment of the Code.
By emphasizing that Congress has no duty to indicate or to
elaborate on all of the changes that the Code had been intended to
effect in existing practice, Ron Pairhad dramatically enhanced the
Court's power to preclude considerations of legislative history.
Now, by announcing that it would uphold the logical consequences of a rewritten provision of the Code, even if these implications were unintended by Congress, the Court hewed even more
closely to the literal language of the Code.
1. Background
Generally, the Code allows bankruptcy trustees expansive
power to "avoid," or reverse, any transaction that was made: (1)
within ninety days before the debtor's bankruptcy; (2) when the
debtor was insolvent; (3) to benefit a creditor; (4) on account of
antecedent debt; and (5) to enable the creditor to receive more
than it would have in a liquidation of the debtor. 77 One of the
orders], some indication of this purpose would almost certainly have found its way
into the legislative history. The legislative record, however, contains no mention of
an intent to limit the scope of § 1292(b). This silence tends to support the conclusion that no such change was intended." Id.
176 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
177 Under § 547(b), the trustee may generally
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
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seven exceptions to the trustee's avoidance power involves transfers that were "made in the ordinary course of 'business
and fi78
nancial affairs of the debtor and the transferee."'
Herbert Wolas, the chapter 7 trustee for ZZZZ Best, Inc., attempted to recover, as preferential transfers, several interest payments and loan commitment fees that the debtor had made on an
eight-month revolving credit agreement during the six months
before it filed for bankruptcy. 179 In an unreported opinion, the
bankruptcy court found the "ordinary course" exception applicable to these payments. It rejected Wolas's argument that ZZZZ
Best, as the operator of a "Ponzi," or pyramid, scheme, had no
ordinary course of business. 8 0 The district court affirmed.''
On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed on different
grounds, citing its prior decision that the ordinary course of business exception did not extend to sheltering interest payments on
long-term debt.'
Although the lender attempted to distinguish
the loan to ZZZZ Best as prepayable at any time and as having
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such
transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
178 Under section 547(c)(2), the trustee may not avoid as a preference a transfer
to the extent that such transfer was
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms.
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988).
179 Wolas v. Union Bank (In re ZZZZ Best Co., Inc.), 921 F.2d 968, 969 (9th Cir.
1990).
180 Id. For an illuminating profile of the debtor's pre-bankruptcy operations, see
JOE DOMANICK, FAKING IT IN AMERICA: BARRY MINKOW AND THE GREAT ZZZZ BEST
SCAM (Knightsbridge, New York 1989).

181 1989 WL 263387 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
182 Wolas, 921 F.2d at 969 (citing In re CHG International, Inc., 897 F.2d 1479
(9th Cir. 1990)).
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conditioned the debtor's access to funds on the debtor's keeping
current with interest payments, the court "fail[ed] to see any significant difference between a revolving line of credit and an ordinary loan for purposes of § 547(c)(2)."' s Nor did the eightmonth term of the revolving loan exclude it from the category of
"long-term loans" - this court of appeals had previously characterized as long-term a loan for only seven months. 184
2.

Upholding Implications, Even if Unintended

Because the text of the exception did not address the term of
the debt for which the allegedly preferential repayment had been
made,' 85 and because the Code did not in fact distinguish between long-term and short-term debt, 86 the Court declined to
restrict to short-term debt the application of the "ordinary
87
course" exception.'

Although Ron Pair had declared that the analysis of sufficiently unambiguous language would not address considerations
of legislative history, Justice Stevens interpreted that decision to
imply that "[g]iven the clarity of the statutory text, respondent's
burden of persuading us that Congress intended to create or pre88
serve a special rule for long-term debt is exceptionally heavy."
This Justice therefore embarked on an extended examination of
the legislative history of § 547.
The version of the statute originally enacted in 1978 as part
of the Code specified that the ordinary course of business exception applied only to payments made within forty-five days after
the debt had been incurred.' 8 9 This qualification had been repealed by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
185 Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 530.
186 Id. n.7.
187 Id. at 530 (citing U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989)).
188 Id. (citing Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 1030-31).
189 The original version of § 547(c)(2) excepted a transfer from the trustee's
avoidance powers
(2) to the extent that such transfer was(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms.
Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 530 n.8 (quoting 92 Stat. 2549, 2598 (1978)) (emphasis added).
183
184
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Act of 1984.9' The Court declined to speculate on Congress's
intentions in deleting this language, since "[t]he fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect
to its plain meaning." 191
Nor did the Court accept the argument that § 547(c)(2) had
originally been enacted to codify a judicially-created "current expense" exception to the preference rule, which had allowed the
debtor to pay its (presumably short-term) trade creditors and
other suppliers even as bankruptcy approached. Indeed, § 547
provided other exceptions to address this concern. 92 Moreover,
there was no "extrinsic evidence" that Congress had intended to
codify the current expense rule 9 3 ; that rule had apparently not
even been mentioned in the legislative history. 9 4 In short, "the
fact that Congress carefully examined and entirely rewrote the
preference provision in 1978 supports the conclusion that the
text of section 547(c)(2) as enacted reflects the deliberate choice
of Congress."

95

On a policy level, the Court identified two separate goals of
the Code's preference provision, § 547: to prevent creditors eager to recover their assets from a failing business from "racing to
the courthouse," and to distribute the debtor's assets equally
among the creditors.' 9 6 Although the "ordinary course of business" exception to the trustee's avoidance power would favor the
190 PUB.

L. No. 98-353, § 462(c), 98 Stat. 333, 378.

191 Wolo.s, 112 S. Ct. at 531 (citing Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S.Ct. 2197 (1991)).

192 As the Court observed, id.
at 532 n.13, under § 547(c)(1), a trustee may not
avoid a transfer to the extent that the transfer was "(A) intended by the debtor and
the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and (B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange." 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1988).
Similarly, under § 547(c)(4), transfers are exempted from the trustee's avoidance powers to the extent that they are
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such
transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the
debtor(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest;
and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an
otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such
creditor.
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988).
193 Wolas, 112 S.Ct. at 532.
194 Id. n.14.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 532-33 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6137, 6138).
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recipients of the transfers in question at the expense of other
creditors, it would discourage these recipients from starting, or
joining in, the feeding frenzy that would pull a drowning debtor
under for the third time. Noting that "the statutory text - which
makes no distinction between short-term debt and long-term
9
debt- precludes an analysis that divorces" the two policies,, 7
the Court held that "[w]hether Congress has wisely balanced the
sometimes conflicting policies underlying § 547 is not a question
that we are authorized to decide."' 9 8 Nor did it determine
whether the $7 million revolving credit agreement that the
debtor had entered into seven months before filing a chapter 7
petition was a long- or short-term debt' 99 ; whether the payments
of interest and the loan commitment fee, made during the 90
days before bankruptcy in the approximate aggregate amount of
$102,500, qualified for the ordinary course of business exception 20 0 ; whether the loan in question had been incurred in the
ordinary course of business of both parties20 '; or whether the
payments had been made in the ordinary course of business and
according to ordinary business terms. 2
In a one-paragraph concurrence, Justice Scalia chided:
It is regrettable that we have a legal culture in which such
arguments have to be addressed (and are indeed credited by a
Court of Appeals), with respect to a statute utterly devoid of
language that could remotely be thought to distinguish between long-term and short-term debt. Since there was here no
contention of a "scrivener's error" producing an absurd result, the plain text of the statute should have made this litigation unnecessary and unmaintainable.2 °3

In the Court's next "plain meaning" case, this Justice's expres197 id. at 533.

Id.
199 Id. at 529 n.5. The Court explained: "Because we hold that the ordinary
course of business exception applies to payments on long-term as well as shortterm debt, we need not decide whether the revolving line of credit was a 'longterm' debt." Id.
198

200

201
202

Id. at 533.
Id.
Id. at 533-34.

203 Id. at 534 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia did not indicate, however, that
the Ron Pair test would specifically have ruled out an inquiry into the legislative
history of the preference provisions. Nor did this Justice address the means by
which a "scrivener's error" could be distinguished from a statutory section that
permitted unintended consequences.
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sion of disappointment with bankruptcy's "legal culture" would be
not only more detailed but also much more impassioned.
F.

20 4
Dewsnup v. Timm

Where Wolas had found the Court unwilling to accept nonliteral interpretations of a Code provision specifically rewritten
by Congress, Dewsnup, like Midlantic and Kelly, conversely demonstrated the Court's reluctance "to effect a major change in preCode practice that is not the subject of at least some discussion in
the legislative history. "205 Accordingly, in affirming Tenth Circuit precedent that denied chapter 7 debtors the ability to "strip
down" the liens of undersecured creditors, the Court held that
such debtors have no statutory right to redeem overencumbered
property by tendering to creditors its market value. However, an
extended and unusually caustic dissent by Justice Scalia suggested that the "plain meaning" approach espoused by the
Court's recent bankruptcy decisions had been carried to such an
extreme that each separate subsection of the Code was now being interpreted in isolation, thereby jeopardizing not only the integrity of the Court's methodology but the collective coherence
of its decisions.2 °6
1.

Background

In 1978, to collateralize a loan of $119,000, Aletha Dewsnup
and her husband granted a lien on two parcels of farmland.
Three years later, after Mr. Dewsnup had died and Mrs. Dewsnup
had defaulted on the loan, the secured creditors filed a notice of
default. However, Mrs. Dewsnup averted foreclosure proceedings by petitioning for liquidation under chapter 7.2o7 By 1987,
the outstanding loan balance had reached $120,000. At this
point, Dewsnup brought an adversary proceeding before the
bankruptcy court to "strip down" the value of the lien to the
property's fair market value of $39,000.28 If this relief had been
granted, she would have been able to recover title to the property, free and clear of liens, simply by paying the fair market
204 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992). The following discussion has been adapted with
permission from that presented in Walter A. Effross, Debtors Stripped of 3d Cir. Right
to Strip Liens, 130 N.J.LJ. 707 (1992).
205 Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779.
206 Id. at 779-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 776. Originally, Mrs. Dewsnup had filed two chapter 11 petitions, but
both were dismissed. Id.
208 Id.
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value to the lienholders. However, the bankruptcy court, °9 the
district court (in an unreported opinion) and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 210 refused to allow the
lien to be stripped down. Noting that the Tenth Circuit and the
Third Circuit had disagreed on the relevant legal issues, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In bankruptcy proceedings, each claim filed against the
debtor is automatically deemed "allowed," and thus qualified for
repayment, unless an objection to the claim is filed by the trustee
or debtor-in-possession, or by another creditor. 2 1'

However,

the allowed claim of a creditor who is undersecured "by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest" is bifurcated by
§ 506(a): the undersecured creditor is deemed to hold a secured
claim in the amount of his interest in the collateral, and an unsecured claim for the deficiency.21 2 In Dewsnup's case, the creditors' allowed claim of $120,000 was thus divided into an allowed
secured claim of $39,000 (the court-determined value of the
property) and an allowed unsecured claim of $91,000, the remainder of the claimed amount.
Since overencumbered property can provide satisfaction
only to those creditors who hold a secured interest in this collateral, under § 554 the trustee may abandon this property as "of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate [i.e., to all other
creditors].

'2 3

Exempted from the bankruptcy estate and re-

turned to the debtor, abandoned property is no longer protected
by the automatic stay and other bankruptcy provisions, but is immediately vulnerable to the secured creditors' state law remedies
of foreclosure.
Dewsnup attempted to deter such foreclosure by citing
§ 506(d), which provides in relevant part that "[t]o the extent
that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void."' 21 4 Arguing that this provision voided the $91,000 unsecured claim that had been created by
§ 506(a), the debtor asserted that she could thus redeem the
209 Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 87 B.R. 676 (Bankr. D. Utah. 1988).

210 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990).
211 Section 502(a) provides that "[a] claim or interest, proof of which is filed
under section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . ..
objects." 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988).
212 See supra note 116 for the full text of § 506(a).
213 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 554.
214 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
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abandoned property merely by retiring the $39,000 allowed secured claim.
Before the bankruptcy court, the secured creditors noted
that the form of relief sought by Dewsnup is provided for by
§ 722.215 However, while that section allows a debtor to redeem
abandoned property by paying to lienholders the amount of the
allowed secured claim, such redemption is available not for real
property but only for "tangible personal property intended for
2 16
personal, family or household use."1
Thus, Dewsnup's attempt

to construe § 506(a) to redeem real property would contradict
the specific provisions of § 722, and, by implication, the intention
of Congress.
Though this statutory argument would persuade the Tenth
Circuit, the bankruptcy court held that the rejection of the
debtor's claim was not "compelled by the language of the
Code. ' 2 17 Instead, the court saw § 506 as intended to limit, to
the amount of estate property securing a creditor's lien, the creditor's abilities to: reject a plan; avoid cramdown; realize the
equivalent of his secured claim; make a § 1111 (b) election; or receive the first distributions in a liquidation.2 1 a
Since abandoned property is not part of the estate, and since
rights to such property are unaffected by the bankruptcy process,
the court found it "inconceivable" that Congress would have intended to permit chapter 7 debtors to avoid creditors' liens on
abandoned property.21 9 Such an unauthorized expansion of the
debtor's rights would deprive the creditors of their entitlement to
foreclose against the property, and thus of their ability not only
to set a minimum sale price (by bidding the amount of the debt)
but to benefit from any appreciation in the value of the property
(by waiting to sell into a rising market). The bankruptcy court
Under § 722,
An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived
the right to redeem under this section, redeem tangible personal
property intended primarily for personal, family or household use,
from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt, if such property
is exempted under section 522 of this title or has been abandoned
under section 554 of this title, by paying the holder of such lien the
amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by
such lien.
11 U.S.C. § 722 (1988).
216 Id.
217 Dewsnup, 87 B.R. at 680.
218 Id. at 682.
219 Id. at 683.
215
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dismissed Dewsnup's complaint with prejudice. The district
court affirmed summarily, without appending an opinion.
a. Split Between the Tenth and Third Circuits
In affirming the district court's opinion and observing that
"[t]he estate has no interest in, and does not administer, abandoned property,

' 220

the Tenth Circuit specifically distinguished

its approach from that of the Third Circuit in Gaglia v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association.22 ' There, the residence of individual chapter 7 debtors, which had an alleged value of $34,000, was
encumbered with a first mortgage in the amount of $29,000 and
a second mortgage for more than $200,000. The Third Circuit
voided the junior mortgage to the extent that it exceeded the
$5,000 of available equity in the property.
The Gaglia creditors, like the Tenth Circuit, read § 506(d) in
conjunction with § 506(a). In their analysis, because abandoned
property such as overencumbered real estate is no longer subject
to the operation of the Code, such property does not qualify
under § 506(a) as "property in which the estate has an interest."
Section 506(a), therefore, could not be applied to claims secured
by liens on overencumbered property, and thus could not separate from such claims unsecured portions to be avoided by the
debtor under § 506(d).
But the Third Circuit held that this reading of § 506(a)
"would seem to conflict with the plain meaning" of § 506(d).222
In addition, whether or not the debtor had any equity in the
property, the estate had an "interest" in the debtor's legal title to
property secured by a mortgage.223 Finally, Gaglia noted that a
creditor whose lien was secured by abandoned property could
more efficiently assert his claim through the bankruptcy process
than foreclose on the property, and that the creditor's participation in the bankruptcy proceeding
"would aid the overall admin224
istration of the estate.

Among the subsidiary issues over which the Third and Tenth
Circuits clashed were:
Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 590-91.
889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1308.
Id. In Dewsnup, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the debtor's interest in legal title
to the property was disposed of when the property was abandoned. Dewsnup, 908
F.2d at 591.
224 Gaglia, 889 F.2d at 1308 n.5.
220
221
222
223
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Import of § 722. The Third Circuit held that § 722 does not
render redundant § 506, which "is not a redemption provision. "225 Even after the unsecured claim created by § 506(a) was
avoided under § 506(d), the debtors would remain subject to the
first mortgage on the property and would be liable to the junior
mortgagee for the remaining equity in the property.
Though agreeing that § 506 is not a redemption provision,
the Tenth Circuit concluded that "the rationale of [Gaglia] mandates that it become one. ' 22 6 The Tenth Circuit read § 722's inapplicability to the redemption of real property as indicating that
Congress did not intend to provide such relief to a chapter 7
debtor. However, unlike the Gaglias, Dewsnup was apparently
prepared to tender to lienholders her property's market value in
cash, and would, under the Third Circuit's analysis, then own the
property free and clear of any liens. To the Tenth Circuit, "[t]his
result [was] both inequitable and unfair and would constitute an
expansion of7debtors' rights far beyond what is contemplated in
22
the Code.

Appreciation of the Property. The Third Circuit noted that
"stripping down" a creditor's lien to the value of his secured interest would not only diminish the amount that the debtor would
have to repay in order to recover clear title but might also enable
the debtor to negotiate a more favorable repayment schedule. If
the junior mortgagee's lien were not stripped down, the debtor
might have little motivation to build equity in the property, since
this creditor could foreclose on their equity at any time.228
Even after the Gaglias had been discharged, a creditor not
involved in the bankruptcy proceedings could foreclose to obtain
a deficiency judgment. The court concluded that "applying
§ 506 here is called for not only by the language of that section,
but will further the Code's policy of providing the debtor with a
fresh start.

' 2 29

Moreover, the Third Circuit found that the appli-

cation of this section would not harm the second mortgagee,
whose total recovery - either through the bankruptcy process or
through foreclosure on the abandoned property- would be limited to the excess of the fair market value of the property over the
230
balance outstanding on the first mortgage.
225
226
227
228
229
230

Id. at 1310.
Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 542.
Id. at 592.
Gaglia, 889 F.2d at 1308.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1308.
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The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting that only at a foreclosure sale, and not within the bankruptcy process, could a
lienholder itself purchase the property as an investment, hoping
that its value would rise. The Third Circuit's analysis, by assuming that an outside party would acquire the property at a forced
sale, would deprive the creditors of the chance to benefit from
any appreciation on the property, thus giving debtors "much
more than the 'fresh start' to which they are entitled. We do not
believe Congress intended such a result when it enacted these
Code provisions." '23
Effect of Relief from Stay. The Gaglia bankruptcy court held
that stripping down liens under § 506 would nullify the creditor's
right to "whatever benefit he might receive" by lifting the automatic stay under § 362(d)(2).2 32 That provision directs the court
to grant relief from the automatic stay if the debtor does not have
equity in the property in question and the property is not necessary for an effective reorganization, both of which conditions
would be met in a chapter 7 liquidation involving overencumbered property.
However, by equating the benefits to the undersecured creditor of proceeding within the bankruptcy process or by foreclosure, the Third Circuit rejected this analysis. Adopting the same
argument opposed by the Tenth Circuit in Dewsnup, the Gaglia
Court held that, whether or not the debtor opposed a motion to
lift stay with his own motion to strip down the lien, "the creditor
receives exactly the same thing - the fair market value of the
property less the value of any more senior obligations. '"233 The
motion to lift the stay, under this logic, merely allows a secured
creditor to obtain his satisfaction quickly; it indicates neither
Congressional intent to allow foreclosure on the chapter 7
Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 593.
In re Gaglia, 76 B.R. 81, 84 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987). Section 362(d)(2)
provides:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing,
the court shall grant relief from the [automatic] stay provided under
[§ 362(a)], such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay ....
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this section, if(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1988).
233 Gaglia, 889 F.2d at 1310 n.9.
231
232
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debtor's overencumbered property nor an intent that the entire
claim remain secured if the property is not liquidated.
Skewing Incentives for Forms of Relief Finally, the Third and
Tenth Circuits diverged over whether allowing the liquidating
debtor to strip down liens would lead debtors to prefer liquidation under chapter 7 to reorganization under chapters 11, 12 or
13. The Tenth Circuit found that, rather than being intended to
allow liquidating debtors to strip down liens on abandoned real
property, § 506 was "intended to facilitate valuation and disposi24
tion of property in the reorganization chapters of the Code.
By contrast, the Third Circuit noted that, though the stripdown application of § 506 was clearly foreseeable, Congress had
not explicitly prohibited such an application of this provision.
Moreover, a liquidating debtor seeking this relief against a reticent unsecured creditor could itself file a proof of claim on behalf
of that creditor to subject that creditor's claim to being stripped
down. Thus, the section "was intended not only to protect credi5
tors, but is also available as a debtor's remedy. "23
In this context, the two courts of appeals construed differently the policy implications of various reorganization provisions
of the Code. The Third Circuit noted that its interpretation of
§ 506 did not give an individual debtor a reason to prefer a chapter 7 liquidation to a chapter 13 reorganization. Because
§ 1322(b)(2) prevents chapter 13 plans from modifying the rights
of creditors that hold claims secured only by an interest in the
debtor's principal residence, and since § 506 determines the extent to which such claims are secured, the result would be the
same. 236 However, the Tenth Circuit interpreted this specific
protection of chapter 13 as indicating Congress's "strong preference for reorganization rather than liquidation in the bankruptcy
setting.

' 23 7

Stripping down liens to allow the debtor to redeem

his abandoned property would be "inconsistent with this preference [since it would] allow debtors more in a liquidation than
they would receive in a reorganization. "238
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit noted that, rather than allowing
liens to be stripped down, § 111 (b) (1) permits undersecured
chapter 11 creditors to elect to hold a secured lien on the prop234
235
236
237
238

Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 591.
Gaglia, 889 F.2d at 1309.
Id. at 1311.
Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 592.
Id.
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erty to the full extent of the original obligation.2 " 9 Yet the Third
Circuit observed that this section "is carefully drawn and uses
specific, precise language": while Congress could exempt certain
creditors from the operation of § 506, it had not chosen to so
exempt chapter 7 creditors holding undersecured liens on abandoned property.2 40 The Third Circuit also indicated that "the
availability of lien avoidance is but one factor that a debtor will
consider in choosing between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11. "211
2.

Resorting to a Subsection-by-Subsection Analysis?

In a brief majority opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the
Supreme Court, restricting its decision to the case before it and
not to "all possible fact situations, ' 242 refused to allow the
debtor to "strip down" liens to the value of the collateral. In
affirming the decision of the Tenth Circuit, the Court was reluctant to alter the bargain that it perceived to have been made
among the debtor/mortgagor and the creditors/mortgagees,
under which the liens on the property were intended to remain in
effect until foreclosure and the creditors were expected to receive
the benefit of any appreciation in the value of the property during the bankruptcy process. 243 Thus, the Court declined to penalize undersecured creditors merely for asserting a claim against
abandoned property, or for being drawn into the bankruptcy
process by the debtor's or another party's filing proofs of claim
244
on their behalf.
In two ways, the Court effectively ignored Ron Pair's standard for the relevance of legislative history. First, without addressing the test enunciated by that decision, the Court found
that the legislative history of § 506 supported the preservation of
Id.
Gaglia, 889 F.2d at 1311.
Id.
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992). The Court decided to "focus
upon the case before us and allow other facts to await their legal resolution on
another day." Id.
243 Id. Although the Court has more recently, on other grounds, held that chapter 13 debtors cannot strip liens on their primary residences, see Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993), infra note 486, it has yet to address the
effect of Dewsnup on lien-stripping in chapter 11 cases. See William R. Baldiga and
Theodore Orson, The Effect of Dewsnup v. Timm on Chapter 11 Cases, 110 BANKING
L.J. 130, 142 (1993) (unlike chapter 7 debtor in Dewsnup, chapter 11 debtor is not
eligible for "windfall" from appreciation in value of property; therefore, "it is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court will.., refuse to extend its prohibition
of 'lienstripping' to the reorganization arena.").
244 Id.
239
240
241
242
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the full amount of the undersecured creditors' lien. Liens on real
property had not been affected by bankruptcy proceedings under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898; nor had that Act reduced a creditor's
lien on an asset of a liquidating debtor except through payment
of the debt.2 4 5 Second, ascribing "a full understanding of this
practice" to the legislators who enacted the Code, 4 6 the Court
cited Ron Pair as support for the proposition that:
Given the ambiguity here, to attribute to Congress the intention to grant a debtor the broad new remedy against allowed claims to the extent that they become 'unsecured' for
purposes of § 506(a) without the new remedy's being mentioned somewhere in the Code itself or in the annals of Congress is not plausible,2 47
in our view, and is contrary to basic
bankruptcy principles.
(This subversion of Ron Pair did not escape the notice of Justice
Scalia, whose dissent assailed the majority's opinion as "[a]lmost
point for point . . . the methodological antithesis of Ron Pair."'248 )
Thus, the Court declined to interpret § 506(d)'s "allowed secured claims" as an "indivisible term of art defined by reference to
§ 506(a)," which splits undersecured allowed claims into allowed secured claims and allowed undersecured claims; rather, the Court
read the phrase "term-by-term to refer to any claim that is, first,
allowed, and, second, secured. ' 249 This construction would inId. at 778-79.
Id. at 779.
Id. (citing Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2138; and Ron Pair, 109 S. Ct. at 1032-33).
Earlier, the Court had noted that
Were we writing on a clean slate, we might be inclined to agree
with [the debtor] that the words "allowed secured claim" must take
the same meaning in § 506(d) as in § 506(a). But, given the ambiguity
in the text, we are not convinced that Congress intended to depart
from the pre-Code rule that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected.
Id. at 778 (footnote omitted).
It was apparently this "ambiguity" that rendered the Code "open to interpretation" under the standard enunciated in Ron Pair. However, there was no indication of a "clear conflict" with "any other aspect of the Code."
The Court made a similar end run around the Ron Pair test in Farrey v.
Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1829 (1991) (debtor cannot avoid fixing of lien on property under § 522(f)(1) unless he held interest in that property prior to attachment
of lien). The parties had agreed on the meaning of the words of the Code section
in question, and Justice White's majority opinion identified neither an ambiguity,
nor a threat to the purposes of the Code. Nonetheless, the Court cited Ron Pair in
concluding that a literal reading of § 522(f)(1) "fully comports with the provision's
purpose and history," id., even though that decision could have been read to restrict the relevance of legislative history in precisely such situations as Farrey's. Id.
248 Id. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249 Id. at 777.
245
246
247
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clude claims such as those of the Dewsnup lienholders, so long as the
claims were allowed in full and secured even in part.
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Souter, Justice Scalia
protested that the majority "replaces what Congress said with what
it thinks Congress ought to have said - and in the process disregards, and hence impairs for future use, well-established principles
of statutory construction." 2 5 In light of the "' "normal rule of statutory construction that '"identical words used in different parts of
the same act are intended to have the same meaning," ... '251. Justice Scalia criticized the majority for engaging in "what might be
called the one-subsection-at-a-time
approach to statutory
exegesis. 2 5 2
The majority, noting the textual ambiguity 25 s in the interpretation of § 506(d), had specifically declined to express an opinion regarding the construction of the term, "allowed secured claim"
elsewhere in the Code. 25 4 But the dissent noted that the phrase,
"allowed secured claim" in § 506(d) "can only be referring to that
allowed 'secured claim' so carefully described two brief subsections
earlier, '25 5 and concluded that the majority's interpretation of this
2 56
phrase would unavoidably insert redundancies into § 506(d).
"

Id. at 780 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (citations omitted). The dissent insisted that "[t]hat rule must surely apply, afortiori, to use of identical words in the same section of the same enactment." Id.
252 Id. at 781 (Scalia, J., dissenting) Cf United States Savings Ass'n of Texas v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (Justice Scalia's majority opinion notes that statutory terms are often "clarified by the remainder of the statutory
scheme-because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes
[their] meaning clear, or because only one of their permissible meanings produces
a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.").
253 Justice Scalia criticized the majority for defining as ambiguous any Code provision that was "the subject of disagreement between self-interested litigants," id.,
without first applying its own "textual and structural analysis." Id. at 788 (Scalia,J.,
dissenting).
254 Id. at 778 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255 Id. at 780 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256 Id. at 782 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Section 506(d) provides generally that "[t]o
the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured
claim, such lien is void ... " 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988) (emphasis added). If the
emphasized phrase referred, as the creditors argued, only to the degree by which
an undersecured claim is actually secured by the value of the collateral, there would
be no need to refer again in this subsection to a "secured" claim. Dewsnup, 112 S.
Ct. at 782. On the other hand, if, as the debtors asserted, the "secured claim" of
§ 506(d) connoted any claim, whether fully- or under-secured, for which a lien had
been given as security, the second occurrence of "secured" would still be redundant. Id. at 783 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The dissent suggested instead that the emphasized phrase be given its "natural
meaning," i.e., that it signify both the secured and unsecured portions of an under250
251
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As for the majority's "benefit of the bargain" analysis, Justice
Scalia observed that, though the Court's analysis of "gaps in the express coverage of the Code, or genuinely ambiguous provisions,"
had often been informed by pre-Code practice, "we have never held
pre-Code practice to be determinative in the face of what we have
here: contradictory statutory text. "257
The dissent also addressed several of the disagreements between the Third and Tenth Circuits that had not been discussed by
the majority. Like the Third Circuit, Justice Scalia read § 506(d) not
as allowing the debtor to redeem the property, but merely as reducing the lienholder's interest in the property to the property's liquidation value. 25 8
The dissent similarly agreed with Gaglia that
§ 1322(b)(2) would not render chapter 7 more attractive than chapter 13, and noted that the debtor's construction of § 506(d) could
equally be applied to chapters 11, 12 and 13.259
In addition, Justice Scalia observed that appreciation in the
value of the collateral could be denied to creditors not only by stripping down liens in chapter 7 but by applying the "cram-down" provisions of chapter 11 or chapter 13.260 In fact, far from being
disfavored, reorganization (as opposed to liquidation) would continue to have the advantages of allowing the debtor to remain in
control of his business and personal assets, and of offering him a
discharge from more prepetition in personam liabilities. 2 6 ' Finally,
the dissent faulted the Tenth Circuit for concluding that § 506(a),
and therefore § 506(d), does not apply to abandoned property:
"[s]ection 506 automatically operates upon all property in which the
26 2
estate has an interest at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed."
This Justice, insisting that the Code's revised "text means precisely what it says," ' 26 3 saw the majority's approach to the interpretation of § 506(a) as diverging widely from the Court's previous
methods of analyzing the Code. For example, two months previously, the Court had in Wolas construed § 547(c)(2)'s ordinary
course of business exception to the avoidance of preferences as
equally applicable to "long-term debt" and "short-term debt." In
secured claim, and that the subsequent reference to "an allowed secured claim" be
given its "previously established statutory meaning," i.e., that this phrase indicate
only the secured portion of the allowed undersecured claim. Id.
257 Id. at 786 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258 Id. at 784 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259 Id. at 784-785 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260 Id. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261 Id. at 784 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
262 Id. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
263 Id. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Wolas as in Dewsnup, the Court had confronted ambiguities that
would appear to allow significant deviations from prior practice.
Wolas had championed the statute's "plain meaning" even where
Congress had arguably not evaluated all of the implications of the
rewritten text, since "the fact that Congress carefully reexamined
and entirely rewrote the [section] supports the conclusion that the
text ... as enacted reflects [its] deliberate choice."264 However, in
Dewsnup the Court had abandoned the plain meaning of a similarly
rewritten section, to revert to the majority's conception of "preCode law." 2' 6 5 Moreover, the majority had seemingly rejected Ron
Pair'semphasis on the irrelevance of the legislative history of, and of
the pre-Code practice relating to, a Code provision which expressed
Congress's intent "with sufficient precision.' '266
Though Justice Scalia's dissent in Dewsnup anticipated a disastrous "destruction of predictability" in interpretations of the
Code,2 6 7 this characterization might well have been exaggerated.
First, it is far from clear that the "plain meaning" approach to the
Code has itself fostered a significant degree of predictability.2 6 8 Second, the Court's explicit restriction to § 506(d) of its construction of
"allowed secured claim" may actually evidence its continued pursuit
of predictability. In interpreting an intricately constructed statute
that is rife with interconnections and cross-references, and that, as
Justice Scalia himself recognized, "has little to do with natural justice, ' 2 69 the Court's inclination to limit its holdings to the circumstances before it can be seen as an attempt not to create more
ambiguities than it resolves. Third, Justice Scalia had himself discerned in Wolas that the Code was "utterly devoid of language that
could remotely be thought to distinguish between long-term and
Id. (quoting Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 532 (ScaliaJ., concurring)).
Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, the dissent found
-[n]o provision of the former Bankruptcy Act, nor any pre-Code doctrine, [that]
purported to invalidate - across the board - liens securing claims disallowed in
bankruptcy." Id.
266 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Yet even when Justice Scalia concurred in the plurality's interpretation of a
notably ambiguous statute, he would find occasion to deride "that last hope of lost
interpretive causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction, legislative history." U.S. v. Thompson/Center Arms Company, 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2111
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (National Firearms Act may not be construed to require manufacturer of pistol sold with accompanying conversion kit to pay tax for
"making" a "firearm.")
267 Dewsnup, 112 S.Ct. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268 See infra notes 589-90 and accompanying text.
269 Dewsnup, 112 S.Ct. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264

265
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short-term debt," the question there at issue. 270 By contrast, Dewsnup addressed the interpretation of the much more complex term,
"allowed secured claim." Indeed, the majority in that opinion twice
noted the "ambiguity" of this phrase, and resorted to reviewing the
section's legislative history. Although the Court did not cite Ron
Pair, its review of the legislative history suggests that it considers
§ 506(a) "open to interpretation."

2 7

'

In addition, while Ron Pair had dismissed as irrelevant a preCode practice that "would be of little assistance," because it "was an
exception to an exception, recognized by only a few courts and
often dependent upon particular circumstances, "272 the Dewsnup
majority cited legislative history and Court precedent as evidence
that Congress was fully aware when enacting the Code that existing
practice discouraged the stripping down of liens.2 73
Where ambiguities in the Code have not expressed Congress's
intent with "sufficient precision" under Ron Pair, the Court may still
rely on such legislative history or pre-Code practice as is sufficiently
developed to have been considered when Congress enacted or
amended the Code. This reading would limit the hermeneutic
threat that Justices Scalia and Souter perceived in the Court's investigation beyond the plain language of § 506 and in the constriction
of the Court's holding to the meaning of one phrase in one subsection of the Code. To the extent that the creditors and the debtor
had anticipated these practices, the Court was prepared to give the
parties the benefit of their bargain. In this sense, Dewsnup indicates
that, despite Ron Pair's apparently stringent standard for the relevance of legislative history, extra-statutory considerations will remain relevant to the interpretation of the Code.
2 74
G. Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz

Extending to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure its
literal interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that
all objections to a debtor's claimed exemptions must be filed
within the statutorily prescribed period, whether or not the exemptions are justified by the Code or even asserted in good faith
by the debtor. The assignment of the Taylor opinion to the most
Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 534 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 246.
Dewsnup, 112 S.Ct. at 778-79.
112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992). The following discussion has been adapted with
permission from that presented in Walter A. Effross, Trustee's Right To Object: Use It
or Lose It!, 131 N.J.L.J. 335 (1992).
270
271
272
273
274
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junior Justice, and the Court's near-unanimity, imply that, as in
Justice Thomas's two prior bankruptcy opinions,275 the issue may
have been seen as relatively straightforward. 76 Yet Justice Stevens's lone dissent, by suggesting that the Court might have
abandoned its strict adherence to the words of the statute had the
debtor's conduct indicated actual fraud, highlights the potential
of the Code's catch-all equitable provision to reconcile the stringent literalism of the "plain meaning" approach with the equitable nature of the Code itself.
1. Background
Under § 541(a) of the Code, the commencement of a bankruptcy case creates a "bankruptcy estate," which is broadly defined to include "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property" as of that time.277 Generally, the assets of the bankruptcy estate are distributable to creditors. Section 522(1), however, allows an individual debtor in any of these proceedings to
275 Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992) (regarding
appeals of interlocutory orders; five-Justice majority concurred in by remainingJustices); Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 112 S. Ct. 1021 (1992) (trustee required to pay
taxes for gains realized from sale of liquidated real estate; unanimous decision).
276 In the wake of Taylor, trustees and creditors would do well to observe scrupulously the time limits for filing objections to: a debtor's discharge (under Code
§ 727(c) and Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a)); the dischargeability of a debt (Code
§ 523(c) and Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c)); the use, sale or lease of property (Code
§ 363 and Bankruptcy Rule 6004(b)); and the abandonment of property (Code
§ 554 and Bankruptcy Rule 6007(a)).
Under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(3), the time limits for filing the first of these
two objections may be extended only after a hearing on notice, requested by motion made before the original time limit has expired. The court may extend the
latter two time limits with or without motion or notice if request is made before the
original, or a previously extended, period expires, or, if the period has expired, on
motion "where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect."
277 Section 541(a) provides:
The commencement of a [voluntary, joint, or involuntary] case creates
an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property,
wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
Section 541 (b) excludes from the estate: "any power that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor"; certain interests of the
debtor as lessee of nonresidential real property; any eligibility of the debtor to participate in certain education programs; and any accreditation status or state licensure of the debtor as an educational institution. Id. § 54 1(b). In addition,
§ 542(c)(2) provides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of
the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under [Title 11]." Id. § 541(c)(2).
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file a list of property that should, under § 522(b), be "exempted"
from the estate: i.e., returned to the debtor. 278 Section
522(b)(1) 2 79 provides that, in those states that have not precluded the "federal exemptions" of § 522(d), 28 0 debtors may

avail themselves of any or all of those eleven specific categories
of exemptions (e.g., a debtor can exempt his interest, not to exceed $1200, in one motor vehicle).
As an alternative to the federal exemptions, § 522(b)(2)(A)
allows individual debtors to claim as exempt in federal bankruptcy proceedings any property that is exempt from attachment
by creditors under applicable state or local law (e.g., the debtor's
interest in certain spendthrift trusts) or under any federal law
other than the federal exemptions (e.g., civil service retirement
278

Section 522(1) provides:
The debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as
exempt under [§ 522(b)]. If the debtor does not file such a list, a dependent of the debtor may file such a list, or may claim property as
exempt from property of the estate on behalf of the debtor. Unless a
party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list
is exempt.

11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (1988).
279 Section 522(b) provides:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor
may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either
paragraph (1), or, in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this subsection
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section,
unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph
(2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize; ....
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than
subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable
on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the
debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or for a longer period of
such 180-day period than in any other place; and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by
the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant
by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
280 Section 522(d) identifies eleven separate classes of property that may be exempted under § 522(b)(1), including: a specified dollar value of the debtor's interest in certain real property, in one motor vehicle, in certain personal, family, or
household possessions, and in tools of the trade of the debtor or of a dependent of
the debtor; certain unmatured life insurance contracts; professionally prescribed
health aids for the debtor or for a dependent of the debtor; and the debtor's right
to receive certain benefits or payments under federal, state or local law. See generally
11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988).
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benefits).2"

Section 522(1) provides that "Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on [the debtor's] list is exempt." Under Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b), such objections may be
filed by the trustee, or by any creditor, within thirty days after the
conclusion of the creditors' meeting or of the filing of any
amendment to the list or supplemental schedules, unless the time
for objection has been previously extended by the court. 2
Bankruptcy Rule 4003(c) provides that the objecting party shall
bear the burden of proof at a hearing before the court. 8 3
In October 1984, when Emily Davis filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, a sex and age discrimination judgment rendered
in her favor by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court was being
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by her former employer. On the schedules to her petition, Davis, noting that the
potential proceeds from the judgment were "unknown," listed
them as an asset that should be exempted from her bankruptcy
estate.284
At the required meeting of Davis's creditors, in January
1985, her counsel advised the trustee that the judgment might
ultimately result in a payment to the debtor of approximately
$90,000. The trustee wrote to the debtor's counsel several days
later, advising that any proceeds of the lawsuit would be property
of the bankruptcy estate. In response to the trustee's request for
further information about the action, Davis's counsel informed
him that a settlement might be reached for $110,000.285
However, the trustee did not file a formal objection to the
debtor's exemption of these funds from her bankruptcy estate.
See infra note 279 and accompanying text.
Rule 4003(b) provides:
The trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of property
claimed as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting
of creditors held pursuant to Rule 2003 (a), or the filing of any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules unless, within such period,
further time is granted by the court. Copies of the objections shall be
delivered or mailed to the trustee and to the person filing the list and
the attorney for such person.
FED. R. BANKR. P.4003(b).
283 Rule 4003(c) provides that "[in any hearing under this rule, the objecting
party has the burden of proving that the exemptions are not properly claimed. After hearing on notice, the court shall determine the issues presented by the objections." FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(c).
284 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz (In re Davis), 105 B.R. 288, 290-91 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1989).
285 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644, 1646-47 (1992).
281
282
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Rather, he stated on the record that, in his experience, debtors
were likely to settle pending suits for amounts well within the
exemption limits. 28 6 The trustee also
opined that the discrimina2 7
tion claim might be "a nullity.

In October 1986, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed
the debtor's judgment against her former employer. Davis subsequently settled the matter for $110,000 (which included her attorneys' fees). Of this amount, $23,483.75 was to be paid "as
and for back pay or front pay"; another $23,483.75, "as and for
all alleged tort claims or any other tort claims not represent[ing]
asserted wage losses"; and the remaining $63,032.50, for legal
fees and costs. 2 8 8

The trustee filed a complaint against the

debtor and her attorneys in bankruptcy court, asserting that the
settlement payments were property of the estate. Noting that the
trustee had not timely filed an objection to the debtor's claim of
exemption, the debtor and her counsel refused to relinquish
these funds.
The bankruptcy court read into § 522(1) a requirement that
the debtor assert all exemption claims in good faith. Otherwise,
the court observed, an unscrupulous debtor could achieve "exemption by declaration": her broad assertion that all of the estate's property was exempt would force her creditors and the
already-overburdened trustee to evaluate the status of each asset.2 8 9 If this tactic were widely adopted, "[o]rderly administra-

tion of such debtors' estates would be difficult, if not impossible,
and uncertainty and constant litigation, if not outright chaos,
would result.

' 290

Moreover, this type of blanket exemption

would contradict § 522(b)'s explicit limitation of exemptions to
property already exempted by federal, state or local law. 2 9

The court noted that Davis's claim of exemption appeared to
be predicated on the federal exemption for loss of future earnings under § 522(d)(I 1)(E). 9 2 It did not disturb that component
286 Id. at 1647. The exemption for payments for loss of future earnings, while
not limited by an absolute dollar value, is restricted by § 522(d)(1 1)(E) to payment
"to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any [of her]
dependent[s]." 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(l1)(E) (1988).
287 Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1646-47.
288 Taylor, 105 B.R. at 291.
289 Id. at 292-93.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 292-93.
292 Id. at 293. Section 522(d)(1 l)(E) exempts from the bankruptcy estate
[t]he debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to(E) a payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of the
debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is or was a dependent, to
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of the settlement identified as for "back pay or front pay," even
though no specific federal exemption provides for "back pay."
However, since no federal exemption applied to tort claims, the
court allowed the trustee to recover for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate the $23,483.75 that had been allocated for such
claims.293 Indeed, because the debtor had admitted mischaracterizing that portion of the settlement in order to avoid tax
liability, the court held that she was now estopped from redefin294
ing the "tort claim" proceeds as payment for lost wages.
The recovered funds would satisfy not only all creditors'
claims, with interest, but also the trustee's counsel fees for bringing the recovery action. Thus, the court declined to determine
whether the remainder of the settlement amount was due to the
trustee, who would merely have returned such funds to the
debtor. Given his "dereliction of duty and/or ignorance of bankruptcy law, '

295

the court was unwilling to allow the trustee to de-

duct additional fees for his administration of any such funds.
The district court affirmed, since "[a]llowing the debtor to recover proceeds for which there was no statutory basis [for exemption] would render § 522(b) negatory.

29 6

However, the Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, finding the result below "unwarranted under the clear
language of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules, 29 7
whose "import is clear and [who] admit of no exception. "298 Citing the legislative history of the Code and Rules, the appeals
court insisted that objections be timely made, even if the debtor's
claimed exemption was invalid or lacked a good-faith statutory
basis.
Indeed, before the enactment of the Code, former Bankruptcy Rule 403 had required the trustee to file a report deeming
each exemption claim allowable or non-allowable, subject to objections by the debtor and creditors within fifteen days. As the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules' Note to current Bankthe extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor.
II U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(E) (1988).
293 Taylor, 105 B.R. at 293. The trustee was also authorized to recover from Freeland & Kronz, the initial transferee, "interest at the prevailing legal rate, from the
date of the initial transfer on September 17, 1987." Id.
294 Id. at 294.
295 Id.
296 118 B.R. 272, 275 (W.D. Pa. 1990).
297 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 938 F.2d 420, 421 (3d Cir. 1991).
298 Id. at 423.
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ruptcy Rule 4003 observes, the Code shifted that burden by allowing the debtor to claim exemptions to which the creditors and
the trustee could object within thirty days.2 9 9 To the Third Circuit panel, "[n]othing in the legislative materials suggest[ed] that
any exceptions to this bright-line rule were intended.

300

The

court of appeals also cited as support another Note of the Advisory Committee, which indicated that, "[i]n the interest of
prompt administration of bankruptcy cases certain time periods
may not be extended.

30 1

The Third Circuit concluded that the finality and certainty
created by strict deadlines outweighed any threat that unscrupulous debtors would incapacitate the bankruptcy system, or receive windfalls, by declaring all of their assets exempt. Not only
does Bankruptcy Rule 9011 (a counterpart to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11) provide for sanctions for bad faith claims of
exemption, but vigilant trustees and creditors should generally
be able to detect and challenge unfounded claims for exemption.
"Thus, in the vast majority of cases, overzealous claims of exemptions by a debtor will serve only
to induce the enmity of the
30 2
other parties and of the court.

Nor would a bankruptcy court's failure to reject unchallenged claims of exemption, even if they were unjustified or
brought in bad faith, circumvent the restrictions of § 522(b).
That section does not become operative, the Court of Appeals
held, until the trustee or a creditor files an objection to the
claimed exemption under § 522(l).3 By contrast, the lower
courts would first have scrutinized controversial claims under
§ 522(b), whether or not an objection had been timely filed. This
regime, the Third Circuit noted, "would render [S]ection 522(1)
3 4
meaningless.1

' 0

Id. at 425 (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003 (advisory committee note)).
Id. at 425.
Id. (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006 (advisory committee note)). Curiously,
while Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(2)-to which this Note is appended-does prohibit
the enlargement of certain time periods in which action may be taken, this prohibition is not applicable to the time period, set forth in Rule 4003(b), for filing objections. Indeed, Rule 9006(b)(2) specifically provides that "the court may enlarge the
time for taking action [under Rule 4003(b)] only to the extent and under the conditions stated in [that Rule]." FED R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(2).
302 Id. at 426.
303 Id.
304 Id.
299
300
301
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Inviting Equitable Elaboration of Plain Meaning?

In his third Supreme Court opinion on creditors' rights, Justice Thomas affirmed the Third Circuit's decision, on the
grounds that "[d]eadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but
they prompt parties to act and they produce finality.

' 30 5

The

high court thus rejected
opposing precedent in the Fifth, Sixth,
30 6
and Eighth Circuits.

The Court observed that, in addition to Rule 9011,
§ 727(a)(4)(B) (denying discharge for fraudulent claims), Rule
1008 (mandating verified filings) and 18 U.S.C. § 152 (criminalizing bankruptcy fraud) provide disincentives for a debtor and her
°
counsel to attempt "exemption by declaration. 307
Congress remained free to supplement these protections if it found them
inadequate. °8
Significantly, the Court declined on procedural grounds30 9
to authorize the lower courts to invalidate the claimed exemption
under § 105(a) of the Code, which provides that "[t]he court may
issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Code]," despite any
Code provision "providing for the raising of an issue by a party
in interest. '3'0 However, the length and tone of this dismissal
appeared unusually defensive. From the Court's six-sentence
justification, which cited four Supreme Court decisions and two
Supreme Court Rules, it might be inferred that the Justices had
recognized the importance of this issue and were awaiting - perhaps even inviting - a suitable case in which to address it.
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644, 1648 (1992).
In re Peterson, 920 F.2d 1389, 1393-95 (8th Cir. 1990) (appropriate standard
for analysis of late objections to claimed exemptions is "middle-ground" of determining whether debtor had good-faith statutory basis for claimed exemption); In re
Dembs, 757 F.2d 777, 780 (6th Cir. 1985) (requiring good-faith statutory basis for
exemption); In re Sherk, 918 F.2d 1170, 1174 (5th Cir. 1990) (inferring requirement of statutory basis for claimed exemption).
307 Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1648.
308 Id. at 1648-49.
309 Id. at 1649. The issue had been raised by the trustee for the first time in his
opening brief on the merits, in contravention of the Court's Rule 14.1 (a) and 24.1,
which restrict the Court's examination to the questions set forth in the petition for
certiorari.
Nonetheless, this intriguing resolution to the problem of the delinquent
trustee had been accepted by the Fourth Circuit and by district courts in Wisconsin
and Pennsylvania. Id. (citing Ragsdale v. Genesco, Inc., 674 F.2d 277, 278 (4th Cir.
1982); In re Stainiforth, 116 B.R. 127, 131 (W.D. Wis. 1990); In re Budinsky, No. 9001099, 1991 WL 105640 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 1990).
310 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
305

306
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The application of § 105 might well have resolved Justice
Stevens's argument in dissent that, given the equitable nature of
bankruptcy, a literal reading of the Code and Rules should be
supplanted by the doctrine of equitable tolling. Traditionally,
that doctrine has allowed statutes of limitation to be extended
where the guilty party affirmatively concealed the fraud or where
the defrauded party's unawareness of the fraud was not due to its
own lack of care.311 Yet the dissent seemed to be stretching to fit
the facts of Taylor to those conditions.
First, Justice Stevens observed that the debtor's claims for
exemption of the entire settlement amount were, even if not
fraudulent, at least unjustified by the Code and Rules.31 2 As the
Third Circuit had recognized, the bankruptcy and district courts
initially resolved whether a claim for exemption that had drawn
an objection satisfied § 522(b); if it did not, these courts then addressed whether the claim had been filed in good faith. The dissent went so far as to propose that since Davis's exemption claim
did not meet the requirements of § 522(b), the 30-day objection
period had never begun to run.

But the claim of exemption filed with Davis's petition (as opposed to her deliberate postpetition representation regarding
tort claims) would not so clearly qualify as affirmative fraud. To
begin with, it could be argued that the debtor and her counsel
had in good faith mistakenly filled out the schedule, or misread
the Code. Even if the claim had been fraudulently made, no effort had been made to conceal such fraud. Indeed, Davis and her
counsel had apparently been candid in representing to the
trustee the potential amount of settlement.
Second, although the trustee had been aware of an objectionable claim, and it was his own "lack of care" in failing to file a
timely objection that had created his present difficulties, the dissent noted that strict operation of the thirty-day objection period
would harm "innocent creditors. 3 1 4 However, many creditors
would have been on notice of the bankruptcy filing, and would
have had the opportunity to examine the schedules with their
counsel, and to object to the claimed exemption, within the
thirty-day period.
Finally, Justice Stevens suggested that the debtor would not
311 Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1650 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Bailey v. Glover, 21
U.S. (1 Wall.) 342, 347-50 (1875)).
312 Id.
313 Id. at 1652 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
314 Id. at 1650 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
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be prejudiced by the trustee's failure to object promptly.- 5 But
the dissent's de facto extension of the objection period would
prejudice other participants in the bankruptcy process by reducing its efficiency and by undermining its certainty and finality. As
the dissent itself recognized, the trustee's counsel, warning of the
potential systemic burden of "exemption by declaration," had
noted that the 880,000 bankruptcy cases filed in 1991 had been
divided among only 291 bankruptcy judges." 6
The dissent concluded by speculating that "if the debtor or
the trustee were guilty of fraud, the Court would readily ignore
what it now treats as the insurmountable barrier of 'plain meaning.'. . . In my view, it is a mistake to adopt a 'strict letter' ap' 17
proach . . .when justice requires a more searching inquiry."

It remains to be seen whether, in light of the equitable nature of the bankruptcy court, the sweeping language of § 105(a)
will foster a "searching inquiry" to overcome the new literalism
of such decisions as Ron Pair, Wolas, and Toibb. The Court's subsequent decision to construe expansively the "excusable neglect"
standard for failure to file documents timely, 1 ' although not directly addressing § 105, indicates that the "plain meaning" doctrine may yet be amenable to considerations of equity.
H.

3 19
Barnhill v. Johnson

In Barnhil, the Court held that funds transferred by a
315 Id. According to Justice Stevens, "[u]nder these circumstances, unless the
debtor could establish some prejudice caused by the trustee's failure to object
promptly, I would hold that the filing of a frivolous claim for an exemption is tantamount to fraud for purposes of deciding when the 30-day period begins to run."
Id.
The time limits with respect to the right to file an objection to the abandonment of property may be among the most significant in today's bankruptcy practice,
given the attempts of many trustees or debtors-in-possession to abandon environmentally troubled properties for which the bankruptcy estates cannot afford
cleanup costs. See, e.g., State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. North American Products Acquisition Corp., 137 B.R. 8, 10 (D.N.J. 1992)
(construing Supreme Court's Midlantic decision as requiring pre-abandonment
hearing to determine threat posed to public and property by abandonment of contaminated facility). An extended discussion of this opinion appears in Walter A.
Effross, The Toxic Risk and "the Public Fisc," I N.J.L. 945 (1992).
316 Id. at 1651 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
317 Id. at 1652 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
318 See infra notes 430-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pioneer Investment Services Company v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership.
319 112 S. Ct. 1386 (1992). The following discussion has been adapted with
permission from that presented in Walter A. Effross, Supremes Endorse "'Date of
Honor" Check Rule, 131 N.J.L.J. 6 (1992).
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debtor's check are recoverable for the benefit of creditors if the
check is honored within ninety days before the debtor's bankruptcy. In rejecting an alternative approach - that recovery is
possible only if the check is delivered within this "preference period" - the Court closely analyzed the definition of "transfers,"
both under the Code and under the Uniform Commercial Code
(the "U.C.C."), and distinguished between the legislative histories of two related subsections of the Code. In absence of support from statute or precedent, the Court declined to construe
broadly the phrase, "conditional transfer," thereby signalling an
informal limit to the "plain meaning" theory.
1. Background
Under § 101(54) of the Code, a "transfer" includes any
"mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or
involuntary, of disposing or parting with property or with an interest in property.... 32 In turn, transfers are a key element of
§ 547's definition of "preferences," presumptively partial transfers made by the debtor before entering bankruptcy.3

21

Prefer-

ential transfers may be reversed by the trustee or debtor-inpossession to recoup the transferred property for more equitable
distribution to creditors.
Section 547(b) defines a preference as "any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property... made on or within 90 days
before the filing of the petition" to or for the benefit of a creditor, that enables the creditor to receive more than the creditor
would in the debtor's liquidation under the Code. 22 However,
neither the Code nor its legislative history explicitly indicates the
time at which transfers by check are deemed to have occurred for
purposes of § 547(b).
In Barnhill, the debtor's check, which a creditor received
ninety-two days before the bankruptcy filing, was dated and deposited the next day, and was honored the following day by the
320 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1988).

321 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
322 See id.

The 90-day "preference period" is extended to one year where the transfer is
made to or for the benefit of an "insider" such as a controlling person of, or an
entity affiliated with, the debtor. II U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988). A literal reading
of § 547 in conjunction with § 550(a), which relates to the recovery of preferential
transfers, has given rise to the so-called Deprizio problem: a one-year preference
period applicable to the lender who takes the guaranty of an insider of the debtor.
See, e.g., Walter A. Effross, Deprizio's Honor: Lenders, Insider Guarantorsand the Prisoners' Dilemma, 21 SEATON HALL L. REV. 774 (1991).
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drawee bank. 2 3 At issue was whether the transfer was recoverable as falling within the ninety-day "preference period." The
creditor argued that the transfer had occurred when it had received the check, two days before the preference period had begun. The bankruptcy trustee countered that the transfer had
taken place when the check had been honored, on the first day of
the preference period. The bankruptcy court3 24 and the district
court s 2 5 supported the creditor's "date of delivery" approach,
but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, favoring the trustee's "date of honor" rule. 26 Because of
the conflict among the circuits on this issue, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
a.

Conflict Among the Circuits
i. Background

In dating transfers by check for purposes of preference
avoidance, several circuits had found relevant the legislative hisJohnson v. Barnhill (In re Antweil), 111 B.R. 337, 339 (D.N.M. 1990).
Johnson v. Barnhill (In re Antweil), 97 B.R. 69 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1989). The
bankruptcy court, following the Tenth Circuit's decision in Bernstein v. RJL Leasing (In re White River Corporation), 799 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1986), held that the
"date of delivery" rule not only would allow the debtor (rather than the bank) to
determine the date of transfer, but would also "comport with the state law treatment of post-dated checks." Johnson, 97 B.R. at 70. The relevant state law determined the time at which an antedated or postdated check is payable by reference to
"the stated date if the instrument is payable on demand or at a fixed period after
[that] date." Id. (citation omitted). The bankruptcy court therefore defined "delivery" as "the later of the date a check is received or dated." Id.
The court found the "date of delivery" rule equally applicable to § 547(b) preference actions and to § 547(c) defenses, because there appeared to be "no good
reason to view a single transaction differently depending on which subsection of
the statute is being read." Id. Moreover, because in this situation both the date of
the check at issue and the date of its delivery were outside the 90-day preference
period, a "date of honor" rule would not aid the plaintiff. Id.
325 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the "date of
delivery" rule was "in accord with much of the legislative history and policy objectives" identified by White River, supra note 312. Johnson, 111 B.R. at 340.
Because both the date written on the check and the date of the check's receipt
fell outside the ninety-day preference period, the district court declined to adopt or
to reject the lower court's definition of the date of delivery as the later of the dates
on which a check is received and dated. Id. at 342. Moreover, because only one-day
intervals elapsed between the check's delivery, date and deposit, and honoring, the
court found the postdating relevant not to the anticipated time of honor but instead
to the time of presentment to the drawee bank, and held that the check was "intended as a cash payment." Id. (citing Global International Airways Corp. v. Evergreen Air Center, Inc. (In re Global International Airways Corp.), 80 B.R. 990, 995
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) (applying "date of delivery" rule to postdated checks if
transfer of check constitutes substantially contemporaneous payment)).
326 Johnson v. Barnhill, 931 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1991).
323
324
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tory of § 547(c). That section exempts certain arms'-length
transactions from § 547(b)'s definition of preferences. 2 7 For example, to encourage trade creditors not to desert a troubled
business, the bankruptcy courts will not reverse payments made
or security interests given by the debtor in exchange for new
goods and services supplied to it, or for debts incurred by the
debtor in the ordinary course of its business, before the bankruptcy filing.
The legislative history of § 547(c) contains statements by
Senator DeConcini and Representative Edwards that "payment
of a debt by means of a check is equivalent to a cash payment,
unless the check is dishonored" and that "for these purposes,
payment is considered to be made when the check is delivered. 3 s28 As the Supreme Court noted, the "date of delivery"

rule for § 547(c) transfers had been unanimously supported by
the five Circuits that had addressed the issue. 2 9
Only one of these decisions, however, had explicitly concerned whether the date of "delivery" occurs when the check is
mailed by the debtor, versus when it is received by the payee.
The Fourth Circuit had found delivery to take place on "the date
that the creditor receives the check. ' '3 3 0

Less definitively, the

Ninth Circuit had held, in the context of § 547(c), that a check
was delivered at "the time the debtor gave the check to the creditor."3'3

Yet all five of the Circuits adopting the "date of deliv-

ery" rule required for the operation of that rule that the check be
presented within the thirty-day period set by U.C.C. § 3503(2)(a) as "a reasonable time for presentment. "332
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1), (2) (1988).
124 CONG. REC. at 34000 and 34200 (1978).
Johnson, 112 S. Ct. at 1391 n.9 (citation omitted).
In re Continental Commodities, Inc., 841 F.2d 527, 530 (4th Cir. 1988),following O'Neill v. Nestle Libbys P.R., Inc., 729 F.2d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 1984)
(§ 547(e)(1)(B) deals with perfection of security interests in debtor's property and
does not apply to § 547(c) cases in which creditor has not taken debtor's check as
security) and In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d at 633-34 (O'Neill is supported by
legislative history, policy considerations and pragmatic concerns; "delivery date"
rule comports with commercial practice, encourages trade creditors to continue
dealing with troubled businesses, and allows debtor to determine precise date of
transfer).
331 Robert K. Morrow, Inc. v. Agri-Beef Co. (In re Kenitra, Inc.), 797 F.2d 790,
791 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied., 479 U.S. 1054 (1987). Agn-Beef held that the enactment of the Code had instituted "no changes.., that suggest a reason to depart
from the rule in Shamrock Golf." Morrow, 797 F.2d at 791 n.1 (citing Shamrock Golf
v. Richcraft, Inc., 680 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982) (adopting date of discovery rule, in
context of Bankruptcy Act)).
332 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Midwest Corp., 873 F.2d 805, 808 (5th Cir. 1989);
327
328
329
330
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Sixth Circuit Precedent

After examining the legislative history of § 547(c), the Sixth
Circuit applied the "date of delivery" rule to § 547(b) as well,
since "[t]o give the word 'transfer' a different meaning in these
complementary subparts seems inconsistent, unworkable, and
confusing." 33 Moreover, a "date of delivery" approach would
have the virtues of "consistency, clarity, and simplicity," and
334
would fulfill the expectations both of debtors and of creditors.
Although the relevant legislative history made no reference to
§ 547(b), the court of appeals attributed this omission to the process of assembling committee reports rather than to a specific
Congressional intent to distinguish the timing of preferences
under the two sections.3 35
Under the Sixth Circuit's analysis, "delivery" occurred when
the payee received the check rather than when the debtor mailed
the check. The court of appeals observed that this rule not only
avoided inquiry into which party insisted on payment by check,
or confusion over when a check was mailed, but placed the burden of documentation on the recipient (to post the check) rather
than on the debtor (to retain proof of mailing). 336 Like the circuit courts that had approached the question in the context of
§ 547(b), the Sixth Circuit required as a condition of this timing
Continental Commodities, 841 F.2d at 530; In re Wolf & Vine, 825 F.2d 197, 201-02
(9th Cir. 1987); White River, 99 F.2d at 634; O'Neill, 829 F.2d at 38.
U.C.C. § 3-503(2)(a) provides:
(2) A reasonable time for presentment is determined by the nature of the instrument, any usage of banking or trade and the facts of
the particular case. In the case of an uncertified check which is drawn
and payable within the United States and which is not a draft drawn by
a bank the following are presumed to be reasonable periods within
which to present for payment or to initiate bank collection:
(a) with respect to the liability of the drawer, thirty days after
date or issue whichever is later.
Id.
333 Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Belknap, Inc. v. Shaler Corp. (In re
Belknap, Inc.), 909 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir. 1990).
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Id. at 884. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit applied the "date of delivery" rule
after drawing analogies to § 547(c) and § 549(a) and observing that "in the commercial arena, for most purposes, payment by check is the end of a commercial
transaction." In re Virginia Information Systems Corp., 932 F.2d 338, 341 (4th Cir.
1991) (citing In re Continental Commodities, 841 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1988); Quinn
Wholesale, Inc. v. Northern, 873 F.2d 77 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 851 (1989)
(under Continental analysis, transfer was effective on date of delivery, in context of
avoidance of postpetition transaction under § 549(a))).
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that the check be presented within thirty days of delivery, and
honored upon presentment.
However, the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Barnhill, noting the
divergent policies of the two provisions, specifically rejected the
application of § 547(c)'s legislative history to § 547(b). Section
547(c), the court observed, encourages creditors to transact with
a troubled debtor, by fulfilling, despite the threat of the debtor's
bankruptcy, the creditors' ordinary commercial expectations of
payment. By contrast, § 547(b) is intended to recover preferential transfers for distribution to creditors, whether or not the
transferees envisioned the debtor's bankruptcy. 3 7
The Tenth Circuit also disagreed with the Sixth Circuit
about the most efficient manner in which to document transactions made by check. While the date of honor could be evidenced by the bank statement, there would not necessarily be a
clear record of the date of delivery. Indeed, under U.C.C. § 3409(1),3 s the debtor's check is not effective when provided to
the recipient, but only when accepted by the drawee bank. Since
the debtor's bank account could be garnished by another creditor, and thus the check recipient's right to the account funds nullified, at any time before the check is honored, the transfer could
occur only when the check is actually honored. The same conclusion had earlier been reached by the Eleventh Circuit and Seventh Circuit339 in their analyses of § 96(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy
0
Act.

34

Concepts similar to those of the Bankruptcy Act's § 96(a)(2)
are embodied in Code's § 547(e), which has itself been seen as a
statutory source for determining the preferential timing of transfers by check under § 547(b). Section 547(e)(1) provides that
for the purposes of § 547's preference analysis, transfers of fixtures or property other than real property are perfected when "a
creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is
superior to the interest of the transferee."'3 4 1 Under § 547(e)(2),

if a transfer is perfected within ten days of its taking effect, the
Johnson v. Barnhill, 931 F.2d 689, 692-93 (1991).
U.C.C. § 3-409(1) provides that "[a] check or other draft does not of itself
operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its
payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it."
339 Nicholson v. First Investment Co., 705 F.2d 410, 413 (11 th Cir. 1983); Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance Corp., 491 F.2d 1288, 1293 (7th Cir. 1974).
340 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) provided that a transfer was made when the transferee's
rights in the property were superior to those of any subsequent judicial lien-holder
whose rights stemmed from a simple contract.
341 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1) (1988).
337
338
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transfer will be regarded as having been made when it took effect; otherwise, the transfer will be deemed to have been made at
the time of perfection.342 If the transfer is not perfected before
the commencement of the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings, the
transfer will be deemed to have been made at the later of the
commencement of the case or ten days after the transfer took
effect.3 43
As the Tenth Circuit noted, however, the language of perfection, which refers to the attachment of security interests, is not
directly appropriate to the honoring of a check, which involves
the direct transfer of the debtor's assets, unless the check has
been taken as security. "It is unnecessary and incorrect to analogize to security interests and to U.C.C. Article 9 perfection rules
when U.C.C. Article 3 squarely covers commercial paper such as
checks.3 44
iii.

Seventh Circuit Precedent

Contradicting the Tenth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit championed the "date of delivery" rule, with "delivery" defined as the
date on which the creditor received the debtor's check. This
court of appeals advanced a more subtle analysis, based on the
inclusion in § 101(54)'s definition of "transfer" of both "absolute [and] conditional" transfers.34 5 The delivery of the debtor's
check to the creditor was seen as a conditional transfer, since the
drawee bank could refuse to honor the check. When the drawee
did honor the check, the transfer of the funds became absolute.
Thus, if either the date of delivery or the date of honor 346 occurred
within the preference period, the payment could be recovered for
the benefit of creditors.347
Under this analysis, the true significance of § 96(a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Act lay not in its having been construed as supporting a "date-of-honor" rule, but in the transformation of its language into § 547(e) of the Code. Not only does § 547(e)(1)
abandon the Act's hypothetical-judgment analysis of transfers,
but under § 547(e)(2) a transfer occurs when even a conditional
interest in the funds is created, although, until that interest is
Id. § 547(e)(2).
Id.
Barnhill, 931 F.2d at 694 n.3.
Global Distribution Network v. Star Expansion, 949 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1991).
An exception would exist under § 547(e) for checks honored during the preference period but within ten days of (prepetition) receipt.
347 Global Distribution, 949 F.2d at 914.
342

343
344
345
346
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perfected, it may be subordinated to the interests of other creditors.3 48 Further, as had the Sixth Circuit in Belknap, the Seventh

Circuit saw no reason to diffentiate the meaning of "transfer"
under § 547(b) from its meaning under § 547(c), because the
Code's own definitions of "transfer" in §§ 101(54) and 547(e)
did not recognize such a distinction.34 9
The Seventh Circuit also attacked the rationales by which the
Tenth Circuit had supported the "date of honor" rule. Though a
transfer may be more objectively indicated by bank records than
by creditors' recollections of when they received a check, even
the date stamped on a check by the drawee bank may be misleading: the U.C.C. allows the bank to dishonor a check stamped
"paid" until midnight of the "banking day" (which, under local
35 °
law, might not include Saturdays) after its receipt.
Next, the court questioned the degree to which the "date of
honor" rule could conform to the U.C.C., because state law on
perfection would be applicable only to determining the date of
absolute transfer (i.e., the date of honor), and not of the earlier
date of conditional transfer (the date of delivery). Also, the
Code's goal of preventing inequitable distribution among creditors did not favor a ninety-day period over an eighty-day or 100day one, or necessarily interpret "transfer" as delivery: "Far
more important ...

is that the rule be simple and frustrate me-

first strategies by creditors." 35 '
Finally, the Seventh Circuit embraced precisely the argument that the Tenth Circuit had rejected: that § 547(e)'s "jarring" reference to "perfection" in fact referred to the honoring
of the check by the drawee bank, after which no superior judicial
lien could attach to these assets of the debtor.352 This court of
appeals observed that "[a]lthough 'perfection' in the U.C.C. refers to security interests, the term is not so limited in § 547(e),"
which itself was found to be only a modification of § 96(a)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Act.353
2. Resolving the Limits of "Plain Meaning"?
In a majority opinion written by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the
Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision to apply the "date of
348
349
350
351
352
353

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

912-14.
913.
911-12.
912.
913.
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honor" rule. While it recognized that the delivery of a check
transferred to the creditor a conditional right in the debtor's
bank account, the Court held that this right did not amount to a
conditional right to "property or an interest in property" of the
debtor under § 101 (54) of the Code.
Between the check's delivery and its presentment, the account might be closed by the debtor or attached by another creditor, or the bank might mistakenly refuse to honor the check.
During this period, the creditor would have only a contingent
right, under U.C.C. § 3-122(3), 354 to sue the debtor for payment
if the check were dishonored. To the Court, treating this "nebulous" right "as a 'conditional transfer' of the property would
accomplish a near-limitless expansion of the term 'conditional.'
In the absence of any right against the bank or the account, we
think the fairer description is that petitioner had received no interest in debtor's property, not that his interest was
'conditional.' -355

Rather, the Court found that the transfer, or § 101(54)'s

"mode, direct or indirect... of disposing of property or an inter-

est in property," had been effected only by the drawee bank's
honoring the check and subtracting that amount from the
debtor's claim against the funds held by the bank for his account.
In addition, the Court held that the "date of honor" rule was in
accord with the Code's § 547(e)(2)(A), which provides that a
transfer occurs at the time that the transfer "takes effect between
the transferor and the transferee." Since the debtor could stop
payment on the check until the moment the check was honored,
it was only at that moment that the transfer to the creditor would
be deemed to have taken place.
For three reasons, the Court found the legislative history of
§ 547(c) of little relevance. First, the majority flatly deemed
§ 547(b) clear enough not to require the Court to examine the
provision's legislative history. 356 Second, even if the statutory
history were relevant, the available passages concerned the "specialized purpose" of § 547(c), not of § 547(b).357 Finally, the
354 U.C.C. § 3-122(3) provides that "[a] cause of action against a drawer of a
draft or an indorser of any instrument accrues upon demand following dishonor of
the instrument. Notice of dishonor is a demand."
355 Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1391.
356 Id. at 1391. "[Alppeals to statutory history are well-taken only to resolve
'statutory ambiguity.' We do not think this is such a case." Id. (citing Toibb, 111 S.
Ct. at 2200).
357 Id.
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Court noted that in Wolas, 3 5 8 it had dissolved any distinction be-

tween "long-term" and "short-term" debts, which the cited portions of the legislative history had addressed. Thus, the Court
held in Barnhill that "it would clearly be inappropriate to extrapolate from that history for purposes of interpreting the scope of
§ 547(b) and § 101(54). ' s5
In a dissent joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens cited
"established practices in the business community ' 360 as supporting the conclusion that the delivery of the check, and the concomitant conditional transfer of the right to funds in the debtor's
bank account, did constitute a "transfer" under § 101(54).
Under § 547(e)(2), the transfer would occur on the date of delivery, on the condition that the transfer was perfected within ten
days. If the check was not honored within ten days, the transfer
would be deemed to occur on the date of honor.
The dissent resolved the question of the "perfection" of
transfers in the context of the Code by noting that the term has a
"broader meaning" in § 547(e) than in the U.C.C. 3 6 1 Under that
provision, perfection of a transfer by check occurs on the date of
honor, after which date no party can acquire a judicial lien that
takes priority over the creditor's interest in the transferred funds.
Citing the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Belknap, the dissent
noted the courts of appeals' decisions and the legislative history
supporting the "date of delivery" rule in the context of transfers
by check. In connection with the definition of "transfer," Justice
Stevens observed that "[n]ormally, we assume that the same
terms have the same meaning in different sections of the same
statute. That rule is not inexorable, but nothing in the structure
or purpose of § 547(b) and § 547(c) suggests a reason for inter36 2
preting these adjacent subsections differently.

Beyond its immediate practical implications, 36 ' Barnhill illus358 See supra notes 146-70 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
Wolas.
359 Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1391 n.9. The Court declined to address whether the
"date of delivery" rule applied to check payments under § 547(c).
360 Id. at 1392 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
361 Id. at 1393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
362 Id. at 1393-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
363 Barnhill encourages creditors to endorse and present as soon as possible to
the drawee banks all checks received from troubled creditors. While a "date of
delivery" rule would take the timing of a transfer by check out of a creditor's hands
(except to the extent that the payee could influence a teetering debtor to deliver
checks more promptly), under the "date of honor" rule endorsed by the Supreme
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trated the continuing indeterminacy in the Court's methods of
statutory interpretation. First, the proper justification for interpreting the same word differently in separate subsections of the
Code remained in the eye of the beholder. Justice Scalia, who in
his Dewsnup dissent had excoriated the Court's "one-subsectionat-a-time approach to statutory exegesis, ' s

61

agreed with the

Barnhill majority that the legislative history of § 547(b) could not
be extended to the "specialized purpose" of § 547(c). Yet it was
Justice Stevens, late of the Dewsnup majority, who here decried
the different meaning of "transfer" attributed to each of these
subsections .65
Second, while Dewsnup had resisted readings of the Code
that would alter the expectations of the parties, the Barnhill majority was faulted by the dissent for rejecting a rule "consistent
with .

.

. traditional commercial practice [and] the treatment of

checks in tax law." '6 6 Not only had the majority failed to address
these considerations directly, but the linchpin of its logic - the
conclusion that the transfer of a check did not constitute a "conditional transfer" of the underlying funds - would directly contradict the expectations of many commercial debtors, payees, and
their counsel. Indeed, the majority had explicitly acknowledged
36 7
the Code's "expansive" definition of "transfer.

Finally, as its sole support for this restriction, the Court offered only its general reluctance to foster "a near-limitless expansion of the term 'conditional.'" Those seeking a firmer analytical
base for Barnhill could only acknowledge, as did Justice Scalia in
Court the behavior of the creditor itself affects the timing of the transfer for preference avoidance purposes.
In this connection, the thirty-day period identified by U.C.C. § 3-503(2)(a) as a
"reasonable time for presentment" of "an uncertified check which is drawn and
payable within the United States and which is not a draft drawn by a bank" might be
seen as an outer limit for presentment; a prudent creditor will have presented the
check as soon as is practicable.
The thirty-day limit remains relevant if the creditor anticipates arguing that,
under § 547(c), the transfer is not a preference. (It should be remembered that
U.C.C. § 3-511 (2)(a) allows the debtor to consent, "expressly or by implication," to
a longer period for the initiation of collection.) Similarly, a payee should not diminish its efforts to ensure, and to record, its prompt receipt of the debtor's checks,
as the "date of delivery" rule still applies in those circuits that have considered
§ 547(c) preference calculations.
364 Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 781. See supra notes 250-73 and accompanying text for
commentary on Justice Scalia's vigorous dissent in Dewsnup.
365 See supra note 363.
366 Id. at 1392 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
367 Id. at 1390.
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Dewsnup,3 6 8 that "a bankruptcy law has little to do with natural
justice."
I.

Patterson v. Shumate 369

In Patterson, the Court unanimously held that creditors cannot reach individual debtors' interests in certain pension plans.
Applying the "plain meaning" doctrine to interpret an ambiguous section of the Code, the Court resolved a 4-4 split among the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals concerning the status of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 3 70 as "applicable nonbankruptcy law."
1. Background
In keeping with the Code's policy of providing a "fresh
start," the debtor may separate from the bankruptcy estate created under § 541(a) of the Code3 7 ' assets that are either "excluded ' 372 or "exempted ' 37 3 from the estate. An excluded asset
never enters the bankruptcy estate. The individual debtor can
argue in the alternative that the asset is exempted from the bankruptcy estate under a specific exception contained either in the
Code or in the relevant federal, state or local law.
The exclusion of a debtor's interest in a pension plan is governed by § 541 (c)(2), which provides that "a restriction on the
transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable" in
bankruptcy proceedings.3 7 4 The exemption of an individual
debtor's interest in a pension plan is governed by § 522. Section
522(b)(1) provides that, in those states that have not precluded
the "federal exemptions" of § 522(d), debtors may avail themDewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992). The following discussion has been adapted with
permission from that presented in Walter A. Effross, Debtor's Interest in ERISA Plans
Exempt from Estate, 131 N.J.L.J. 759 (1992).
370 PUB. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 898 (1974). ERISA, which protects employees'
retirement income held in a fund created or maintained by their employer, is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144, and in several sections of the Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
371 See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
372 For a more extensive analysis of exclusion issues and of the circuit courts' 4-4
division on this issue before the Supreme Court's decision in Shumate, see Walter A.
Effross, ERISA Meets Title 11: The Looking-Glass Logic of Pension Benefits in Bankruptcy,
in EMERGING BANKRUPTCY ISSUES OF THE 90'S 181-244 (New Jersey Institute for
Continuing Legal Education Seminar Materials, 1992).
373 See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
374 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988) (emphases added).
368
369

1993]

GRAMMARIANS AT THE GATE

1711

selves of any or all of those eleven specific exemptions.3 75 One of
the federal exemptions, § 522(d)(10)(E), exempts the debtor's
right to receive "a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness,
disability, death, age or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent
of the debtor.

'3 76

As an alternative to the federal exemptions,

§ 522(b)(2)(A) allows individual debtors to claim as exempt any
property that is exempt from attachment by creditors under applicable state or local law or uner any federal law other than the
federal exemptions.3 77
Thus, a debtor's interest in a pension plan might be: (a) excluded from the bankruptcy estate under applicable nonbankruptcy law: (b) exempted from the estate under a specific
federal exemption, to the extent necessary for the support of the
debtor and her dependents; (c) exempted under applicable state
or local law (for example, if the plan qualifies as a spendthrift
trust 3 78 ); or (d) exempted from federal law other than the federal
exemptions. At the time that Shumate began his litigation, the
Supreme Court had not ruled on whether ERISA qualified either
as "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under (a) or as relevant federal law under (d).
When Coleman Furniture ("Coleman") filed a chapter 11
petition for reorganization in 1982, Joseph B. ShumateJr., Coleman's president and the chairman of its board of directors, had
been with the company for more than thirty years. Shumate's
375 See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text. The federal exemptions are
operative in the District of New Jersey.
376 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)(E) (1988).
377 See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
378 On July 9, 1993, the New Jersey Assembly enacted a bill, effective immediately, rendering exempt from creditors certain pension or profit-sharing assets and
distributions. P.L. 1992, Chapter 177 (Assembly Committee Substitute for 1992
Assembly Nos. 288 and 1462).
The Act revised N.J. STAT. ANN. 25:2-1 to render "void as against creditors"
every deed of gift and every conveyance, transfer and assignment of goods, chattels or things in action, made in trust for the use of the person making the same."
Two sets of exceptions remain to this general rule. First, creditors can attack transfers as preferences or fraudulent conveyances made in violation of the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. 25:2-20 et. seq., or any other state or federal law. Second, the statute will not shelter the assets of a qualifying trust from
claims made under any order for child support or spousal support or from the
claims of an alternate payee, under a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO").
(However, the interest of any alternate payee under a QDRO will be exempt from
all claims of any creditor of the alternate payee.)
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interest in Coleman's pension plan (the "plan"), which had almost 400 participants and which was funded solely by Coleman's
contributions, was estimated at $250,000.371

These contributions were tax-deductible to Coleman, and,
with their earnings, were taxed as income to plan participants
only on their withdrawal of the funds. The plan's favorable tax
treatment resulted from its being "ERISA-qualified," that is,
meeting various requirements of that statute. 3

0

Notably, by

prohibiting participants from assigning or alienating their bene38
fits, the plan complied with 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) of ERISA
and with a counterpart provision of the Internal Revenue Code
("IRC"), 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13).38
In these respects, the plan
resembled a spendthrift trust, whose corpus and benefits many
states protect from a beneficiary's creditors if the beneficiary (1)
is not the creator of the trust; (2) has no control over the trust
funds; and (3) cannot voluntarily or involuntarily control his in383
terest in the trust.

In 1984, Shumate filed a chapter 13 petition, which, like
Coleman's, was converted to a chapter 7 liquidation. All of the
Coleman pension claims except Shumate's were paid in full; Shumate and his trustee in bankruptcy, John R. Patterson, each asserted the right to recover Shumate's interest in the plan from
Coleman's bankruptcy trustee, Roy V. Creasey. Because of the
procedural posture of the parties in related litigation, the district
court assumed jurisdiction over the bankruptcy court proceedings with regard to the disposition of Shumate's interest in the
4
3

plan.

8

Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2245.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) provides that "[elach pension plan shall provide that
the benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."
382 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988) provides that "[a] trust shall not constitute a
qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which such a trust is a part
provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."
The terms "assignment" and "alienation" include:
(i) Any arrangement providing for the payment to the employer of
plan benefits which otherwise would be due the participant under the
plan, and
(ii) Any direct or indirect arrangement (whether revocable or irrevocable) whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary a
right or interest enforceable against the plan in, or to, all or part of a
plan benefit payment which is, or may become, payable to the participant or beneficiary.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-(13)(c).
383 See, e.g., 119 A.L.R. 19 (regarding "Validity of Spendthrift Trusts").
384 Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2245.
379
380
381
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The district court denied Shumate's motion to compel his
chapter 7 trustee to turn over Shumate's interest in the plan.
First, the court analyzed whether this asset could be excluded from
Shumate's estate under the "applicable non-bankruptcy law" referred to in § 541(c) (2). 35 Since the Fourth Circuit had construed that phrase to refer only to state law, 3 8 6 the district court
restricted its examination to whether the plan was a valid spendthrift trust under Virginia law.38 7
The court observed that Shumate's voting control over his
own Coleman stock, and his right to vote other stock held in a
voting trust, had enabled him to terminate the plan at any time
under its terms and to opt for a lump sum of his own interest plus
the reversion of excess pension funds as a dividend to himself.
Shumate had "exercised such power over the ... pension trust

that he could control it to suit his needs. Such dominion is inconsistent with the notion of spendthrift trusts.

38 8

Thus, Shu-

mate could not exclude from his bankruptcy estate his interest in
the plan.
Nor could this interest be exempted from the estate. Because
Virginia did not give effect to the federal exemptions of § 522(d),
the specific exemption of § 522(d)(10)(e) would not apply. 8 9
Shumate
nonetheless
argued
for
exemption
under
§ 522(b)(2)(a), contending that 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) of ERISA
would prevent any assignment of his interest in the plan, even to
Coleman's bankruptcy trustee. However, the court noted that
the House and Senate reports on that provision of the Code did
not refer to ERISA.390 Indeed, the federal laws listed in those
reports were related to benefits granted not by private employers, but by the federal government itself (e.g., Social Security payments, veterans' benefits) or by federally protected industries
(e.g., the Foreign Service, railroads). 9 1
Before hearing Shumate's appeal, the Fourth Circuit had reversed its earlier position on the construction of "applicable
bankruptcy law": for purposes of exclusion, this reference would
Creasey v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 83 B.R. 404 (W.D. Va. 1988).
McLean v. Central States, S.& S. Areas Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir.
1985) (examining, in determining whether debtor's interest in trust fund is property of estate, enforceability under state law of pension trust agreement's restrictions on transfer).
387 Creasey, 83 B.R. at 406.
388 Id. at 408.
389 Id. at 409 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 34-31 (Michie 1985)).
390 Id. at 410.
391 Id.
385
386
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now be taken to include ERISA.392 The court of appeals thus
found that, despite Shumate's control over the disposition of
plan assets, the only relevant inquiry was whether the plan was
ERISA-qualified - that is, whether it contained a nonalienation
provision. 93 The approach would harmonize ERISA's policy of
protecting the pension benefits of employees with the Code's
"fresh-start" policy of excepting certain assets from the bankruptcy estate. 94 Reversing the district court, the Fourth Circuit
upheld the exclusion from Shumate's estate of his interest in the
plan. Since its resolution of this issue was dispositive, the appeals
court declined to address whether Shumate's interest in the plan
could be exempted from the estate under § 522(b).395
Although the Fourth Circuit was the first court of pppeals to
adopt this position, it would be joined by the' Third, Sixth and
Tenth Circuits by the time the issue reached the Supreme
Court.3 9 6 Among the arguments cited by these courts of appeals
were: (i) that the phrase should be read literally;397 (ii) that the
same phrase is used elsewhere in the Code to refer both to state
and to federal law; 398 and (iii) that the Code specifies where only

state law is intended. 399 These four circuits also held that an examination of the legislative history was, alternatively, inappropriate (under Toibb, because there was no ambiguity in
§ 541(c)(2));4 °° irrelevant, because the pension plans at issue in
these cases were unlike those addressed by state spendthrift trust
law;40 ' and, finally, inconclusive. 40

2

Moreover, the exclusion of

the debtor's interest in his ERISA-qualified plan would: give full
force to both ERISA and the Code; 40 3 further ERISA's broader
Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 365.
Id.
396 Gladwell v. Harline (In re Harline), 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 2991 (1992); Velis v. Kardanis (In re Velis), 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991);
Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Forbes v.
Holiday Corp. Sav. and Retirement Plan, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991).
397 Harline, 950 F.2d at 674; Velis, 949 F.2d at 81; Lucas, 924 F.2d at 601; Moore,
907 F.2d at 1477.
398 Harline, 950 F.2d at 674; Velis, 949 F.2d at 81; Lucas, 924 F.2d at 601; Moore,
907 F.2d at 1477-78.
399 Harline, 950 F.2d at 674; Velis, 949 F.2d at 81; Lucas, 924 F.2d at 601-02;
Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478.
400 Harline, 950 F.2d at 674; Lucas, 924 F.2d at 601; Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478.
401 Harline, 950 F.2d at 674.
402 Lucas, 924 F.2d at 602; Moore, 907 F.2d at 1479.
403 Harline, 950 F.2d at 675; Patterson, 943 F.2d at 365; Lucas, 924 F.2d at 603;
Moore, 907 F.2d at 1480.
392
393
394
395
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purpose of ensuring uniform treatment throughout the country; 40 4 and prevent being disqualified from the entire plan from

tax-exempt status in the event that a single bankrupt participant's
interest in the plan was turned over to his bankruptcy trustee. 40 5
Nor did these courts find § 541(c) (2) to be redundant with
§ 522.406

Four other circuit courts of appeals would reach the opposite conclusion. 0 7 The arguments against exclusion included: (i)
that § 522(d)(10)(E)'s specific exemption of income from qualified plans indicated that Congress intended the debtor's right to
payment from spendthrift trusts to be included in the original
bankruptcy estate; 408 (ii) that the legislative history indicated that
ERISA-qualified plans were not intended to be exempted from
the estate under § 522;409 and (iii) that, while ERISA might preempt state law, it was subordinate to the Code's policy of distributing the debtor's property among creditors.4 10
2.

"Plain Meaning" Triumphant

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine whether
for purposes of exclusion ERISA constituted "applicable
nonbankruptcy law." ' 4 1 ' Justice Blackmun's "plain meaning"

analysis quickly dispatched the problems raised by Patterson:indeed, the first sentence of the Court's analysis indicated that "In
Lucas, 924 F.2d at 603; Moore, 907 F.2d at 1480.
Moore, 907 F.2d at 1480.
Velis, 949 F.2d at 81-82 (Section 522 deals with distributions made from pension plan and distributions that debtor has present and immediate right to receive;
even if pension plan assets in hands of trustee are beyond reach of creditors because not part of debtor's estate under § 541(c)(2), distributions made from plan to
debtor would not enjoy such protection, in absence of exemption under
§ 522(d)(10)(E)).
407 Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 2488 (11 th Cir. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726
F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
These circuits would later be joined by the Ninth Circuit. See Reed v. Drummond
(In re Reed), 951 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 113 S.
Ct. 314 (1992), opinion withdrawn and superseded, 985 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1993);
Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1991), reversed, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.
1993) (reversing prior opinion in light of Supreme Court's Patterson decision); John
Hancock Mutual Life Insur. Co. v. Watson (In re Kincaid), 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir.
1990).
408 Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272.
409 Daniel, 771 F.2d at 1360-61; Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d at 1491; Graham, 726 F.2d at
1273-74; Goff, 706 F.2d at 583-85.
410 Goff, 706 F.2d at 588-89.
411 Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
404
405
406
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our view, the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA
is our determinant. ' 41 2 The "natural reading" of § 541(c)(2)4 13
indicated that "applicable nonbankruptcy law". "encompasses
any relevant nonbankruptcy law, including federal law such '4 as
14
ERISA. We must enforce the statute according to its terms."
Moreover, other provisions of the Code demonstrated that Congress, when it desired to do so, "knew how to restrict the scope
of applicable law to 'state law' and did so with some frequency."415 Finally, the Court found that ERISA's restriction on
assignment or alienation of the benefits of a qualified plan fell
within § 541 (c)'s "restriction on the transfer" of a debtor's "ben4 16
eficial interest" in the trust.

This straightforward application of the plain-meaning doctrine generally dispensed with consideration of the provision's
legislative history.4 17 Nonetheless, the Court observed that what
"meager excerpts" could be gleaned from the House and Senate
Reports accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 indicated only that the exclusion was intended to include, but not
that it was limited to, spendthrift trusts.4 1 8 In short, the Fourth
Circuit and its supporters, "by ignoring the plain language of
§ 541(c)(2) and relying on isolated excerpts from the legislative
41 9
history[,] have misconceived the appropriate analytical task."
The trustee argued that excluding debtors' entire interests
in
ERISA-qualified
plans
would
directly
contradict
§ 522(d)(10)(E)'s limited federal exemption for such interests.
However, the Court found that its broad interpretation of
§ 541(c)(2) had not eviscerated this exemption, which also covered interests in plans that were not excludable under a broad
reading of "applicable nonbankruptcy law," including individual
retirement accounts (IRA's) and pension plans established by
Patterson, 112 S.Ct. at 2246 (citing Toibb, 111 S.Ct. at 2199).
Id.
Id. at 2247 (citing Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 241). Indeed, lower courts had construed the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in other sections of the Code to
include federal law. Id. n.2.
415 Id. (citing, inter alia, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (providing exemptions tracking
"the State law that is applicable to the debtor") and 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (determining "in accordance with State or territorial law" the nondischargeability of debt
for alimony, maintenance or support)).
416 Id.
417 Id. at 2248. "[T]he clarity of the statutory language at issue in this case obviates the need for any ...inquiry [into legislative history]." Id. (citing Toibb, 111 S.
Ct. at 2200; Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 241).
418 Id.
419 Id. n.4.
412
413
414
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churches and by governmental agencies."'
Finally, the Court cited legislative and social policies in support of its construction of the Code. The exclusion from the
debtor's estate of his interest in an ERISA-qualified plan "ensures that the treatment of pension benefits will not vary based
on the beneficiary's bankruptcy status": that is, lenders unable to
reach such interests outside of the bankruptcy process would
have no additional incentive to file involuntary petitions against
borrowers. 4 2 ' Nor should ERISA's protection of pension bene-

fits be withheld from debtors. Moreover, the Court's broad reading of "applicable non-bankruptcy law" to incorporate ERISA
would promote nationwide uniformity in the bankruptcy treatment of pension benefits, rather than leaving them to "the vagar'4 2 2
ies of state spendthrift trust law."

Yet the majority's application of the "plain meaning" rule
did not satisfy Justice Scalia. Just as his ninety-nine-word concurrence in Wolas had reproached the "legal culture" for encouraging litigation that "the plain text of the statute should have made
...
unnecessary and unmaintainable, ' 4 23 his two-paragraph con420 Id. at 2248-49.
421 Id.
422 Id. at 2250. Patterson'spro-debtor stance was reinforced by the Court's denial
of certiorari in Farm Services v. Morter, 937 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 2991 (1992), in which the Seventh Circuit excluded a debtor's interest in
a non-traditional pension plan. Morter held that, so long as the retirement plan did
not allow the beneficiary and his creditors to reach the plan corpus, the plan would
qualify as a spendthrift trust under state law, and thus could be excluded under
§ 541(c)(2). Morter, 937 F.2d at 358. "The fact that the plan administrators might
have to dip into the fund to make up any shortfall [in distributions] is not as important to the analysis as the extent of access to the plan and who has that access." Id.
Although it reconciled the most serious conflict between ERISA and bankruptcy law, Patterson left several other issues unresolved. For instance, the Court
did not address whether the federal exemption of § 522(d)(10)(E) applies to the
entire undistributed corpus of a pension trust or only to distributions that a debtor
has an immediate and present right to receive. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2249 n.5.
Nor did the Court decide whether ERISA constitutes relevant federal law for exemptions under § 522(b)(2)(A). Id. at 2250.
In addition, Patterson noted without comment the Internal Revenue Service's
position that the conveyance to a debtor's bankruptcy trustee of the debtor's interest in a pension plan would revoke the plan's ERISA-qualified status, and thus extinguish the tax benefits to employers and participants. Id. at 2247 n.3. In a recent
letter ruling, the IRS had itself endorsed the exclusion of such interests under
§ 541(c)(2), but had nonetheless approved a method of protecting the plan's ERISA-qualified status: subject to IRS approval, the plan trustee could forward to the
bankruptcy trustee a loan check and hardship withdrawal check payable to the
debtor, who would endorse the checks to the bankruptcy trustee in the bankruptcy
trustee's presence. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-051 (Dec. 5, 1990).
423 Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 534 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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currence in Patterson found "mystifying" the ability of three
Courts of Appeals to interpret "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
as excluding federal law. 4 24 To this Justice, "the phenomenon

calls into question whether our legal culture has so far departed
from attention to text, or is so lacking in agreed-upon methodology for creating and interpreting text, that it any longer makes
sense to talk of 'a government of laws, not of men.' "425
Justice Scalia was mollified, however, by the majority's emphasis on the connotations of "state law" and "applicable nonbankruptcy law" elsewhere in the Code: he perceived this approach as a harbinger of the Court's return to the proposition
that phrases should be interpreted uniformly across the provisions of the Code. Although he had castigated the majority in
Dewsnup for its "one-subsection-at-a-time approach to statutory
exegesis,

' 42 6

in Patterson this Justice concluded his dissent with

the presumption that "in our search for a neutral and rational
interpretive methodology we have now come to rest, so that the
symbol 7 of our profession may remain the scales, not the see42
saw."
This interpretation, though, may have been premature.
First, although the Patterson majority noted that its interpretation
of "applicable non-bankruptcy law" was consonant with lower
court opinions construing that phrase elsewhere in the Code, it
carefully refrained from commenting on "the correctness of
[those] decisions.1' 428 Second, the Dewsnup majority, which explicitly limited its holding to the situation then before the
Court,4 29 involved an ambiguity more complex than that of Shumate: indeed, one whose resolution required a review of legislative history and pre-Code practice. The Code's "plain meaning"
approach might not be stepping off the Scalia see-saw so quickly!

J. Pioneer Investment Services
v. Brunswick Associates
43
Limited Partnership

6

The Court's next venture into the "plain meaning" of the
Code concerned the "excusable neglect" exception to the Rule
Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2250-51 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See supra notes 250-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Dewsnup.
427 Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2251 (Scalia, J., concurring).
428 Id. at 2247 n.2.
429 Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992).
430 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993).
424
425
426
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of Bankruptcy Procedure that prohibited the late filing of a proof
of claim. Just as the Court had in Dewsnup construed the phrase
"allowed secured claim" "term-by-term to refer to any claim that
is, first, allowed, and, second, secured," '' so did the majority
here endorse a collegiate dictionary's definition of "neglect," as
modified by the Court's construction of "excusable." Yet, the
dissent, adopting a legal dictionary's strict interpretation of "excusable neglect" as an indivisible term of art, rejected the Court's
multifactored approach to the equities of permitting an untimely
action.
1. Background
Pioneer Investment Services ("Pioneer") filed a chapter 11
petition on April 12, 1989.432 The debtor's list of its twenty largest unsecured creditors included plaintiffs Brunswick Associates
Limited Partnership ("Brunswick"), Clinton Associates Limited
Partnership ("Clinton"), and West Knoxville Associates Limited
Partnership ("W.Knoxville"), but not plaintiff Ft. Oglethorpe Associates Limited Partnership ("Ft. Oglethorpe").43 3
The following day, the bankruptcy court clerk's office mailed
a Notice for Meeting of Creditors that scheduled for May 5, 1989
the creditors' meeting called for by § 341 (a) of the Code.434 The
same notice fixed August 3, 1989 as the bar date for unsecured
creditors to file proofs of claim, and warned that "[y]ou must file
a proof of claim if your claim is scheduled as disputed, contingent or unliquidated, is unlisted or you do not agree with the
amount. See 11 U.S.C. § 1111 & Bankruptcy Rule 3003. Bar
4 5
date is August 3, 1989.P9

3

Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 777.
Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership v. Pioneer Investment Services
Company (In re Pioneer Investment Services Company), 943 F.2d 673, 675 (6th Cir.
1991).
433 Id.
434 Id. at 674-75. Section 341(a) provides that "[w]ithin a reasonable time after
the order for relief in a case under [title 11], the United States trustee shall convene
and preside at a meeting of creditors." Section 343 requires the debtor to appear
at this meeting to submit to examination under oath by "[c]reditors, any indenture
trustee, any trustee or examiner in the case, or the United States trustee." 11
U.S.C. § 343 (1988).
435 PioneerInv., 943 F.2d at 675. Section 1111 (a) provides that a proof of claim or
interest is not deemed filed merely because the debtor has scheduled it as disputed,
contingent or unliquidated. 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (a) (1988).
Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(2) generally requires creditors or equity security
holders whose claims or interests are not scheduled or are scheduled as disputed,
contingent, or unliquidated to file a proof of claim or interest by the bar date set by
the court (or by such later date as shall be set by the court). If a creditor's proof of
431
432
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The bankruptcy court found that Mark Berlin, an attorney
and experienced businessman who was the president not only of
Clinton's, W.Knoxville's and Brunswick's general partner, but
also of Ft. Oglethorpe's general partner, had received and read
this notice, and had appeared at the May 5 meeting of
creditors.436

Pioneer's statement of affairs and relevant schedules, which
the debtor had received an extension of time to file, were filed in
May and did not name any of the plaintiffs as a creditor holding
contingent, unliquidated or disputed claims. However, on May
25 these documents were subsequently amended to so identify all
of the plaintiffs except Ft. Oglethorpe. 4 7
In mid-June 1989, the plaintiffs retained an experienced
bankruptcy attorney, Marc Richards. Berlin's affidavit suggested
that Berlin had provided Richards with a complete copy of the
bankruptcy file for the partnerships, including the notice of the
bar date. Berlin also stated in his affidavit that he had been advised by Richards that the file did not indicate a bar date and that
there was thus no immediate need to file proofs of claim.4" 8
The plaintiffs filed their proofs of claim on August 23, 1989,
twenty days after the bar date. Accompanying these filings was a
motion that the court allow the late filing under Rule 9006(b)(1),
as "the result of excusable neglect,

' 43 9

namely, the disarray

caused by Richards's withdrawal from his former law firm on July
31, 1989 and his alleged consequent inability to gain access to
the case file until mid-August. 440 However, the bankruptcy court
interpreted "excusable neglect" narrowly, as encompassing only
claim is not timely filed, that creditor "shall not be treated as a creditor with respect
to such claim for the purposes of voting and distribution." FED. R. BANKR. P.
3003(c)(2).
436 Pioneer Inv., 943 F.2d at 675.
437 Id.
438 Id.
439 Pioneer Inv., 113 S. Ct. at 1492. Rule 9006(b)(1) provides:
Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subdivision,
when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of
court, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally
prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) on motion made
after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the
failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1) (emphasis added).
440 Pioneer Inv., 113 S. Ct. at 1492-93.
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circumstances beyond a party's reasonable control.4 4 ' Since the
partnerships had received timely notice of the bar date, they
could have complied with this filing deadline.4 4 2
The district court reversed, citing the Sixth Circuit's more
liberal interpretation of "excusable neglect" in the context of
other federal rules. 44 ' To determine this question for purposes
of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), the district court endorsed the application of the Ninth Circuit's standard, enunciated in In re
Dix,4 4 4 which entails consideration of:
(1) whether granting the delay will prejudice the debtor;
(2) the length of the delay and its impact on efficient court
administration;
(3) whether the delay was beyond the reasonable control of
the person whose duty it was to perform;
(4) whether the creditor acted in good faith; and
(5) whether clients should be penalized for their counsel's
mistake or neglect.4 4 5
The bankruptcy court was also advised to take into account the factors identified by the Sixth Circuit in INVST Financial Group, Inc. v.
Chem Nuclear Systems, Inc. concerning "whether the filing of the late
proofs of claim resulted from negligence, indifference or culpable
44 6
conduct on the part of the moving creditors or their counsel.
On remand, the bankruptcy court once again found no "excusable neglect." In an unpublished opinion the court concluded, after
applying the Dix factors, that: (1) the debtor would not be
prejudiced by the late filings; (2) the twenty-day delay in filing would
not adversely affect efficient court administration; (3) the delay had
not been caused by circumstances outside the creditors' control; (4)
the creditors and their counsel had acted in good faith; and (5) because Berlin was a sophisticated businessman and had been aware of
the bar date, it was not inappropriate to penalize the creditors for
441 Pioneer Inv., 943 F.2d at 676. The bankruptcy court derived its test from
South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 817 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub
nom. Biscayne 21 Condominium Associates, Inc. v. South Atlantic FinancialCorp., 475 U.S.
1015 (1986). Pioneer Inv., 113 S. Ct. at 1493.
442 Id.
443 Pioneer Inv., 943 F.2d at 676-77 (citing INVST Financial Group, Inc. v. Chem.
Nuclear Systems, Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 397-400 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Garrett
v. INVST Financial Group, Inc., 484 U.S. 927 (1987) (determination of "excusable
neglect" under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which concerns motions to set aside default
judgments, involves considerations of prejudice to plaintiff, of merits of defendant's defenses, and of any culpable conduct on defendant's part)).
444 95 B.R. 134 (BAP 9th Cir. 1988).
445 Pioneer Inv., 943 F.2d at 677 (quotation omitted).
446 INVST Financial Group, 815 F.2d at 398-99.
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the neglect of their counsel.4 4 7 The bankruptcy court also found
that Richards had been negligent in failing to meet the bar date, and
inferred from this failure the attorney's indifference to the bar date
and to the court's orders.4 4 8 The district court affirmed, also in an
unpublished opinion.
The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that in applying the fifth Dix
factor the bankruptcy court had "inappropriately penalized the
plaintiffs for the errors of their counsel." 4'4 9 Because Berlin's experience in business did not extend to bankruptcy, his failure to note a
brief reference to a "bar date" in a form headed "Notice for Meeting of Creditors," as well as his reliance on Richards's representations concerning the absence of a filing deadline, should not
disadvantage the debtors.4 5 ° Indeed, Berlin's specific questions to
Richards regarding filing deadlines, and his reliance, as a businessman without expertise in bankruptcy, on Richards's answer, undercut the effect of the only Dix factor that might have militated against
the creditors-that the late filing had been within their control. 4 5'
The court of appeals held that delayed claims should not be precluded where "the fault is clearly attributable to the attorney, and
no prejudice results to the debtor."'4 52
2.

Equitable Excuses and Dueling Dictionaries

In affirming the Sixth Circuit's liberal interpretation of "excusable neglect, ' 4 53 the Supreme Court emphasized the equitaPioneer Inv., 113 S.Ct. at 1493.
448 Pioneer Inv., 943 F.2d at 677.
449 Id. The Court recommended that "the Dix factors should be applied as aids
for case-by-case adjudication, rather than [as] a necessary or complete list of the
factors to be considered." Id.
450 Id. at 678. After noting the more explicit language recommended by Official
Bankruptcy Form 16 for a notice of a proof of claims deadline in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy, the Sixth Circuit observed that
[W]hile we do not suggest that the court was obligated to notify creditors in precisely this form, the comparison between this Form 16 notice and the notice actually given in this case suggests the dramatic
ambiguity of the latter. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the fact that
the notice was simply and inconspicuously labeled "Bar date" without
any reference to its significance as a deadline for the filing of proof of
claims.
d.
447

451
452
453

Id.

Id.
That reading of Rule 9006(b)(1) had been adopted by the Tenth Circuit in In
re Centric Corp., 901 F.2d 1514, 1517-18 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Trustees of
Centennial State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Centric Corp., 498 U.S. 852
(1990) (approving bankruptcy court's application of five-factor test for "excusable
neglect"), but opposed by four other circuit courts. See In re Davis, 936 F.2d 771,
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ble nature of bankruptcy practice. Justice White observed that, in
light of the "range of possible explanations for a party's failure to
comply with a court-ordered filing deadline,"4 '54 Rule 9006(b)(1)
should not be construed rigidly, that is, to excuse late filings only
if the delay resulted from circumstances beyond a completely
blameless party's reasonable control.
On a literal level, the expression "excusable neglect" invited
a lenient approach. The Court observed that a collegiate dictionary's definition of "neglect" extended beyond "simple, faultless
omissions to act [to include,] more commonly, omissions caused
by carelessness." 4 '55 This more compassionate reading was sup774 (4th Cir. 1991) ("excusable neglect" inquiry centers on whether delay could
have been prevented by exercise of diligence by party that failed to perform); In re
Danielson, 981 F.2d 296, 298 (7th Cir. 1992) ("excusable neglect" is common term
in rules of procedure, and Congress regularly holds that the term does not include
sloth, ignorance and other negligence); Hanson v. First Bank of South Dakota,
N.A., 828 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1987) (conduct does not constitute "excusable neglect" when delay was within creditor's control and could have been prevented by exercise of diligence by party that failed to perform); In re Analytical
Systems, Inc., 933 F.2d 939, 942 (11 th Cir. 1991) (standard of "excusable neglect"
is whether failure to timely perform duty was due to circumstances that were beyond reasonable control of person whose duty it was to perform). Pioneer Inv., 113
S. Ct. at 1494 n.3.
454 Id. The Court explained:
At one end of the spectrum, a party may be prevented from complying by forces beyond its control, such as by an act of God or unforeseeable human intervention. At the other, a party simply may choose
to flout a deadline. In between lie cases where a party may choose to
miss a deadline for a very good reason, such as to render first aid to
an accident victim discovered on the way to the courthouse, as well as
cases where a party misses a deadline through inadvertence, miscalculation, or negligence.
Id.
455 Id. at 1494-95 (citing WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 791
(1983) (defining "neglect" as "to give little attention or respect to a matter" or,
alternately, "to leave undone or unattended to esp[ecially] through carelessness.")). Cf Begier v. U.S., 496 U.S. 53 (1990) (citing "common meaning of'withholding,' " as evidenced by entry in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, in
support of literal interpretation of Internal Revenue Code regarding employers'
withholding of wages).
The Court noted the general principle that, in the absence of evidence otherwise, Congress is presumed to have intended words in statutes to carry "their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Id. at 1495 (quoting Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (looking beyond development and evolution of early
common-law definition, to ordinary meaning of term, "bribery" at time Congress
enacted Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952)). Cf. Rowland v. California Men's Colony,
113 S. Ct. 716 (1993) (extended discussion by both majority and dissent regarding
meaning of "person" under Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, which contains definition
of "person" applicable to every congressional statute "unless the context indicated
otherwise"; under literal reading of statute in question, only a natural person, and
not a corporation is eligible for treatment informa pauperis).
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ported on a policy level by the applicability of Rule 9006(b)(1)'s
"excusable neglect" standard to filings of proofs of claim in
chapter 11 cases, which in the context of providing the debtor
with a "fresh start" commonly involve equitable considerations,
but not to chapter 7 cases, which primarily concern the efficient
dismantling and distribution of the bankruptcy estate.456 Moreover, the predecessors of Rule 9006(b), and of Rule 3003(c),
which governs the time to file claims in chapter 11 proceedings,
had explicitly been intended for equitable, not strict,
application.45 7
In addition, an expansive construction of "excusable neglect" was supported by the interpretation of that phrase as it
appeared in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: in Rule 6(b),
the model for Rule 9006(b)(1) 458 ; in Rule 13(f), which allows a

counterclaim to be introduced by amendment where the deadline
has passed because of the party's "oversight, inadvertence, or ex456 Id. The Court noted that, while Rule 9006(b)(3) prohibits extension of the
deadlines for filing proofs of claim in chapter 7 beyond the provisions of Rule
3002(c), which addresses the filing of such claims, Rule 9006(b) does not similarly
restrict the deadline for filing chapter 11 proofs of claim to the times specified in
Rule 3003(c). Id. n.4.
457 Id. Former Rule 10-401(b) (the counterpart to Rule 3003(c)), concerned the
filing deadlines for proofs of claim under chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
the forerunner of the Code's chapter 11. Rule 906, like its successor, today's Rule
9006, provided that courts could accept late filings in reorganization proceedings
"where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 10-401(b) indicated that the extension of the filing deadline in
these circumstances "is in accord with Chapter X generally which is to preserve
rather than to forfeit rights." Id. The note itself quoted a Senate Report that referred to the Bankruptcy Rules' "enlargement of the fixed bar date in a particular
case with leave of court and for cause shown in accordance with the equities of the
situation." FED. R. BANKR. P. 10-401(b) (advisory committee note) (repealed)
(quoting S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938)).
458 Rule 6(b) provides:
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request
therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made
after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the
failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the
time for taking any action under Rules 50(b) and (c)(2), 52(b), 59(b),
(d) and (e), 60(b), and 74(a), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b) (emphasis added). The Court cited a variety of precedent from
the courts of appeals, but none from the Supreme Court itself, to suport a literal
reading of "excusable neglect." Pioneer Inv., 113 S.Ct. at 1496 n.7 and n.9.
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cusable neglect, or where justice requires"459; and in Rule
60(b)(6), which allows courts to reopen a judgment "for any
other reason justifying relief from [its] operation" after the expiration of the one-year period of Rule 60(b)(1), which concerns
reopening judgments for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or ex4 60
cusable neglect.
Having concluded that "neglect" could appropriately be extended to include certain instances in which the movant had not
been the victim of uncontrollable circumstances, the Court next
evaluated the factors that would render neglect "excusable." In
the absence of Congressional elaboration of the latter term, and
without further discussion, the Court held that "the determination is at bottom an equitable one, taking into account all of the
46 1
relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission."
Such circumstances would include those identified by the Sixth
Circuit: "the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the
delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason
for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good
4 62
faith."
Yet the Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's assessment of the
relative responsibilities of the partnerships and of their counsel
for the late filing of the proofs of claim. Rather than addressing
the partnerships' interactions with their attorney regarding the
filing, and accordingly insulating them from the adverse effects of
their counsel's negligence, the Court reaffirmed its prior decisions that clients "be held accountable for the acts and omissions
of their chosen counsel. ' 4 63 The analysis should concentrate on
whether the neglect itself is excusable, and not on whether the
459 Id. at 1497 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 13(f)). The Court found that for purposes
of this rule, lower courts had determined "excusable neglect" by evaluating, among
other factors, "the good faith of the claimant, the extent of the delay, and the danger of prejudice to the opposing party." Id. n.10.
460 Id. at 1497 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) & 60(b)(1)). Rule 60(b)(6) has
been read to allow reopening of a default judgment against a party that had, during
the one-year period, been incarcerated, suffered medical problems, and otherwise
been the victim of factors beyond his control. The Court had characterized such
circumstance as "an extraordinary situation which cannot fairly or logically be classified as mere 'neglect' on his part." Id. (quoting Klaprott v. United States, 335
U.S. 601, 613-24 (1949)).
461 Id. at 1498.
462 Id. (citing Pioneer Inv., 943 F.2d at 677).
463 Id. at 1499 (citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (not inequitable to client to dismiss his claim because of his counsel's unexcused failure to attend scheduled pretrial conference:
attorney was client's freely-chosen
representative, whose acts, and receipt of notice, bound client); United States v.
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clients are blameless.464
On balance, though, the Court noted that the Dix factors had
favored the partnerships, which had been found to have acted in
good faith and whose assertion of a late claim would neither prejudice the debtor nor disrupt the efficient administration of the
bankruptcy proceeding. 46 5 Although the Court attached "little
weight" to the disorder attending Richards's professional transition, it did recognize the unusually inconspicuous placement of
the notice of bar date in the April 13 notice to creditors.466 Richards should indeed have read carefully enough to become aware
of the notice; but since there was no showing of prejudice to the
partnerships or to the bankruptcy process, "or any indication at
all of bad faith," the Court upheld the Sixth
Circuit's conclusion
46 7
that the neglect had been "excusable.

Justice O'Connor's dissent, which was joined by Justices
Scalia, Souter and Thomas, focused on the "plain language" of
Rule 9006(b)(1), which authorizes a court "at any time in its discretion... [to] permit [an] act to be done where the failure to act
Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985) (client may properly be penalized for counsel's late
filing of tax return).
464 id.
465 Id. at 1499. In fact, the debtor's second amended plan of reorganization had
made provisions for the partnerships' claims. Id.
466 Id. at 1499-500.
467 Id.
Judge Irenas of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
recently reversed a bankruptcy court's order, issued before Pioneer Investment, that
had rejected the appellant's motion to file a late proof of claim; the district court
remanded the decision to the bankruptcy court for reconsideration. Linder v.
Trump's Castle Assocs., 155 B.R. 102 (D.N.J. 1993). The bankruptcy court was
found not to have taken into account the last two of the three factors that the
Supreme Court's decision "requires a court to weigh... in deciding whether there
is excusable neglect under Rule 9006(b)(1): the conduct of the party and his counsel; prejudice to the debtor; and the interests of efficient judicial administration."
Id. at 108.
The district court noted three elements of the situation before it that made the
case for allowing a late filing "more compelling" than in Pioneer Investment. Id.
First, the claimant, a slip-and-fall plaintiff, had selected her lawyer to represent her
in her personal injury action, not in the defendant's subsequent bankruptcy proceedings; indeed, the record did not reflect that the claimant and her lawyer had
possessed any actual knowledge of the debtor's bankruptcy when the notice of the
bar date had been mailed. Second, this notice had not been mailed directly to the
claimant. (Although the debtor's claims agent had certified that it had mailed this
notice to the claimant's lawyer, the lawyer denied having received it, or having
otherwise become aware of any obligation to file a proof of claim or of a deadline
for doing so). Finally, this individual claimant was not, as in Pioneer Investment, "[a]
sophisticated bankruptcy entit[y] with actual knowledge of the bar date," nor was
her chosen lawyer "experienced bankruptcy counsel." Id.
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[previously] was the result of excusable neglect. '4 68 In the dissent's reading, a court was first called on to determine whether
the situation evidenced "excusable neglect": only after finding
such neglect was it to address the equities of extending the deadline.4 69 By instituting a balancing test involving a multitude of
equitable factors, the majority had diverted attention from'4 7the
"threshold" inquiry: "the reason the deadline was missed. 0
Moreover, the Court had unjustifiably concluded from the
absence of statutory benchmarks for "excusable neglect" that equitable considerations underlay the inquiry ab initio,47 ' and accordingly had improperly introduced "a multifactor balancing
test covering numerous equitable considerations. 472 Indeed, in
a recent decision interpreting the corresponding portion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the Court's analysis of "excusable neglect" had addressed, rather than the equities of the
matter, the degree of fault of the party that had failed to file.473
The dissent identified several "guideposts" of its own, albeit
not of the most explicit nature, for a stricter interpretation of the
rule. First, it read Rule 9006(b)(1) as requiring a retroactive determination of "excusable negligence," based on the movant's
own blameworthiness, rather than a prospective determination
that would take into account the effect on the parties and on the
proceedings of allowing the late filing. The language of the Rule
concerned whether "the failure to act was the result of excusable
neglect, "' 74 thereby clearly indicating that the relevant evaluaId. at 1500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1)).
Id. The majority protested that, although reducing the factors of the test for
"excusable neglect," the dissent had hardly precluded litigation over the application of the remaining factors. Only a bright-line test prohibiting any late filings
where the movant had been to any degree negligent would avert such litigation;
and yet, the majority found such a test irredeemably inflexible. Id. at 1498 n. 14
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
470 Id. at 1505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
471 Id. at 1500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
468

469

472

d.

Id. at 1501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (refusal to permit late filing under "excusable neglect"
standard of Rule 6(b) was within discretion of district court)).
The majority had distinguished Lujan by observing that it did not "define 'excusable neglect' or even decide whether that standard could have been met on the
facts of that case." Id. at 1498 n.13. Admitting that Lujan had offered no definition
of the phrase, the dissent nonetheless insisted that the decision had "applied that
phrase to the facts before us," and had in fact characterized the "excusable neglect" standard as "the greatest of all" obstacles to allowing an extension of time.
Id. (quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 897).
474 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1) (emphasis added).
473
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tion should not incorporate considerations of developments after
the neglect itself had occurred.4 75 Second, to replace the majority's reliance on a collegiate dictionary's definition of "neglect, ' 476 the dissent found "dispositive," in the absence of
congressional indications to the contrary, a standard legal dictionary's entry for the term of art, "excusable neglect," which emphasized the circumstances rather than the consequences of the
failure to act in a timely manner.4 77
Not only would the determination of "excusable neglect"
from a retroactive and equitable vantage point be unavoidably
self-defining, asserted the dissent, but it would vitiate the very
requirement that such neglect be "excusable." If "excusable neglect" merely consisted of those actions that the court, after examining the equities, found worthy of redemption, there would
by implication be no neglect that automatically would not be excused, even "the highly culpable and the willful." '4 78 The major-

ity thus had provided no guidance to those who, in its words,
might "freely ignor[e] court-ordered deadlines in the hopes of
winning a permissive reprieve under Rule 9006(b)( l). ' 47 1
Noting the disagreement between the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the bankruptcy and district courts, Justice O'Connor
criticized the the majority's balancing test as unduly indetermi475 Pioneer Inv., 113 S. Ct. at 1501-02. This reading neglected, however, the explicit statutory authorization of the court to extend the time period "at any time in
its discretion," which might be seen to allow for post-deadline inquiries. FED. R.

BANKR.

P. 9006(b)(1).

Pioneer Inv., 113 S. Ct. at 1494-95. See supra note 455 and accompanying text.
477 Id. at 1502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 566
(6th ed. 1990) (defining "excusable neglect" as "a failure to take the proper steps
at the proper time, not in consequence of the party's own carelessness, inattention,
or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care and vigilance
of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party. As used in rule (e.g., Fed.
R. Civ. P. 6(b)) authorizing court to permit an act to be done after expiration of the
time within which under the rules such act was required to be done, where failure
to act was the result of 'excusable neglect,' the quoted phrase is ordinarily understood to be the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances."). Cf Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1829 ("No one asserts that the two verbs
underlying [§ 522(f)(1)] possess anything other than their standard legal meaning:
'avoid' meaning 'annul' or 'undo' . . . and 'fix' meaning to 'fasten a liability
upon.' ") (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY). See also LOOKING-GLASS, supra note 1, at
271. Humpty Dumpty explains to Alice that "'slithy' means 'lithe and slimy.'
'Lithe' is the same as 'active.' You see it's like a port manteau [suitcase] - there are
two meanings packed up into one word."
478 Id.
479 Id.
476
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nate and, therefore, appealable.48 ° Equitable considerations
should not be relevant in determining whether a party's negligence could constitute "excusable neglect," because the first part
of the Court's test - whether the conduct at issue was excusable
neglect at all - was dispositive. In the situation before the
Court, the48 partnerships' neglect "was inexcusable under any
standard."

1

Though agreeing with the majority that a client cannot be
insulated from the effects of his counsel's errors, the dissent observed that the bankruptcy court had not found that the partnerships' counsel had missed the bar date because of the unusual
form of notice; in fact, that court had found that both the attorney and his clients had had actual notice of the deadline. 482 The
former counsel had himself admitted that the failure to file the
proofs of claim timely "really is probably mine"! 48 3 Without remanding the matter to the bankruptcy court for a factual finding
on whether counsel's failure was indeed attributable to the form
of notice, the dissent could not reach this conclusion.484 Neither
the partnerships, their former counsel, the court of appeals, or
the majority had provided a clear explanation of the late filing:
the bankruptcy court, however, had characterized the error as the
result of the attorney's "indifference," 8 which
would remove it
45
from the scope of "excusable neglect.

By reaching for their dictionaries, both the majority and the
dissent in Pioneer Investment might be said to have addressed the
"plain meaning" of the Rule at issue. However, their disagreement over whether the phrase "excusable neglect" should be interpreted as a term of art or as the conjunction of two ordinary
words indicates a continuing confusion over the quantum of language that is susceptible to "plain meaning" analysis. Moreover,
like justice Scalia's dissent in Dewsnup,Justice O'Connor's dissent
in Pioneer Investment illustrates the invocation of "plain meaning"

considerations in the service of predictability, and thus of reduced appellate litigation in bankruptcy. Yet the narrow margin
by which this interpretation was defeated implies that even the
480 To the dissent, the ambiguity of the Court's new test "not only renders consistent application unlikely but also invites unproductive recourse to appeal." Id. at
1505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
481 Id. at 1503 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
482 Id. at 1504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
483 Id. (quoting the record).
484
485

Id.
Id.
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Court may not be able to enunciate rules of "plain meaning"
themselves sufficiently clear to preclude alternative readings of
the Code.
Nobelman v. American Savings Bank48 6
With only a passing mention of its decision in Dewsnup,
which barred "lien-stripping" of undersecured mortgages in
chapter 7 proceedings,487 the Court held one term later that the
"plain language" of § 1322(b)(2) prohibited chapter 13 debtors
from "stripping down" undersecured mortgages on their primary residences. Nobelman thereby overruled the decisions of
four circuit courts of appeals.
Justice Scalia did not lament, as he had in Wolas 4 as and Patterson,489 the "legal culture" that had given rise to those decisions. The Justice's tolerance for ambiguity in this context was
reflected by the Court's adoption of a "plausible" (rather than
definitive) interpretation of the Code section in question, and
abandonment of the "rule of the last antecedent," which itself
would have provided an alternate interpretation "quite sensible
as a matter of grammar." Indeed, despite a one-paragraph concurrence by Justice Stevens, who insisted that "the Court's literal
reading of the text of the statute is faithful to the intent of Congress," Nobelman may indicate that the "plain meaning" analysis
of the Code is substantively- rather than semantically-driven.
K.

1. Background
In 1984, the debtors executed a note in favor of the American Savings Bank (the "Bank") in the amount of $68,250.00. The
note was secured by a deed of trust on the debtors' primary residence, a condominium in a Dallas complex, and by an undivided
0.67% interest in: the common areas of the complex; escrow
funds; proceeds of hazard insurance; and rents. Six years later,
the debtors filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition. The Bank's
proof of claim, originally in the amount of $71,265.04 but subsequently amended to $71,335.04, indicated that the claim would
be secured to the extent of the Bank's security interest in the
113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
See generally Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992); see also supra notes 20473 and accompanying text.
488 See Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 534 (1991) (Scalia,J., dissenting); see
also supra note 203 and accompanying text.
489 See Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250-51 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra notes
424-25 and accompanying text.
486
487

1i993]

GRAMMARIANS AT THE GATE

1731

property, and unsecured for any remainder. °
The debtors' plan of reorganization set the value of the residence at $23,500.00, without objection, and proposed to make
direct payments to the Bank of this amount at the mortgage contract rate. Under the operation of § 506(a),49 1 the remaining
$41,257.66 of the Bank's claim would be treated as a general unsecured claim, i.e., would not be paid.49 2 In an unreported decision the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Texas,
agreeing with the objections of the Bank and the standing chapter 13 trustee, denied confirmation of the plan, on the grounds
that the bifurcation of the Bank's claim by § 506(a) was a "modification" that would violate § 1322(b)(2).49 3 Under the latter
provision, a chapter 13 plan may "modify the rights of holders of
secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in
realproperty that is the debtor's principalresidence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any
class of claims. 494
a.

The District Court Opinion

In affirming the bankruptcy court, the district court reviewed
at length the divided precedent on the issue: three court of appeals decisions supporting the debtor's plan stood against "numerous bankruptcy court[ ]" decisions to the contrary.4 9 5 In
Houghland v. Lomas & Nettleton Company (In re Houghland), 496 the
Ninth Circuit had reduced the issue to a "relatively simple" question by relying on the plain meaning of the statutory language.
Section 103(a) 497 indicated that § 506(a), and thus its division of
each undersecured claim into a "secured claim" and an "unsecured claim," were directly applicable to claims in chapter 13
490 Nobelman v. American Savings Bank (In re Nobelman), 129 B.R. 98, 99 (N.D.
Tex. 1991).

See supra note 116.
In Ron Pair, the Court had interpreted this section as "provid[ing] that a claim
is secured only to the extent of the value of the property on which the lien is fixed;
the remainder of that claim is considered unsecured." U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises,
489 U.S. 235, 239 (1989).
492 The debtors' proposed plan, however, would have cured the prepetition arrearages owed to the Bank. Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 99.
493 Id.
494 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added).
495 Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 101.
496 886 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1989).
497 Section 103(a) provides, in relevant part, that chapter 5 of title 11 applies to a
case under chapter 13 of the same title. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
491
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proceedings.4 98
Proceeding to analyze the language of § 1322(b)(2) directly,
Houghland observed that
the "other than" clause ... follows the secured claim por-

tion of the sentence and precedes the unsecured claim portion. Certainly it refers to what preceded it, and indicates that
a secured residential real estate claim will have special protection. Indeed, if the referent of the "other than" clause is not
the secured claim language which precedes it, what could the
referent be? It would be most unusual if it were the unsecured
claim language or the whole sentence. That strongly indicates
that only the "secured claim" portion is protected.4 9 9
The Ninth Circuit foresaw little prejudice to residential real estate
lenders from its decision to protect against modification only the
secured portion of an undersecured lender's claim: most of such
lenders, it noted, take care to avoid being undersecured.5 °° In addition, even if the legislative history had been relevant, commentators
had found in it only an indication that Congress had intended to
50
benefit these lenders. '
In its own examination of the question, the Third Circuit had
found "no language of [§ 1322(b)(2)] which is inconsistent with
[Hougland's] construction,"502 and agreed that the legislative history
of this section "does not provide...

much insight into the critical

498 Houghland, 886 F.2d at 1183.
499 Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 100 (quoting Houghland, 886 F.2d at 1184). The court
dismissed suggestions that Congress would have signalled such an intent by referring in the "other than" clause to a "secured claim" or to "such claim." These
constructions would have resulted in "an awkward and wooden sentence structure.... As it is, the sentence has a natural rhythm and flow that does not disturb
its clarity." Houghland, 886 F.2d at 1183.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that
Congress quite plainly has provided for the separation of undersecured claims into two components-a secured component and an
unsecured component. It has then provided for their treatment in
Chapter 13 proceedings. The secured portion has special protection
when residential real estate lending is involved. The unsecured portion does not.
Id. at 1185.
500 Id. The Court declined to specify whether its interpretation of § 1322(b)(2)
applied to "persons who are not true residential real estate lenders [who] secure
their loans by taking a security interest in a debtor's home so that they can take
advantage of the Chapter 13 provisions." Id.
501 Id.
502 Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1990),

cited by Houghland, 129 B.R. at 100.
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question here.15 ° 3 The Tenth Circuit had similarly detected "nothing in the plain language of § 1322(b)(2) which 'instructs us to go
beyond the Code's statutory definition of the term secured claim' to
protect the unsecured portion of an undersecured home mortgage." 5 4 The court of appeals had accordingly endorsed
a literal reading of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) [as] less speculative
and less quasi-legislative than attempting to ferret its meaning
from its legislative history, which ...

is not clear enough with

respect to this issue to show a "demonstrably" different congressional intent than
that indicated by the plain meaning of
50 5
the statute itself.

The district court in Nobelman, itself citing the "plain language
of § 1322(b)(2)," ' 6 rejected the analyses of these circuit courts of
appeals as "strained and unconvincing. ' 50 7 First, unlike Hougland,
the court found "an inescapable, although limited, conflict ' 50 ' be503 Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127. Tracing the evolution of § 1322(b)(2) from the recommendations of the Committee on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
which Congress had created in 1970, through the separate bills introduced in the
Senate and the House, the Third Circuit concluded that
although it is clear that [this section] was inserted on behalf of the
home-mortgage industry, the fact that the provision itself was a compromise [between the Senate's proposed restriction on the modification of not only residential but also non-residential real estate
mortgages, and the House's tolerance for unrestricted modification of
all secured and unsecured claims] suggests that the residential mortgage providers did not emerge with all the protection they may have
sought.
Id. at 128.
504 Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410, 1415 (10th Cir.
1991), quoted by Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 101. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Third
and Ninth Circuits that
an undersecured mortgage is, for the purposes of the bankruptcy
code, two claims, and only the secured claim is protected by section
1322(b)(2). More importantly, we recognize that while bifurcations,
in the literal sense, may be a modification of the mortgage represented
in the secured and unsecured claims, bifurcation is not, of itself, a
"modification" of the secured claim made impermissible by section
1322(b)(2). Indeed, the act of bifurcation recognizes, but does not
affect, the secured claim.
Id. at 1415.
505 Id.
506 Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 104.
507 Id. at 101.
508 Id. at 102 n.2. "It is clear that a limited conflict exists, in that section 506 can
be used to undermine the protection afforded by section 1322(b)(2) under the very
narrow circumstances defined by that statute." Id. at 102. Cf. Hart, 923 F.2d at
1415 n.4 (term "secured claim" as used in § 1322(b)(2) is defined by § 506(a),
thereby requiring bifurcation); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128 ("construing section
1322(b)(2) to allow bifurcation of secured and unsecured portions and to allow
modification of the unsecured portion makes it consistent with section 506, a sec-

1734

SETON HALL LI W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1636

tween § 506(a) and § 1322(b)(2), in light of which the more specific
provisions of the latter subsection should control the more general
provisions of the former.5" 9 Second, in Hougland the Ninth Circuit
had restricted § 1322(b)(2)'s operation to preventing further modification of a claim already stripped down to its secured portion,
thereby effectively rendering that subsection meaningless. 5 '0 Third,
that circuit's "plain meaning" analysis had overlooked the Code's
definition of "claim" as a "right to payment," whether such right is
secured or unsecured. 5 1' Fourth, in enacting the Code Congress
had not indicated any intent to alter the existing practice of not allowing chapter 13 debtors to modify claims secured by a mortgage
on the debtor's residence.51 2 Finally, on a policy level, the debtor
would receive an unintended augmentation of his "fresh start" if
allowed to retain any post-discharge appreciation in the property's
value.51 3
b.

The Fifth Circuit Opinion

Before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision
affirming the district court, several significant developments had
occurred. First, the Supreme Court had handed down Dewsnup v.
Timm, 5 1 4 which bars individual debtors in chapter 7 liquidation
proceedings from stripping down the liens of undersecured creditors. However, the Dewsnup holding had specifically been restricted to "the case before us," and would not necessarily
govern "all possible fact situations. ' 5 15 In addition, that decision
did not address the connotations of the phrase "allowed secured
claim" in any section of the Code other than § 506(d).5 16
tion of general applicability"); Houghland, 886 F.2d at 1184 (sections "are in harmony when read in the context of the whole statute").
509 Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 102.
510 Id.
511 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1988)).
512 Id. at 103-04 (citing In re Mitchell, 125 B.R. 5, 8 (D.N.H. 1990); In re
Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200, 203 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989). In addition, the Fifth Circuit's review of the legislative history of § 1322(b)(2) had identified a congressional
intent to provide "home mortgagor lenders, [who perform] a valuable social service
through their loans ....
special protection against modification thereof (i.e., reducing installment payments, secured valuations, etc.)." Grubbs v. Houston First
American Savings Assoc., 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted),
quoted by Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 103.
513 Id. at 104 (citing First Interstate Bank of Oklahoma, N.A. v. Woodall (In re
Woodall), 123 B.R. 95, 97-98 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1990).
514 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992). See supra notes 196-262 for an analysis of the Dewsnup
decision.
515 Id. at 778.
516 Id. at 778 n.3.

1993]

GRAMMARIANS AT THE GATE

1735

Three months after Dewsnup, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, finding that decision's construction of "secured claim"
inapplicable to § 1322(b)(2), joined the Third, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits in allowing liens to be stripped down in chapter 13 proceedings. 51 7 Two months later, reaffirming its own pre-Dewsnup
517 In Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (In re Bellamy), the court
perceived that
[t]he real question is whether the "rights" to which § 1322(b)(2) refers include the mortgagee's rights concerning its claim or its rights
with respect to its secured claim. If the former, then § 1322(b)(2) must
be read as prohibiting modification of a mortgagee's right to payment
of the full amount of its allowed claim, i.e., the amount of its note.
But construing this section of the Code in that light would be directly
contrary to one of the Code's cornerstones, aimed at making a fundamental change from the Bankruptcy Act, that treatment under the
Code turns on whether a claim is secured or unsecured, not on
whether a creditor is secured or unsecured.
962 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). According to the Second Circuit, the bifurcation of an undersecured claim under § 506(a) did not modify the
creditor's "rights," but merely resolved the manner in which the Code would satisfy the creditor's right to payment. Id. at 180.
Bellamy held that "[t]he 'other than' clause [of § 1322(b)(2)] is most logically
read to refer to those words that precede it: 'secured claims.' " Id. at 180. Not only
was there no conflict between the two sections, id., but the legislative history "indicates only that § 1322(b)(2) was designed to provide greater protection to home
mortgage lenders than other secured creditors in the Chapter 13 context. This is,
of course, plain on the face of the statute itself," as well as consistent with the
Second Circuit's reconcilation of the two sections at issue. Id. at 182.
Bellamy found Dewsnup inapplicable to chapter 13 proceedings because the Dewsnup opinion had construed "secured claim," in the context of § 506(d), as indicating a claim that was secured to any extent. By contrast, the Second Circuit read
§ 506(a)'s reference to "secured claim" to denote to the precise extent to which the
claim in question was in fact secured. Id. at 183.
For several reasons, the circuit court found that the former approach would
make § 1322(b)(2) "difficult to comprehend and would render it in conflict with the
Code's overall scheme." Id. at 183. The court raised the following considerations:
(1) § 506(d) refers only to "secured claims." However, § 1322(b)(2) refers as
well to "unsecured claims," which could be presumed to have the same meaning in
that section as in § 506(a), and thereby (circularly) to accord "secured claims" the
same meaning as in both sections.
(2) Both § 506(a) and § 1322(b)(2) involve the treatment of claims, and are to
be interpreted in light of the Code's focus on the status of claims, and not of creditors, as secured or unsecured; and deviation from this "expressed treatment of
claims (designed specifically as a change from pre-Code practice .... )" would be so
exceptional as necessarily to have been indicated explicitly by Congress either in
the Code itself or in its legislative history. By contrast, § 506(d) concerns the treatment of liens.
(3) The Dewsnup Court had declined to apply to § 506(d) the definition of "secured claim" under § 506(a), reasoning that Congress had not indicated its intent
to diverge from pre-Code practice regarding the treatment of liens. The Code directly indicates, however, that, contrary to pre-Code practice, the debtor may modify the claims of creditors that hold real property as security.
(4) Although Dewsnup prohibits lien-stripping in a chapter 7 proceeding, in
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precedent that had'allowed lien-stripping in chapter 13, the
Third Circuit cited the Second Circuit's analysis approvingly."'
Like the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that the specific
provisions of § 1322(b)(2) conflicted with, and thereby controlled, the more general provisions of § 506(a).51 9 In addition,
the language of § 1322(b)(2) prohibited the modification not of
those claims that were secured solely by a security interest in the
debtor's principal residence, but of "the rights of holders of" such
claims, whether under-, over- or fully-secured. 520 Finally, reviewing its previous examination of this section's legislative history,
the Court reiterated that Congress had "desire[d]
to afford some
52 1
protection to the home mortgage industry."

2.

Preferring "Plausible" to "Quite Sensible"
Construction

In a relatively brief opinion by Justice Thomas, the Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision. As had
the district court and the court of appeals, the Justices emphasized the focus of § 1322(b)(2) on restricting not the modifications of certain claims themselves but instead the modification of
the "rights" of the holders of those claims. However,
which a debtor's personal liability would be discharged on liquidation, a chapter 13
debtor would remain personally liable for certain obligations until he or she made
all payments called for by the plan of reorganization. Thus, lien-stripping in a
chapter 13 context would have a more significant and long-lasting impact on the
debtor's "fresh start" and chances of successful reorganization: "discharging the
unsecured portion of the debt allows the debtor to pay off the secured position of
the note at an earlier date and lessens the total debt burden." Id. at 183-86.
Even if authorizing lien-stripping would permit the debtor to benefit from subsequent appreciation in the value of the property, the Court noted, the legislative
history of § 1322(b)(2) did not oppose this outcome. "In addition, these speculative contingencies regarding fluctuating real estate prices are not sufficient to justify a result contrary to that required by the Code's language." Id. at 186.
518 In Sapos v. Provident Institution of Savings, 967 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1992), the
court followed the analysis of Bellamy, noting as well the Dewsnup Court's restriction
of its decision to "the [chapter 7] case before us." Id. (quoting Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct.
at 778). The Third Circuit concluded, in relevant part, that a "Chapter 13 debtor
with an undersecured debt, whether that debt be secured solely by residential real
estate or by realty and personalty, may resort to bifurcation under section 506(a)."
Sapos, 967 F.2d at 928. Cf Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d
123 (3d Cir. 1990); see also supra notes 502-03 and accompanying text.
519 Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 989 F.2d 483, 488 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
520 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added)).
521 Id. at 489 (citing Grubbs v. Houston First America Say. Assoc., 730 F.2d 236,
245-46 (5th Cir. 1984)). Although the court cited Grubbs, that decision had not
focused on the interplay between § 1322(b)(2) and § 506(a). Id.
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[t]he term "rights" is nowhere defined in the Bankruptcy
Code. In the absence of a controlling federal rule, we generally assume that Congress has "left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law,"
since such5 2"[p]roperty
interests are created and defined by
2
state law."
The rights protected by § 1322(b)(2) were thus those rights granted
to the creditor by the mortgage instrument, as construed and enforced under Texas law: namely, the rights to repayment, retention
of the lien, acceleration of the loan upon default, foreclosure and
public sale, and suit to recover any deficiency remaining after
foreclosure.5 23
The Court explicitly rejected the "rule of the last antecedent,"
by which the "other than" clause of § 1322(b)(2) would have been
taken to refer to the immediately preceding phrase, "secured
claims," as that term was defined by § 506(a). "We acknowledge
that this reading of the clause is quite sensible as a matter of grammar. But it is not compelled. Congress chose to use the phrase
'claim secured . . .by' in § 1322(b)(2)'s exception, rather than repeating the term of art 'secured claim.' "524 Thus, the Court found
it "also plausible," in light of the Code's broad definition of
"claim," to interpret "a claim secured only by a [homestead lien]"
as connoting both the secured and unsecured elements of the
claim.5 2 5 That, in fact, was found to be the sense of the phrase
"claim... secured by a lien" in § 506(a).526
Moreover, even if it were accepted that the debtor's stripping
down the Bank's undersecured lien to its secured portion would not
"modify" the unsecured component of the lien, it would undeniably
change the interest rate, amount of monthly payment, and/or term
of the note, thereby effecting "a significant modification of a contractual right."'5 27 In fact, neither the mortgage contract nor the
Code indicated how such a modification would be implemented. 528
522 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2110 (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55
(1979)).
523 Id. Indeed, the Court observed that "[t]hese are the rights that were 'bargained for by the mortagor and the mortgagee.' " Id. (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm,
112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992)).
524 Id. at 2111.
525 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101 (5) (1988) (defining "claim" to include any "right to
payment, whether... secure[d] or unsecured," or any "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment,
whether... secure[d] or unsecured.")).
526 Id.
527 Id.
528 Id.
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Perhaps uncomfortable with the Court's implication that the
Code "should provide less protection to an individual's interest in
retaining possession of his or her home than of other assets," Justice Stevens added in a one-paragraph concurrence that, as indicated by the Fifth Circuit's review of the legislative history of
§ 1322 (b)(2), "favorable treatment of residential mortgagees was intended to encourage the flow of capital into the home lending market."'52 9 Thus, "it . . . seems quite clear that the Court's literal
reading of the text of the statute is faithful to the intent of
5 30
Congress.
As compared to the robust analyses advanced by the Court in
its other "plain meaning" decisions (for instance, Dewsnup and Patterson), the logic of Nobelman seems curiously flabby. Dismissing the
application of a well-respected rule of statutory interpretation as
"quite sensible as a matter of grammar [but] not compelled," the
Court instead introduced a broad definition of "claim" to advance
an interpretation that it could most strongly characterize as "also
plausible ' 5 31 and, in light of certain practical considerations, "more
reasonable. '53 2 A paragraph-long digression on the debtor's ability
to pay off arrearages, and on the effect of the automatic stay on the
lender, seems extraneous.5 33 Moreover, both the omission of any
extended discussion of Dewsnup, and Justice Stevens's election to offer an explicit reconciliation of the Court's conclusion with the literal terms of the statute suggest that the "plain meaning" doctrine
is far from plain, and at its core concerns much more than mere
5 34
syntax.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 245- 46).
Id.
Cf U.S. v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1016 (1992). Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, held that because of the existence of "plausible" alternative readings
of § 106(c), which concerns the applicability to bankruptcy proceedings of the principle of sovereign immunity, that section could not be "unambiguously" construed
to impose monetary liability on the federal government. Yet Justice Stevens's dissent, which was joined by Justice Blackmun, dismissed the alternate readings as
"obviously less satisfactory-both as a matter of sound bankruptcy policy and as a
principled interpretation of the English language-than a literal reading of the statute." Id. at 1019 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Nordic Village dissent also observed
that "[t]he legislative history unambiguously demonstrates that Congress intended
the statute to be read literally." Id. at 1018 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
532 Id. at 2111.
533 Id. at 2110.
534 In one of the first judicial analyses of Nobelman, the bankruptcy court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania observed:
[I]t is important to emphasize what Nobelman did not decide. Firstly,
the Court did not rely on the reasoning employed in the context of a
Chapter 7 case in Dewsnup v. Timm [citation omitted]. It did not hold
529
530
531
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Rake v. Wade5 3 5

If the Court's unanimity, and assignment of a "plain meaning" opinion to its most junior Justice, had signalled Nobelman's
resounding rejection of an interpretation admittedly "plausible,"
Justice Thomas's opinion for the entire court in Rake v. Wade offered no such concessions. Reconciling three Code provisions to
allow postpetition interest on arrearages to holders of oversecured home mortgages that did not explicitly provide for such
interest, the Court endorsed a holistic hermeneutics.
1. Background
In this consolidated case, three married couples that had
each filed for chapter 13 protection all appealed on the same issue. Each couple was in default on a promissory note secured by
an oversecured first mortgage on its principal residence; each
had proposed a chapter 13 plan that would satisfy the schedule
set forth in its mortgage for future payments of principal and interest. Each pair of debtors also anticipated curing their default
by paying over time the missed monthly payments, as well as the
attorney's fees and default penalties, required by their mortgage.
The mortgages assessed a five-dollar late payment charge, and
provided that upon a default in payment the lender could forethat a "strip down" of a mortgagee's lien was not permissible in a
Chapter 13 case. Thus ... the Court did not hold that the reasoning
of Dewsnup applied to a Chapter 13 (or a Chapter 11) case. If the
Court had so reasoned, it would have been unnecessary for it to reach
the issue of the impact of § 1322(b)(2) upon "lien stripping" ....
Secondly, the Court did not comment on the issue of whether 11
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) was applicable to the mortgage at issue, given the
particular security interests taken therein, because the Nobelman
debtor apparently assumed or conceded that the mortgage in issue
was within the scope of § 1322(b)(2).
Hirsch v. Citicorp Mortgage Corp. (In re Hirsch), 155 B.R. 688, 689, 690 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1993).
Because the debtor/mortgagor in Hirsch had granted a security interest in
"rents," "profits," present and future "fixtures," and all "replacements and additions" to the debtor's residence, the court found that the mortgagee did not have a
claim secured "only by . . . real property," and thus that § 1322(b)(2) (and the
Nobelman analysis) did not apply. Id at 690-91. Accordingly, the debtor was permitted to utilize § 506(a) to strip down the mortgage, conditional on his being granted
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan that would pay the mortgagee's allowed secured
claim in full under § 1325(a)(5)(B) and ultimately on the debtor's obtaining a discharge. Id. at 691 (citing In re Taras, 136 B.R. 941, 949, 950 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1992)) (until Third Circuit holds otherwise, Dewsnup does not affect bankruptcy
court's duty to follow Third Circuit's construction of § 506 in Wilson, in allowing
debtors to bifurcate mortgagee's claims).
535 113 S.Ct. 2187 (1993).
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close on the property, in which case the arrearages and the
lender's costs and attorney's fees would become due and payable
immediately. These documents, however, did not explicitly require interest to be paid on such amounts.53 6
Because the debtors' proposed plans did not provide for the
payment of such interest, William Wade, the assignee of the
debtors' promissory notes and also their trustee in bankruptcy,
objected to the confirmation of their plans. Wade argued that
under § 506(b), as interpreted by Ron Pair,53 7 his nonconsensual
oversecured claim was entitled to postpetition interest. He derived further support from § 1325(a)(5), which permits a chapter
13 plan to be "crammed down" (i.e., confirmed) over the objections of the holder of an allowed secured claim if that creditor is
allowed to retain its lien on the collateral and if the plan pays the
creditor "value, as of the effective date of the plan,. . . not less

than the allowed amount of such claim. "538 The latter condition
has been interpreted as requiring the payment to the creditor of
39
the present value of his claim, including postpetition interest.5
The bankruptcy court held in each case, and the district
court affirmed (after the cases were consolidated for appeal), that
Wade was not entitled to such interest in the absence of an
explicit provision of such interest by the mortgage instruments
themselves. 540 Further, § 506(b) 541' and § 1325(a)(5) were inapId. at 2189; Wade v. Hannon, 968 F.2d 1036,1037 (10th Cir.1992)
Id. at 2189; Wade, 968 F.2d at 1037.
An alternative condition for cram-down is for the debtor to surrender the
collateral to the creditor, under § 1325(a)(5)(C).
Section 1325(a) provides that
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if536
537
538

(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien
securing such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to the
holder[.]
539 968 F.2d at 1037, citing Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427
(6th Cir. 1982). See also Rake, 113 S.Ct. at 2191 (all parties, and the United States as
amicus, agree that § 1325(a)(5)(B) requires payment to holders of allowed secured
claims of present value of their claims, which implies payment of interest).
540 Rake, 968 F.2d at 1037. See also Rake, 113 S.Ct. at 2189 (quoting district court
opinion to effect that § 1322(b)(2) and § 1322(b)(5) "do not alter the contract between the parties governing such matters as interest, if any, to be paid on
arrearage.").
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plicable to the debtors because § 1322(b)(2) prohibits the modification of "rights of holders of secured claims.., secured only by
a security interest in property that is the debtor's principal
residence.

542

a. Circuit Court Precedent
In reversing the lower courts' unpublished decisions, the
Tenth Circuit reviewed the five previous court of appeals decisions on the issue,543 four of which it opposed. It agreed only
with the analysis of the Sixth Circuit (the first to have addressed
this question), which held that the payment of interest on arrearages did not modify the agreement for the oversecured loan.5 4 4
That court of appeals had observed that under § 1322(b)(5),
"notwithstanding [§ 1322(b)(2), a chapter 13 plan] shall provide
for the curing of any default. .

.

.

"4

The payment of interest

would be "merely incident to the 'cure,' which is excepted from
the rule of section 1322(b)(2). 546 Nor should § 1322(b)(2) be
seen as an exception to a secured creditor's general entitlement
to such interest for his oversecured claim under § 506(b) and
§ 1325(a).547
Senior Circuit Judge Celebrezze's dissent from the Sixth Circuit's opinion maintained that it was the mortgage itself that defined the "curing" of a default; unless the instrument contained
an explicit provision for the payment of interest on arrearages,
to provide such interest would be to modify the parties' bargain
and to provide a windfall to the creditor.548 Moreover, the dissent attacked as "both inappropriate and unpersuasive" the majority's analogy to § 506(b) and § 1325: the mortgagee does not
have a secured or unsecured claim, as addressed by those sections, but instead has a security interest in the debtor's principal
residence, as specifically addressed by § 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5),
5 49
and as reflected in the legislative history of those sections.
541 Section 103(a) renders § 506(b) applicable to chapter 13 cases: "Except as
provided in [§] 1161, which concerns railroad cases], chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this
title apply in a case under chapter .. .13 of this title."
542 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
543 Rake, 968 F.2d at 1038-40.
544 Cardinal Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Colegrove (In re Colegrove), 771 F.2d 119
(6th Cir. 1985)
545 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988).
546 Colgrove, 771 F.2d at 122.
547 Id.
548 Id. at 123-24 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
549 Id. at 124-125 (Celebrezze,J., dissenting) (citing Congressional Record to the
effect that § 1322(b)(2) constituted a compromise between counterpart provisions
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Rejecting the Sixth Circuit's analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
five months later cited legislative history in concluding that
§ 1322(b)'s treatment of the modification of debts secured by the
debtor's home "was intended to create a special exception to section 1325(a)(5)(B), [which itself was] intended for those creditors
whose rights may be modified or whose collateral is subject to
rapid depreciation." 5 5 Other courts had read the requirement
of § 1325(a)(5)(B), that the plan provide a secured creditor with
"value, as of the effective date of the plan," as calling for the
payment to oversecured creditors of interest on past due installments. The Eleventh Circuit, though, found this section inapplicable to residential mortgages.5 5 ' If the lenders had wanted to
receive such interest, they could have incorporated a provision to
this effect into their contracts; indeed, § 1322(b)(2) would have
prevented the modification of such an arrangement.5 52
The Third Circuit agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in refusing to allow interest on arrearages.5 5 3 Like the dissent from the
Sixth Circuit's opinion, this Court found that a "cure" of the
debtor's default under § 1322(b)(5), which would reinstate a
creditor's contractual rights, did not constitute a "modification"
of those rights under § 1322(b)(2), and thus rendered inapplicable the present value test of § 1325(a)(5). 554 Indeed, to require
creditors to pay interest on arrearages in contradiction of the
terms of the mortgage instrument would "disrupt the [contractual] scheme for cure embodied in § 1322(b)[(5)]. 5 5 5 It would
also depart from the pre-Code judicial practice, which Congress
had not indicated an intent to alter, of "first, enjoining foreclosure, and then permitting cure in accordance with nonbankruptcy
in the House bill and Senate amendment on the protection of security interests in a
debtor's principal residence). See supra note 521 and accompanying text for further discussion of the legislative history of § 1322(b)(2).
550 Foster Mortage Corporation v. Terry (In re Terry), 780 F.2d 894, 896-97
(1 th Cir. 1985).
551 Id. at 896 (quoting § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) and citing Memphis Bank & Trust Co.
v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982) (section requires debtor to pay interest to
oversecured creditor interest on arrearages) and In re Corliss, 43 B.R. 176 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1984) (same)).
552 Id. at 897.
553 Appeal of Capps, 836 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1987).
554 Id. at 776 (citing In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987) (legislative history
of § 1322(b)(2), as well as similar provisions elsewhere in the Code, indicate that
debtor's cure of default was not intended by Congress to modify creditor's rights;
thus, chapter 13 debtor's right of redemption of property terminated with creditor's foreclosure judgment)).
555 Id. at 777.
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In short, the specific

provisions of § 1322(b) for home mortgagees would trump those
of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) for secured creditors in general.557
Similarly, after distinguishing between cure and modification, the Fourth Circuit, the first court of appeals to address this
issue after the Ron Pairdecision, proceeded to find Ron Pair irrelevant to the mortgage cure situation. 558 The Supreme Court had

in Ron Pairinterpreted § 506(b) to allow oversecured creditors to
incorporate into the secured portion of their claims the late
charges and attorney's fees that had been provided for in the
agreement, as well as interest. These interest amounts would become part of the creditor's secured claim whether or not the written agreement between the creditor and debtor had provided for
such interest (indeed, whether or not such an agreement had
ever existed). However, to the Fourth Circuit the adherence to
the mortgage agreement in the cure process rendered "[t]he valuation of the claim or the collateral [under § 506]... simply im-

material." 559 Unlike the other courts of appeals that had faced
the issue, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the caselaw and statutes of
the relevant state to determine whether they independently required the payment of interest on arrearages; however, this
search proved fruitless.56
The Ninth Circuit followed the analyses of the Third, Fourth
and Eleventh Circuits, and of the Sixth Circuit's dissent, in denying interest on arrearages to oversecured mortgagees with no
56 1
contractual right to such interest.

b.

The Tenth Circuit's Opinion

Contrary to "thirteen of the fifteen judges who have decided
this issue at the circuit level, and ... the writer of the principal
treatise on bankruptcy law," '5 62 the Tenth Circuit found it "incon556
557
558

Id. at 777 n.9. See also infra note 562.

559
560

Id. at 1155.

Id. at 777.

Landmark Financial Services v. Hall, 918 F.2d 1150,1154 (4th Cir. 1990).

The court concluded that "[tihe decision to rely on state law ... does not
simplify the matter because we can uncover nothing in the statutes or case law of
Virginia which clearly governs the situation involving interest on mortgage arrearages." Id.
561 Shearson Lehman Mortgage Corporation v. Laguna (In re Laguna), 944 F.2d
542 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1577 (1992).
562 Rake, 968 F.2d at 1040 (citing COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, $ 1322.90[04], at
1322-23, 1324). The Tenth Circuit quoted this commentary:
[Section] 1322(b)(5) was intended to codify the practice under which
foreclosure was enjoined during the pendency of a Chapter XIII plan
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gruous and at odds with the Supreme Court's recent admonitions
to us on how we are to read and construe statutes" to deny oversecured creditors interest on arrearages.5 63
First, the court held that a debtor's cure of default under
§ 1322(b)(5) was a modification of the creditor's rights under
§ 1322(b)(2), since it thwarted the mortgage's acceleration
clause, denied the mortgagee the right to foreclose, and subverted the mortgage's provision that all payments in default were
immediately due and payable. 564 Because the Third and Eleventh Circuits had acknowledged that the process of cure did in
fact affect the mortgagees' rights, the Tenth Circuit could only
conclude that they "must be using modification as a term of art
[without] explain[ing] the basis for creating or defining this term
of art."' 56 5 Nor did these decisions clearly differentiate between
under the former Bankruptcy Act, with the debtor given a reasonable
amount of time to cure defaults. Since that cure occurred under applicable nonbankruptcy law, the interest and costs to which the mortgagee was entitled were determined under applicable nonbankruptcy
law. Nothing in the Code or its legislative history indicates any intent
to alter those rights where a cure is effectuated under section
1322(b)(5).
...The present value tests [of § 1325(a)] compensate creditors
whose rights have been modified by reductions in payments, interest
charges or the total amount due; where a default is cured, however,
the creditor's rights are not modified. Since the contract terms remain in force (except for the injunction against foreclosure), the time
value of money is irrelevant. The creditor receives the interest,
charges and costs to which it is entitled under the contract and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Typically, the creditor is not entitled under
its contract to receive interest on previously accrued interest (compound interest) or on attorneys' fees and costs, as would result under
the Colegrove Court's decision.
Id. The Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits had cited this analysis as support for
their own reading of sections 1322(b)(5) and 1325(a). Laguna, 944 F.2d at 545
("No other circuit has adopted the majority's reasoning in Colegrove, and it has been
strongly criticized by the leading bankruptcy treatise as well"); Landmark Financial
Services, 918 F.2d at 1155 (mortgagee receives only the interest and other charges to
which it is entitled under mortgage agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law);
Capps, 836 F.2d at 775 (creditor receives interest, charges and costs to which it is
entitled under contract and under applicable nonbankruptcy law) and id. at 777 n.9
(cure historically rested on contractual provisions and on nonbankruptcy law).
563 Id. (citing Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2242).
564 Id. Contradicting mortgage instruments that require immediate repayment of
any arrearages, § 1322(b)(5) allows the plan to "provide for the curing of any default within a reasonable time."
565 Id. (citing Terry, 780 F.2d at 896 ("residential mortgages that would otherwise
permit the lender to declare the entire debt presently due, may be modified by the
plan to cure the default and reinstate regular installment payments") (emphasis
added) and Capps, 836 F.2d at 776-77 (creditor may be "adversely affected to some
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granting interest on arrearages, which had been regarded as a
modification, and affecting contractually-determined cure periods, acceleration clauses, and foreclosure rights, which had not
been so perceived.566
Second, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that in a
cure situation under § 1322(b)(5) a mortgagee's right to interest
on arrearages was predicated on the contract's terms and on
nonbankruptcy law. The cure process itself modified material
terms of the contract: "[i]t seems wholly unreasonable to eviscerate the contract provisions of acceleration and foreclosure and
then find binding the absence of a term regarding interest on
arrearages. 567 Nor could the relegation of the residential mortgagee to contractual remedies be premised on the mortgagee's
having, as the Sixth Circuit's dissent had found, 568 a mere "secur-

ity interest" rather than a "claim": both § 1322(b)(2) 569 and
§ 1322(b)(5) referred to the residential mortgagee's "claim."
Moreover, Ron Pair had construed § 506(b) to require that the
debtor pay postpetition interest on an oversecured creditor's
claim even if the contract did not provide for such interest (and
in fact, even if the lien was noncontractual); and there was no
indication that Congress had intended to treat home mortgage
claims differently.570
Finally, the Court faulted those decisions that had analyzed
the legislative history of § 1322 in this context, for not having
first determined that such inquiry was justified by the the statute's ambiguity.5 7 ' The Tenth Circuit itself found no such ambidegree by a bankruptcy and a plan of the kind here proposed," but these "incidental adverse effects . . . were regarded by Congress as insignificant when compared
with the adverse effects of modifications and other aspects of the bankruptcy
laws.").
566 Id. at 1040-41.
567 Id. at 1041.
568 See supra notes 548-49 and accompanying text.
569

Id. at 1041.

Section 1322(b)(2) refers to the modification of "the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property
that is the debtor's principal residence ..
" (emphasis added)
Section 1322(b)(5) allows a plan to "provide for the curing of any default
within a reasonable period of time and maintenance while the case is pending on
any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date
on which the final payment under the plan is due." (emphasis added).
570
571

Id. at 1041.

Id. (citing Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2200 (although court appropriately may refer to
statute's legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity, there is no need to do so
where language of statute is not unclear)). See also supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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guity: in its reading, § 1322(b)(2) prohibited modification of the
amounts of future payments, the interest rates, or the term of the
mortgage note, while the cure provision of § 1322(b)(3) authorized the modification, under a chapter 13 plan, of the note's provisions for payment of arrearages. 57 Indeed, recourse to the
legislative history would have been unavailing, since "we find no
reference to interest or arrearages, or anything that would require [residential mortgagees] to be treated less charitably than
other oversecured creditors. 5 73
2.

Finding the "Most Natural" Meaning

In affirming the Tenth Circuit's allowance of interest on arrearages, the Supreme Court used "plain meaning" techniques
first to subordinate § 1322(b) to § 506(b), thereby allowing
preconfirmation interest, and then to harmonize § 1322(b) with
§ 1325(a)(5), thus allowing postconfirmation interest.
The Court began its analysis by reviewing Ron Pair'sconclusion that § 506(b) by its literal terms "directs that postpetition
interest be paid on all oversecured claims,

collateral,5 75

' 574

to the extent of the

value of the
until the chapter 13 plan's confirmation
or effective date.5 76 Because the arrearages owed on the mortgages were "plainly" included in the trustee's oversecured
claims, "[u]nder the unqualified terms of § 506(b), [the trustee]
' ' 57 7
is entitled to preconfirmation interest on these arrearages.
Nor did § 1322(b)(5)'s provisions for the curing of defaults prohibit the inclusion of such preconfirmation interest in the allowed
amount of the arrearages to be cured under the plan. Thus, the
Court reconciled the two sections: "We generally avoid construing one provision in a statute so as to suspend or supersede an5 78
other provision.

Next, the Court examined the "plain language of the Code"
Id. at 1042.
Id. The Court noted that Ron Pair'sown examination of postpetition interest
had found no guidance in the Code's legislative history. Id.
574 Rake, 113 S. Ct. at 2191 (quoting Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 245).
575 Id. at 2187 n.4 (quoting United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988) (§ 506 denies oversecured creditors
postpetition interest to extent that such interest, when added to principal amount
of claim, will exceed value of collateral.)).
576 Id. See also id. at 2187 (citing 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
506.05, 506-43, and
n.5c to this effect, and observing that parties agreed that rights granted under
§ 506(b) are relevant only until confirmation of plan).
577 Id. at 2191.
578 Id. at 2192.
572
573

19931
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to dispose of the debtors' argument that § 1322(b) had been intended by Congress to exempt residential mortgage claims from
the present value calculation of § 1325(a)(5)(B). 579 Section
1325(a)(5) was by its terms applicable to "each allowed secured
claim provided for by the plan."1580 Determining that "[t]he most

natural reading of the phrase to 'provid[e] for by the plan' is to
'make a provision for' or 'stipulate to' something in a plan,1"'1

the Court found that the debtors' chapter 13 plans had specifically "provided for" the payment of the arrearages. 58 2 The

trustee was thus entitled to interest on the arrearages under the
"present value" analysis of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). 58 3 This conclusion was also supported by a close reading of another provision
of the Code. Although § 1328(a) provides generally for the "discharge of all debts provided for by the plan,

'58 4

§ 1328(a)(1) ex-

cerpts from discharge claims "provided for under section
1322(b) (5) of this title."' 58 5 As the Court observed, this exception

would be unnecessary unless claims subject to § 1322(b)(5) had
been considered to be "provided for by the plan." 586
With this opinion, the Court's "plain meaning" bankruptcy
decisions of the 1922-93 term came to a close.
III.

INTERNAL AMBIGUITIES OF THE "PLAIN

MEANING"

APPROACH

"[H]ere's a question for you. How old did you say

you were?"
Alice made a short calculation, and said "Seven
years and six months."
579 Id.
580 11

See supra note 554 and accompanying text.
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1988).
581 Rake, 113 S. Ct. at 2192 (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1053 (10th
ed. 1982) ("provide for" defined as "to make a stipulation or condition")).
582 "While payments of principal and interest on the underlying debts were simply 'maintained' according to the terms of the mortgage documents during the pendency of petitioners' cases, each plan treated the arrearages as a distinct claim to be
paid off within the life of the plan pursuant to repayment schedules established by
the plans." Id. at 2192-93.
583 Id. at 2193. In this connection, the Court accepted the Tenth Circuit's conclusions that a cure of a default under § 1322(b) does constitute a modification of
the mortgagee's contractual rights and that Congress did not intend § 1322(b)(2)
to be construed as a special exception for holders of home mortgage claims from
the "present value" cramdown provision of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). Id. at 2193 n.9.
584 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988).
585 Id. § 1328(a)(1).
586 Rake, 113 S. Ct. at 2193.
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Humpty Dumpty exclaimed trium-

phantly. "You never said a word like it!"
"I thought you meant 'How old are you?'" Alice
explained.
"If I'd meant that I would have said it," said
Humpty Dumpty.
Alice didn't want to begin another argument, so
she said nothing.
"Seven years and six months!" Humpty Dumpty
repeated thoughtfully. "An uncomfortable sort of age!
Now if you'd asked my advice, I'd ' have
said 'Leave off
58 7
at seven' - but it's too late now."
In the four terms since the Court decided Ron Pair,588 its conflicting hermeneutic approaches have left unsettled not only the
contextual basis for construing the Code's literal meaning but also
the conditions under which the statute's legislative history may appropriately be reviewed. Although ostensibly a significant step towards judicial predictability,5 8 9 the "plain meaning" approach has
proven to be less a cohesive, coherent method of statutory interpretation than a loose collection of principles, which themselves may
often be breached.5 9 °
The Court's "plain meaning" analysis can be seen as incorpo587 LOOKING GLASS, supra note 1, at 265-66.
588 The Ron Pair decision was handed down on February 22, 1989.
589 See Pioneer Investments, slip op. at 16 (to dissent, "indeterminacy [of the

majority's test for 'excusable neglect'] not only renders consistent application unlikely
but also invites unproductive recourse to appeal"); Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250
(Justice Scalia concurrence welcoming Court's return to "neutral and rational interpretive methodology"); Taylor, 112 S.Ct. at 1648 ("[d]eadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and they produce finality"); Dewsnup,
112 S. Ct. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Scalia dissent foreseeing "destruction of
predictability" under majority's scheme of analysis); Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 534 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (Scalia concurrence observing that "the plain text of the statute
should have made this litigation unnecessary and unmaintainable").
590 See Charles J. Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions:
The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823, 880
(1991) (recent emphasis on textualism has led to "the lack of a consistent jurisprudence in the Court's bankruptcy decisions .... [T]he Rehnquist Court appears to
drift from bankruptcy decision to bankruptcy decision."). These commentators
question another's suggestion that textualism produces greater predictability:
"such an argument can only be accepted if one also accepts the somewhat dubious
premise that the diverse persons that make up this nation's federal judiciary should,
and can, interpret language in an identical manner." Id. at 881 (citing Adam J.
Wiensch, Note, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code
Law, 79 GEO. L.J. 1831, 1857-58 (1991) (consistent use of textualist approach
reduces uncertainty over how bankruptcy courts will decide issues, and develops
"bright line rules")).
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rating material from six realms of relevance, each progressively
more inclusive and farther removed from the literal meaning of the
code section in question. Each level of this inquiry, contains inher-

ent ambiguities and contradictions.
A.

The Six Stages of "Plain Meaning"
1. One Subsection's Language in a Vacuum

At the most basic level, the "plain meaning" approach concerns the significance of the language of a single word or phrase
in a Code subsection, without reference to any other Code section or subsection, any other statute, or any legislative history,
judicial precedent, or commercial practice. However, the richness of the interconnections between Code provisions, and the
frequent interaction between the Code and other statutes, renders such analytical purity unlikely. In Barnhill, for example, the
Court's endorsement of the "date of honor" rule for identifying
preferential transfers by check hinged on its reluctance to embrace "a near-limitless expansion of the term 'conditional' " in
the Code's definition of "transfer." ' 5 9' Yet before narrowing its
focus to this point, the Court had reviewed another subsection of
the Code and a provision of the U.C.C., as well as the legislative
history of a third Code subsection.5 9 2
Moreover, the Court is divided over the quantum of statutory language to be subjected to "plain meaning" analysis. In
Dewsnup, the majority unpacked § 506(d)'s phrase, "allowed secured claims," reading it "term-by-term to refer to any claim that
is, first, allowed, and, second, secured."5 9' 3 The dissent, however,
read the phrase in its entirety, attributing to it the meaning found
in other Code sections. 594 This disagreement is also evident in
the question of whether specific phrases constitute terms of art.
For example, in Pioneer Investment, the Court began its interpretation of Rule 9006(b)(1)'s phrase, "excusable neglect," by first analyzing a collegiate dictionary's definition of "neglect"; by
contrast, the dissent based its arguments on a legal dictionary's
definition of "excusable neglect" as that phrase had emerged
over centuries of caselaw. 5 9 5 In Nobelman, the circuit court of apBarnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1391.
See supra at 354-60.
593 Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 777.
594 Id. at 778 n.3.
595 Pioneer Investment, 113 S. Ct. at 1494-95. Interestingly, the Court did not review that dictionary's definition of "excusable." See id. at 1502 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
591
592
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peals appeared to diverge over the use of the word "modifica596
tion" as a term of art.

2.

Within One Section

On a second level of inquiry, controversy has marked the
Court's decisions concerning whether the same phrase is to be
interpreted similarly in separate subsections of the same Code
section. Ron Pair59 7 and Wolas 598 viewed subsections through the

lens of the purpose and language of the section containing them.
However, in Dewsnup, Justice Scalia's dissent excoriated the majority's "one-subsection-at-a-time approach to statutory exegesis;"-"' and in Barnhill,Justice Stevens found "nothing in [their]
structure or purpose" to justify a distinction between § 547(b)'s
and § 547(c)'s meaning of "transfer." 60 0
Nor does the Court's approach to grammatical questions encourage predictability. In restricting lien-stripping of home
mortgages in chapter 13 proceedings, Nobelman jettisoned the
"rule of the last antecedent," under which an ambiguous clause
would be taken to refer to the immediately preceding clause.
The Court "acknowledge [d] that this reading of the clause is
quite sensible as a matter of grammar. But it is not compelled."' 0 ' The majority championed own interpretation less
than warmly, as "also plausible" and as "more reasonable" than
an alternative construction.6 2
3.

Across Different Sections

The method of inter-section comparison of the Code's connotations has been no better established. At least one Justice has
recognized that, although "[n]ormally, we assume that the same
terms have the same meaning in different sections of the same
statute. . . . [t]hat rule is not inexorable . . ..Indeed,
although Ron Pair"6 04 and Patterson6 1 5 detected congressional inSee supra note 565.
Ron Pair, 109 S. Ct. at 1031 n.5 (rejecting interpretation of § 506(b) that
would bring that subsection into conflict with other subsections of § 506).
598 Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 532 n.13 (§ 547(c)(2) not intended to codify "current
expense" exception to preference rule, because § 547 provided other exceptions to
address this concern).
599 Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 781 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
600 Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1393-94.
601 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111.
602 Id.
603 Id. at 1393 (Justice Stevens, dissenting) (citations omitted).
604 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242 (had Congress intended § 506(b) to apply only to
596
597
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tent behind the omission from certain Code sections of provisions that appeared explicitly in others, this negative inference
was clearly rejected in Midlantic. There, the Court read into the
abandonment power an environmental exception that did not appear in § 554's plain language but that was an existing exception
to the automatic stay. °6
Code provisions not directly at issue have been cited by both
a majority and a dissenting opinion to minimize the apparent
threat posed by the Court's interpretation of one section: those
sections indicate either that the danger is actually present (and
presumably tolerated),6 °7 or has been addressed, 608 elsewhere in
the Code. In Taylor, the Court noted the range of Bankruptcy
Rules and Code provisions that would counter a debtor's option
to declare all of his property exempt.609 Justice Scalia's dissent in
Dewsnup observed that debtors could deny creditors the appreciation in the value of collateral not only by stripping down liens in
chapter 7 cases but by applying the "cram-down" provisions of
chapter 1 1 or chapter 13.610
Also thrown into doubt has been the effectiveness of the
well-established "rule against superfluity." This principle was
most recently endorsed in Rake, which honored the Court's tendency "generally [to] avoid construing one provision in a statute
so as to suspend or supersede another provision. "611 Yet the fact
that Rake overruled four courts of appeals suggests that the rule
against superfluity is only one of several factors in the interpretaconsensual liens, it could have so indicated by use of phrase "security interest,"
which Code defines, and uses in other sections for this purpose).
605 Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2247 (because Congress has restricted scope of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to state law with regard to other sections of Code, where
it had not indicated such a restriction "applicable nonbankruptcy law" will include
federal laws); id. at 2250 (Justice Scalia's concurrence, applauding Court's return to
principle that "consistency of usage within the same statute is to be presumed").
606 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 503-04.
607 Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 785 (dissent's observation that appreciation in value of
collateral could be denied to creditors not only by stripping down liens in chapter 7
cases but by applying "cram-down" provisions of chapter 11 or chapter 13).
608 Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1648 (indicating the range of Bankruptcy Rules and Code
provisions that would minimize threat that debtor would declare all her property
exempt).
609 Id.
610 Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 785 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
611 Rake, 113 S. Ct. at 2192. Cf Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct.
1146, 1149 (1992) ("Redundancies across statutes are not unusual events in drafting, and so long as there is no 'positive repugnancy' between two laws ... a court
must give effort to both"; since giving effect to both provisions at issue would not
render either wholly superfluous, rule against superfluity did not apply).
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tion of the Code, and that the judgment that one provision is
being interpreted to suspend or supersede another may vary with
the observer. Similarly, in Patterson the Court overturned the decisions of two circuits by finding that a broad interpretation of
§ 541(c)(2) would not render superfluous § 522(d)(10)(E)'s limited federal exemption for a debtor's interest in ERISA-qualified
plans.6 12
Indeed, in Kelly, the dissent proposed that the majority had
violated this rule. To these two Justices, the finding that the
debtor's restitution payments were made to and for the benefit of
the state was justified in the case before the Court only because
the victim was a governmental unit. If the Court was in fact
adopting the broader principle that any restitution payment, to
whomever made, was to or for the benefit of the government, it
would be removing any independent meaning from this element
of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(7).613
4. In the Context of the Code's Policies
The fourth stage of "plain meaning" analysis involves consideration of the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code.
Although Patterson suggested that "policy considerations [might
not even be] relevant where the language of the statute is . . .
clear,

'6 1 4

the Court has often confronted the intrinsic conflicts

among the Code's goals. In Davenport, the Justices were reluctant
to disturb the existing balance between incentives for debtors to
seek the protectional chapter 7 rather than chapter 13.615 Examining in Wolas the "sometimes conflicting policies" underlying
the preference provisions, they concluded that "[w]hether Congress has wisely balanced [them] is not a question that we are
authorized to decide.

' 6 16

The policy factor extends to the pro-

jected use and users of the Code itself: attacking the majority's
prohibition of lien-stripping in chapter 7 proceedings, Justice
Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2248-49.
Kelly, 107 S. Ct. at 363 n.3.
Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2249.
Davenport, 495 U.S. at 563.
Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 533. The preference policies are: (1) to prevent creditors
from "racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy" and, (2) "more important," to distribute the debtor's assets equally among
creditors. Id. See Wiensch, supra note 590, at 1855-56 (One "reason supporting the
Court's textualist approach is that the Court strikes a carefully crafted balance
among competing interests."); see also id. at 2856 (citing Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 24546 ("Congress expressly chose to create ... alleged tension" by enacting, in the
face of policy of equal payments, provisions of Code regarding payments of interest
only to oversecured creditors.)).
612
613
614
615
616
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Scalia in Dewsnup emphasized that to allow such strip-downs
would not thereby render chapter 7 more attractive to debtors
than chapter 13.617

This stage of inquiry also includes arguments based on existing commercial practice, to the extent that it can be argued
that the Code should not deprive the debtor and creditors of the
benefit of their bargain. The Dewsnup decision was based in part
on the principle that a court should not rewrite mortgages that
had been negotiated and executed prepetition. ts Similarly, in
Nobelman, the Court referred to Dewsnup in defining the creditor's
rights by reference to the terms of the home mortgage at issue, as
construed and enforceable under state law; since these rights
would be modified if the undersecured mortgage lien were
stripped down, § 1322(b)(2) prohibited the debtor from reducing the creditor's claim. 619 However, this policy has not always
carried the day. In Barnhill, Justice Stevens's dissent cited "established business practices in the business community" in favoring
the "date of delivery" rather than the "date of honor" rule for
Mr
recently, Rake's expansive interpreference purposes. 620 More
pretation of § 1325(a)(5) allowed oversecured home mortgagees
interest on arrearages even though such interest had not been
provided for in the mortgage instruments. 62 '
5.

In Conjunction with Extra-Code Policies

On the fifth level of abstraction, the Court may look outside
the Code and bankruptcy policies to the goals of other statutes,
both federal and state. For example, in Midlantic, the Court observed that statutes enacted after the Code indicated Congress's
environmental concerns.622 In Kelly, the Court bowed to the policy that "federal bankruptcy courts should not invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings" or affect those courts' choice
of alternatives among imprisonment, fines and restitution. 623 In
Patterson, the Court emphasized that lenders should be given no
617 Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 785-85. Cf Tabb & Lawless, supra note 590, at 878
(faulting Toibb for failing to discuss policy issues, in light of issues regarding "the
ability of overloaded bankruptcy courts to accommodate square-peg individual
chapter 11 petitions in the round hole of the courts' dockets.").
618 Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778.
619 Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2110. This constituted the Nobelman Court's only reference to Dewsnup.
620 Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1392 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
621 Rake, 113 S. Ct. at 2189.
622 Midlantic, 109 S. Ct. at 762-63.
623 Ron Pair, 479 U.S. at 4749.
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incentive to file involuntary petitions against borrowers in order
thereby to reach their pension interests more easily, and that ERISA's protection of pension benefits should not be withheld from
debtors. 624 And in PioneerInvestment, the Court analogized to various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to construe the "excusable
25
6
neglect" provision of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) (1).

6.

Consideration of Equities

Finally, the Court may review the equities of the matter. In
particular, § 105 authorizes a bankruptcy court to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of [the Code]. 6 26 The Court has not
been eager to address the implications of this provision.62 7 In
Taylor, though holding that all objections to a debtor's claimed
exemptions must be filed within the statutorily prescribed period, whether or not they are justified by the Code or even asserted in good faith by the debtor, the Court refused on
procedural grounds to consider the application of § 105. In fact,
Justice Stevens's lone dissent suggested that consideration of the
equities would lead the Court to "readily ignore what it treats as
the insurmountable barrier of 'plain meaning.' "628
The tables were turned in Pioneer Investment, where the Court
explicitly rejected a strict reading of Rule 9006(b)(1)'s "excusable neglect," adopting instead a more lenient construction because "the determination at bottom is an equitable one, taking
account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's
omission.

' 629

In her dissent, Justice O'Connor specifically ob-

jected to the "indeterminacy [of the majority's test, which] not
only renders consistent application unlikely but also invites un63 0
productive recourse to appeal.
B.

Recourse to Legislative History

Reinforcing the textual emphasis of its "plain meaning" approach is the Court's reticence towards examining the legislative
624 Patterson, 112 S. Ct at 2248-50.
625 Pioneer Investment, 113 S. Ct. at 1496-97.
626 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988).
627 See Wiensch, supra note 590, at 1859 (perceiving textualist approach as a product of "the Court's increasingly narrow view of the equitable powers of the bankruptcy courts.").
628 Taylor, 112 S. Ct. at 1652 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
629 Pioneer Investment, 113 S. Ct. at 1498.
630 Id. at 1504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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history of Code sections. Like the "plain meaning" approach itself, the Court's restrictions on the relevance of legislative history
have had an uncertain development.
1. Tacit Incorporation of Pre-Code Precedent
In two early cases, the Court construed the literal meaning
of the Code in the light of pre-Code precedent, under the "normal rule of statutory construction... that if Congress intends for
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created
concept, it makes that intent specific." '6 3 '

Midlantic cited pre-

Code precedent in support of its imposition of environmental restrictions on the simple language of the Code provision concerning abandonment. Yet the dissent observed that this body of
precedent consisted of only three decisions, which, even if relevant, could not be presumed to have come to the attention of
Congress when it drafted the Code.63 2 In Kelly, the issue was not
the substantiality but the effect of the precedent: the Court inferred congressional agreement with pre-Code precedent that
had actually contradicted the explicit language of the earlier Bankruptcy Act. 633 Kelly noted that any intention for the Code to deviate from this precedent would have been reflected in the statute's
63 4
legislative history.

Ron Pair attempted to restrict the application of legislative
history to the interpretation of "statutory language which, at
least to some degree, [is] open to interpretation, ' 635 where
"under the proposed interpretation, [the Code provision is] in
clear conflict with state or federal laws of great importance. 63 6
However, the Court indicated neither the requisite degree of ambiguity that could exist, nor the criteria for a "clear conflict," nor
the factors that would qualify laws as of "great importance."
(Presumably, any issue on which the circuit courts of appeal had
split would qualify, Justice Scalia's disappointment with the prevMidlantic, 474 U.S. at 501.
Id. at 512 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
633 Kelly 479 U.S. at 45-47.
It is questionable whether the explicit tilt of the present Court, at least in theory, towards the "plain meaning" of the Code will prevent current drafters of Code
revisions from arguing that Congress, in enacting these measures, will be deemed
to have approved tacitly of existing bodies of opinions that diverge from this literal
approach to the current statutory language.
634 Id. at 51.
635 Ron Pair, 109 S. Ct. at 1032.
636 Id.
631

632
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alent "legal culture '"637 notwithstanding.) In fact, in Toibb, Justice Stevens's dissent suggested, without citing the Ron Pair test,
that the majority's logical interconnection of various Code sections to extend chapter 11 protection to individuals could be undone by a simple ambiguity that would broaden the scope of
inquiry to include both other Code provisions and the Code's
legislative history.63 8
Curiously, in WolasJustice Stevens himself engaged in an extended analysis of the legislative history of § 547, construing Ron
Pair as indicating that, "[g]iven the clarity of the statutory text,
respondent's burden of persuading us that Congress intended to
create or preserve a special rule for long-term debt is exceptionally heavy." ' 6 39 Indeed, in the face of straightforward statutory

text, 6 0 Ron Pair would have precluded an examination of legislative history, especially where the proposed interpretation here, that payments on long-term as well as short-term debt qualify for the ordinary course of business exception to the trustee's
power to avoid preferences- is not "in clear conflict with state
or federal laws of great importance."" The Court's indulgence
in this analysis is all the more puzzling given its enunciation in
Wolas of the general principle that "[t]he fact that Congress may
not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its
637 See Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250 (ability of three courts of appeals to interpret
"applicable bankruptcy law" as excluding federal law "calls into question whether
our legal culture has so far departed from attention to text, or is lacking in an
agreed-upon methodology for creating and interpreting text, that it any longer
makes sense to talk of'a government of laws, not men.' "); Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 534
("It is regrettable that we have a legal culture in which such arguments [as the
distinction between long-term and short-term debt, where the Code addresses
neither] have to be addressed (and indeed are credited by a Court of
Appeals) ..
")
638
Section 109(d) .... states that "only a person that may be a debtor
under Chapter 7... may be a debtor under Chapter 11 .. " (Emphasis added.) It does not, however, state that every person entitled to
relief under Chapter 7 is also entitled to relief under Chapter 11. In
my judgment, the word "only" introduces sufficient ambiguity to justify a careful examination of other provisions of the Act [adopting the
Code], as well as the legislative history.
Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2202 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
639 Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 530 (citing Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 241-42).
640 Justice Scalia's concurrence found the statute "utterly devoid of language that
could remotely be thought to distinguish between long-term and short-term debt."
Id. at 534 (Scalia, J., concurring).
641 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 245.
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plain meaning.""64
For its part, Dewsnup, in reviewing the legislative history of
§ 506(d), interpreted Ron Pair as indicating that "this Court has
been reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the
Code, however vague the particular language under consideration might be, to effect a major change in pre-Code practice that
is not the subject of at least some discussion in the legislative
history."643 "Of course," the Court added, "where the language
is unambiguous, silence in the legislative history cannot be controlling." 64 4 But it did not find that § 506(d) met that standard of
clarity.6 45
In his dissent, Justice Scalia found that "[a]lmost point for
point, today's opinion is the methodological antithesis of Ron
Pair- and I have the greatest sympathy for the Court of Appeals
who must predict which manner of statutory construction we
shall use for the next Bankruptcy Code case."' 64 6 Not only did

Wolas indicate that deference should be granted to the congressional redrafting of the provision in question, but in Ron Pair,
"[h]aving found a 'natural interpretation of the statutory language [that] does not conflict with any significant state or federal
interest, nor with any other aspect of the Code,'

. . .

we deemed

the pre-Code practice to be irrelevant.'"
In Barnhill, the Court saw Toibb as holding that "appeals to
statutory history are well-taken only to resolve 'statutory ambiguity' "; and it accordingly denied that such ambiguity surrounded
the question of whether the "date of honor" or the "date of delivery" should be used for avoidance of transfers by checks as
preferences .64 8 "But even if legislative history were relevant, the
statements on which petitioner relies, by their own terms, apply
only to § 547(c), not § 547(b)." 649 In his dissent, Justice Stevens
seemed to infer such ambiguity from the unanimity of the courts
of appeals decisions that had adopted the "date of delivery" rule
for purposes of § 547(c): he noted that these decisions "are consistent with the legislative history, which, though admittedly not
conclusive, identifies the date of delivery of a check as the date of
642
643

Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 531.
Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779.

644

Id.

645

Id.

646
647
648

649

Id. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 245) (citations omitted).
Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1391 (quoting Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2200).

Id.

1758

SETON HALL I

transfer for purposes of § 547(c).

W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1636

65 °

The Court in Pattersonfound dispositive the plain meaning of
§ 541(c)(2)'s reference to "nonbankruptcy law," as including
both state and federal law. Although Toibb stood for the principle that "courts 'appropriately may refer to a statute's legislative
history to resolve statutory ambiguity,' ",651 in Patterson, as in Ron
Pair, that "the clarity of the statutory language [in qustion] obviates the need for any such inquiry. "652 Moreover, the Court indicated that even if it were to review the legislative materials, it
would find no clear indications that the import of the statute was
contrary to its plain meaning.6 53
Indeed the "meager excerpts" available "[b]y no means ...
provide a sufficient basis for concluding, in derogation of the
statute's clear language, that Congress intended to exclude other
state and federal law from the provision's scope. "654
Each of these three "plain meaning" decisions addressed the
connotations of common words or phrases that have not been
explicitly redefined by the Code. Perhaps because of the equitable considerations involved in its examination of "excusable neglect", in Pioneer Investment the Court delved deeply into "the
history of the present bankruptcy rules," without any references
to Toibb or Ron Pair.6 5 5 In Nobelman, although the Court's focus
on "rights" and on grammatical constructions did not concern
the Code's legislative history, Justice Stevens in a one-paragraph
concurrence observed that this perspective could resolve the apparent "anomaly" that "the Bankruptcy Code should provide
less protection to an individual's interest in retaining possession
of his or her home than of other assets. ' 6 56 Finally, Rake, which
was concerned largely with determining the appropriate definitions of "rights," "cure," "modification," and "provide for," did
not mention legislative history.6 5 7
2.

Utility of Congressional Statements and Reports

Even if legislative history is deemed germane to interpreting
the Code, questions remain regarding the extent to which state650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657

Id. at 1393.
Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2248 (quoting Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2200).
Id. (citing Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2200; Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241).
Id.
Id.
Pioneer Investment, 113 S. Ct. at 1495.
Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Rake, 113 S. Ct. at 2187 (1993).
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ments made on the floor of Congress, and House or Senate Reports themselves, can be taken to indicate legislative intent. Of
the decisions previously analyzed, several have briefly evaluated
congressional statements and reports on the Code provisions in
question, whether or not such legislative history was formally
deemed relevant. Generally, such examinations have produced
little direct history, and have thus been useful only to discount
allegations of an intent to change pre-Code practice.658
In Hoffman v. ConnecticutDep't of Income Maintenance,659 a notably fractured Court held that § 106(c) does not authorize a bankruptcy court to issue a money judgment against a state. Under
the relevant law, such a judgment could be effected only if Congress had made "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" its intention to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit in federal court.66 ° Justice White's plurality
opinion, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and
Justice Kennedy, rejected as irrelevant legislative history arguments based on floor statements regarding this provision. 66 ' Ac-

cording to the Court, "[li]f congressional intent is unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute, reliance on committee reports and floor statements will be unnecessary, and if it is not,
' 662
[this textual standard] will not be satisfied.
Justice Stevens,joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote a separate
opinion "to explain why the legislative history of § 106 lends ad658 Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2248 (maintaining that House and Senate reports "contain only the briefest of discussions addressing § 541(c)(2)," insufficient to overcome the provisions plain meaning); Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1391 (positing that
statements on which petitioner relies, by their own terms, apply to different subsections of the Code than are at issue); Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779 (asserting that
House report indicates "full understanding of [pre-Code] practice," but not intent
to grant broad new remedy to debtor); Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 533 n.14, n.15 (legislative history does not mention rule in question; House Committee Report concludes
that pre-Code law is "hopelessly complex," thereby undercurring arguments that
Code intended to preserve pre-existing law); Toibb, 111 S. Ct. at 2200 (citing "scant
legislative history of this precise issue" and "apparently conflicting views" in such
history as had been produced); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 243 n.6 (opining that neither
Committee Reports nor statements by managers of legislative discuss relevent
question at all) and at 254 (no statement expressing intent to work major change in
pre-Code law); Kelly, 479 U.S. at 50-51 (noting no indication in House and Senate
Reports supporting proposed interpretation).
Some decisions of the Rehnquest Court, however, have addressed in depth the
relevance of such legislative history.
659 Begier v. U.S., 496 U.S. 53, 64 n.5 (1990).
660 Id. at 65 (quoting 124 CONG. REV. at 32417 (remarks of Rep. Edwards)).
661 Id. at 66 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 373 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6329).
662 Id. at 70 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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ded support to [the]. reading of the statute" that had been advanced injustice Marshall's dissent, which these two Justices and
Justice Brennan had joined. 66' This opinion relied heavily on the
floor statements of the House and Senate sponsors (Rep. Edwards and Sen. DeConcini) to the effect that § 106, as proposed,
had permitted the bankruptcy courts to bind governmental units
or matters other than the amount and dischargeability of tax liabilities owing by the debtor or the estate, and authorized the
courts to subject the government to the avoidance of preferential
transfers .664

The next term, Justice Marshall's majority opinion on the interpretation of § 541 noted that "[b]ecause of the absence of the
conference and the key roles played by Representative Edwards
and his counterpart floor manager Senator DeConcini, we have
treated their floor statements on the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as
persuasive evidence of congressional intent.

' 66 5

In particular,

because the Code did not specifically address the avoidance of
voluntary prepetition payments of trust fund taxes, the Court focused on Representative Edwards' remark that "[t]he courts
should permit the use of reasonable assumptions under which
the Internal Revenue Service, and other tax authorities, can
demonstrate that amounts of withheld taxes are still in the possession of the debtor at the commencment of the case." 66 6 That

"reasonable assumption" was provided in a House Report which
indicated that a payment of withholding taxes would generally
not be seen as a preference.667
Yet Justice Scalia's concurrence, though arriving at the same
conclusion though "the standard tools of legal reasoning," attacked the majority's "scouring the legislative history for some
scrap that is on point and therefore ipsofacto relevant, no matter
how unlikely a source of congressional reliance or attention).6 68
There was no indication in the record he charged, that Representative Edwards's remarks had been heard by anyone except the
presiding officer, or even that they had been made on the floor
rather than having been retroactively inserted into the CongresId. at 67-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 69 (Scalia,J., dissenting). The dissent dismissed these documents as "a
kind of legislative-history 'rider' that even the most ardent devotees of legislative
history should ignore." Id.
667 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1016 (1992).
668 To be effective, waivers of the governmen's sovereign immunity must be
"'unequivocally expressed.' " Id. at 1014 (citations omitted).
663
664
665
666
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sional Record.669 Moreover, these statements (on the tracing of
tax trust funds for bankruptcy purposes) were not directly relevant to the House proposal at issue.6 0 To this Justice, "Congress conveys its directions in the Statutes at Large, not in
excerpts from the Congressional Record that do not clarify the
text of any pending legislative proposal." '6 7 ' In addition, Justice

Scalia found it "both demeaning and unproductive for us to ponder whether to adopt literal or not-so-literal readings of Commit672
tee Reports, as though they were controlling statutory text.
In United States v. Nordic Village Inc. ,673 Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, rejected questions of legislative history as irrelevant to the question of whether § 106(c) imposed mandatory liability on the federal government unambiguously: 674 "if clarity
does not exist [in the statutory text], it cannot be supplied by a
committee report. ' 6 75 However, Justice Stevens' dissent, which
was joined by Justice Blackmun, found that the statements of
Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini indicated a
"congressional purpose to waive sovereign immunity [that] is
pellucidly clear."'6 76 Unusually, the opinion would have used leg-

islative history to support a literal reading of the statute.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Though the Court's "plain meaning" approach to interpreting the Bankruptcy Code threatens to exclude considerations of
legislative history, the gate is not yet closed. The dramatic rise
over the last decade in the number and sophistication of bankruptcy filings has brought the Code's myriad ambiguities to the
attention of more and higher courts, and has spawned a series of
proposals for the statute's revision. Moreover, bankruptcy issues
and policies are increasingly colliding with judicial interpretations of recent federal and state enactments in such disparate
669 Id. at 1016.

670 Id. at 1018 (citing 124 CONG. REC. 32394 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards);

124 CONG. REV. 33993 (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (both to effect that § 106(c)
covered, in addition to determination of amounts and dischargeability of debtor's
tax liability, matters such as avoidance of preferential transfers)).
671 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989).
672 Id. at 2822 (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 474 U.S. 234, 242
(1985)).
673 Id. at 2823 (citing statements of Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini to the effect that "[§] 106(c) permits a trustee or debtor in possession to assert
avoiding powers under title I I against a governmental unit").
674 Id. at 2824.
675 Id. at 2827 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
676 Id. at 2828 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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fields as environmental, tax and labor law.6 7 7
Against this backdrop, the attempt of the "new literalism" to
extract the "natural" sense 6 78 of a statute that may have "little to
do with natural justice ' 6 79 should continue to encourage both
carefully-worded legislation and creatively-argued litigation. It
remains to be seen, however, whether the Code or the "plain
meaning" approach itself will present the greater hermeneutic
challenge.
"It seems very pretty," [Alice] said when she had
finished Labberwocky], "but it's rather hard to understand!" (You see, she didn't like to confess, even to
herself, that she couldn't make it out at all.) "Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas - only I don't
know exactly what they are!"6 8 °
-MAlice, upon reading Jabberwocky.
677 See Walter A. Effross, The "Broken Bench" of Bankruptcy Law, 44 HARV. L. BULL.
26 (1993).
678 See Rake, 113 S. Ct. at 2192 (identifying "[tihe most natural reading" of
§ 1325(a)(5)); Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 1498 (rejecting construction of Rule
9006(b)(1) that "would ignore the most natural meaning of the word 'neglect' ");
Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2246 (reviewing "[t]he natural reading" of § 541(a)(1)); Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 782 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's construction of
§ 506(d) as fostering unnatural reading of that subsection); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at
241, 249 (endorsing "natural reading" of § 506(b)); Kelly, 479 U.S. at 44 (considering "most natural construction" of § 63 of Bankruptcy Act).
679 Dewsnup, 112 S.Ct. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
680 LOOKING-GLAss,

supra note 1, at 197.

